The cease-fire was reached in bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, which is the correct route for progress toward peace. However, the cease-fire and the peace initiative were very likely coordinated with the United States. It could hardly be a coincidence that US Secretary of State Rice has flown to the Middle East to "jumpstart" the peace process that was already jump started.

Olmert's offer, made in a memorial speech for David Ben-Gurion, includes both a "carrot" and a stick:

You must stop the terror, violence and efforts to harm Israeli
citizens in the south, center and north, recognize our right to live in peace and security next to you, and relinquish your demand for the realization of the right of return. It is a right goal, a natural goal, an attainable goal.

If you demonstrate the necessary determination and discipline, you will find in us a ready partner. The State of Israel is a powerful State. Do not be fooled by our internal differences, our political rivalries or the gloomy atmosphere which we sometimes project.

In a violent battle, we will prevail, even if it is lengthy and even if it claims many victims; even if it involves compromises on comfort or quality of living, the State of Israel has proven its strength in the past and is prepared for it today.

Do not put us to another test, which will involve many casualties and destruction, and which will lead to total hardship and despair.

To be sure, the offer was not made by Ehud Olmert only out of the goodness of his heart. Limited, but nonetheless brutal, IDF operations in the Gaza strip had done nothing either to halt the smuggling of arms or to stop the senseless daily rain of Qassam rockets on Sderot, which claimed two more lives and numerous casualties in a brief period. An IDF bombardment of Beit Hanoun killed 19 civilians by accident, providing another occassion for U.N. condemnations of Israel. Meanwhile, the suffering caused in Gaza by the Israeli operations was uniting the Palestinians, consolidating support for the Hamas led government, and turning world opinion against Israel. The fact that Israel had withdrawn unilaterally from Gaza was being quickly forgotten, and European capitals were floating peace plans that essentially gave the Hamas government everything it asked for.

As the moderate stance of PM President Mahmoud Abbas weakened, Abbas and the Hamas were reported to be close to agreeing on a unity government that would not concede the right of Israel to exist or agree to accept the validity of previous agreements with Israel. The Quartet and the US might well be tempted to recognize this government, and end the boycott of the Palestinian Authority. This was all the more likely because the US will be seeking Arab support for its new policy in Iraq, whatever that might be.

The Israeli government finally recognized that there is no military solution in Gaza short of reconquering the entire Gaza strip and removing the Hamas government by force. At present, this option, advocated by extremists, is totally unrealistic. Israel lacks the international support that would make such an operation possible, it lacks confidence in its army after the lackluster performance in Lebanon, and it lacks internal support for an operation that would undoubtedly claim many Israeli and Palestinian lives. The vaunted military solution would probably turn into another fiasco like this summers war in Lebanon.

Even that military operation would not be a "solution." It would have to be accompanied by a sound diplomatic plan of reconstruction that would reinstate Palestinian self-rule on a basis that would make progress toward a peaceful democratic state possible. Absent such a plan, it would at best force a UNIFIL policed solution. Behind the umbrella of international peace keeping troops, Hamas would continue to build political support and military prowess, just as Hezbollah is doing in Lebanon.

Signficantly, Olmert's speech included acknowledgement of the Arab peace plan, which has been hitherto largely ignored by Israeli governments:

: The voices emanating from those States regarding the need for recognition and normalization of relations with the State of Israel – including, for example, some parts in the Saudi peace initiative – are positive, and I intend to invest efforts in order to advance the connection with those States and strengthen their support of direct bilateral negotiations between us and the Palestinians.

Reactions to Olmert's offer were fairly predictable. Israeli hawks noted with dismay that the cease fire does not extend to stopping of arms smuggling. Some lamented that Olmert had "sold out" the country.
Mahmoud Abbas welcomed the initiative. It remains to be seen if he can deliver a real cease fire in Gaza and a move toward ending all terror activity, as well as political concessions like giving up the right of return that would make peace possible. From his exile in Damascus, Khaled Meshaal, the real leader of the Hamas, stuck to his guns, literally and figuaratively, offering a long term "Hudna" without recognizing Israel, and promissing a renewal of violence if Palestinians do not achieve a state "really soon." The Hamas formula of "Land for Nothing" is not going to go anywhere as it is.

The reactions of different politicians, "peace" groups and political commentators to the initiative is probably a good litmus test of their sincerity in espousing peace.

Beyond that, prospects for progress are not bright. We can realize the difficulties, by contemplating the improbability of what would be the most minimal long term non-solution. It is not good, but it is better than nothing, and better than what there is now. Whether or not it is feasible depends on political logic. Given that this is the Middle East, and political logic is what it is here, we can't give it very great chances of success. This solution would contain approximately the following elements, borrowed from all the different plans and policies:

1- Israel would withdraw from a large part of the West Bank, but not from Jerusalem or the large settlement blocks such as Ariel and Gush Etzion. This would be a "Geneva Plan" minus.

2- Palestinians would get an entity that would be close to a state. This entity would recognize the right of Israel to exist, but would not grant Israel full diplomatic recognition. It would be demilitarized. It would have a single unified security force and all the armed groups would be disarmed. It would be pledged to maintain peace and stop incitement. Probably this Palestinian entity would have a UNIFIL type force that would keep the peace on both sides, and it might be a joint UN trusteeship of several states. The Palestinians could achieve statehood if they demonstrated the ability to maintain order and keep the peace.

3- Israel would also withdraw from the Golan heights, but not to the border of the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee) as the Assad government desires. Syria would stop supporting the Hamas and Hezbollah, and cease its efforts to destabilize Lebanon and Iraq.

4- The EU and US would sponsor a program to resettle and compensate Palestinian Arab refugees, as well as an aid package for the Palestinian entity.

5-Arab states would end the trade boycott of Israel, and sign non-belligerence agreements with Israel.

6- The Haram as Sharif - Temple Mount would become an international territory, jointly administered by Israel and Jordan, since the Hashemite family have never abandoned the positions of custodian of the Haram as Sharif.

7-"Impossible" questions such as Jerusalem and right of return would be postponed for quieter times.

This non-solution would allow Israel, the Arab Palestinians and the Arab countries to provide a better life for their citizens. It would end the misery of the Arab Palestinian refugees. It could create an atmosphere that would lead to a peaceful solution, not in five years perhaps, but in fifty. Meanwhile, nobody would give up their principles and nobody would need to make concessions that are really politically impossible. Syria would not immediately give up its claim to the Sea of Galilee, and Palestinians would not give up their claims to that part of the Jerusalem that was to be internationalized under the UN partition plan or to the "right" of return. It is probably a utopian dream, though it is less of a dream than the Palestinian state that is contemplated by the Bush admnistration and the quartet under the road map. We can all see the flaws and problems in both "plans." Understanding why even this non-solution will not happen gives us a much better insight into what is so sadly wrong in the Middle East.

Ami Isseroff