Those who adopt the impasse approach include both the average pessimistic citizen and those who want to deal with Hamas in a way that will cause it to fail in running the government (such as the Israeli right wing groups). These groups want to use Hamas' electoral success as a justification for maintaining the status quo and not making any move in the direction of ending the occupation. Rather, they prefer to deepen the occupation by methods such as disconnecting the West Bank from the Gaza Strip, creating a permanent buffer zone in Gaza, closing the Gaza Strip completely by prohibiting its residents from any movement to the outside world, and continuing to construct the separation barrier in the West Bank surrounded by new buffer zones. Other methods include preventing Palestinians from entering the Jordan valley, which represents one-third of the land area of the West Bank, expanding the population of the big settlement blocks in West Bank and taking control of all of Jerusalem, while transforming the checkpoints located in the territories occupied in 1967 into 'terminals', as if these terminals represented international border crossings. In other words, this approach (in its right-wing Israeli version) wants to exploit Hamas' success in order to give Israel a free hand in implement whatever it likes on the ground, with the justification that there is no Palestinian partner. The freezing of the Israeli realignment plan after the July 2006 war in Lebanon gave further momentum to this position.

The second approach is expressed clearly by the Islamic Jihad, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and a part of Hamas who believe that Jihad is the shortest way to "liberate" Palestine, with the hope that the "Mujahedin" (holy warriors) from other Islamic and Arab countries will join in a "holy war" against Israel. These groups justify their approach by the failure of the Oslo peace process to provide the Palestinians with statehood; therefore they want to move from negotiations to resistance/Jihad in order to obtain to this statehood.

This second approach has different interpretations: one of them calls for full Jihad against Judaism and not only Israel (the Al-Qaeda approach); the second calls for armed struggle/Jihad to end the occupation without recognising Israel (The Islamic Jihad); and a third approach (Hamas) calls for Jihad in the broader sense which includes personal Jihad (building yourself as a Muslim), social-economic Jihad (building social solidarity between Muslims and building the economy), and political Jihad (building the Islamic political structures, steadfastness and a rejection of concessions when it comes to what are considered to be rights). In this sense, armed resistance is not itself THE Jihad according to Hamas terminology, but only a small part of it. Moreover, this small part can be, according to Hamas, frozen either temporarily through a lull (Tahdiya), or permanently or semi-permanently through a Hudna (long-term cease fire). In this regard, one should carefully note this new terminology, which the secular democratic intellectuals may not be aware of, resulting in them reaching misleading conclusions due to ignorance. It should be further noted that, according to Hamas terminology, a lull can be declared unilaterally. A lull would mean that Hamas would not initiate attacks, but would reserve the right to respond to attacks by the other side. Practically speaking, in the last two years Hamas has been the most committed Palestinian faction towards the lull with Israel, not even retaliating to the Israeli attacks on its members, which represents a difference between what Hamas says and what it practices. On the other hand, the Hudna that Hamas calls for is an Islamic term inherited from the experiences of the Prophet Mohammed. This term refers to a contract that will be agreed upon by two or more sides. Thus, the idea of the Hudna includes negotiations and conditions that would be included in the contract of the Hudna. In this sense, according to Hamas leaders, Israel can come to Hudna negotiations and ask for the idea of enacting a permanent Hudna to be included in the Hudna contract – that is, the Hudna would never expire. This Islamic interpretation of the meaning of the Hudna should be understood by the secular community, particularly because it includes an acceptance of negotiations with the other side about the content of the Hudna the moment that the other side (ie the Israelis) are ready to recognise the rights of Palestinians to statehood.

The "Threat" Versus "Challenge" Approaches Vis-a-vis Hamas' Success
Upon an analysis of the first and the second strategic approaches towards dealing with the Hamas success, two scenarios were developed. One saw Hamas as a threat to peace with Israel and to the stability of the Middle East and concluded that Hamas should be caused to fail by halting international aid to the Palestinian people, with the assumption that this would lead to the Palestinian people revolting against Hamas and bringing down the government. The second scenario sees Hamas' success as an opportunity and therefore, those who believe in the second scenario are ready to work with the challenge to moderate Hamas politically and democratise it internally.

The first scenario carries many risks, which are not limited to the following: first, the assumption that the people will hold Hamas responsible for the halting of international aid may be proven incorrect - people may revolt against Israel and the West, since it is they who will stop the aid, not Hamas. Second, this strategy will be accompanied on the ground by Israeli policies to retain Greater Jerusalem and build the wall, thereby reinforcing the belief that Israel is the enemy and not Hamas. Again, any possible revolt will be against Israel in the shape of a third, and very violent Intifada. Third, the assumption that the Hamas government and members will suffer because of the withdrawal of aid has absolutely no basis; smuggling money, like smuggling weapons in the last decades, Hamas and its members managed financially through all the years before their election to the Palestinian Parliament without international funding. In this case it is the Palestinian people who will suffer, because of the end of salary payments to PA staff (most of the staff are Fatah members and average citizens) and the removal of the support to education, health and social security, the three fields that receive the majority of the international funding after the salaries. Fourth, the assumption included in this scenario, of recruiting Fatah to work with Israel and the USA against Hamas, will lead to the fragmentation of Fatah between those who will cooperate with Israel, those who cooperate with the USA, those who stay neutral and those who will ally themselves with Hamas. In the event of such fragmentation, the idea of Fatah's unity replacing Hamas when the latter fails will evaporate. Additionally, the Palestinian people will hold Fatah responsible for allying with Israel and the USA against part of its people. Fifth, this scenario will also encourage internal Palestinian clashes between Fatah and Hamas, unless both of them unite against Israel.

The Opportunity-Challenge Approach
With all of that said, it appears that other options should be considered, namely the third approach of dealing with Hamas' success as a challenge, taking into consideration the opportunities. First and foremost, Hamas is a product of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which calls for peaceful ways to bring people to Islam; it is not an Al-Qaeda or a Taliban-type terrorist group that is ready to kill whoever disagrees with them. Hamas also has, as all Muslim Brotherhood Sunnis do, a lot of problems with the Iranian Shi'ite regime. Moreover (as its leaders in Gaza told a Dutch delegation on 11 March 2006) Hamas is very likely to follow the Turkish Justice and Development Party model of bringing Islam and democracy together. Second, being an Islamic organisation, Hamas can give a broader Islamic legitimacy, in addition to the Palestinian national legitimacy, to any agreement that it might reach with Israel, which will make such an agreement significantly more solid and sustainable. Third, Hamas is ready for a long term Hudna with Israel, and is also ready to renew the Tahdiya (lull). Fourth, Hamas now has the leadership of the Palestinian people; it may also take over the PLO if Abu Mazen fulfils his promises to Hamas during the Cairo Palestinian National dialogue in 2005, ie to give Hamas representation in the PLO institutions according to the representation Hamas got in the PLC elections.

Dealing with this challenge as an opportunity will require working closely with Hamas through a positive and constructive communication process in order to gain an agreement with Hamas on many issues. The first issue is to gain recognition by Hamas of the Palestinian 1988 Declaration of Independence and political program. Second, Hamas should recognise the Arab Peace Initiative of 2003. Third, gain recognition by Hamas of the UN resolutions with regards to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Fourth, gain Hamas acceptance of previously enacted laws and the status of Shariah in the existing laws, rather than them moving towards greater Islamisation. This should include not changing the existing education laws and the laws regarding women's rights.

These issues should not be brought to Hamas as conditions or pressures, but should rather be the subjects of dialogue and patient, long-term processes of constructive communication.

A coalition of the Arab League, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and probably Malaysia and Indonesia should work with Hamas on these issues. These countries should work in co-ordination with the USA and the EU. However, it is very important to understand that the USA should refrain from exerting direct pressure on Hamas by itself, because this will be counter-productive. The USA should use the good offices of the Arab and Islamic countries mentioned above, who can work with Hamas more effectively. Israel should most definitely not interfere and try to deal with Hamas on its own.

Still, the question remains: how will a political resolution move towards a Palestinian state beside Israel?

Scenarios of a Political Move
Several political plans are in the offing, some of them leading to Palestinian statehood and some not. The three following scenarios are likely (taking into consideration the positions of Israeli political parties who might lead Israel in the coming four years), but none of them lead to a Palestinian state beside Israel.

Scenario One:
Israel partially disengages with the settlements, with the continuation of the occupation (the realignment plan of Olmert). This scenario includes dismantling all the settlements east of the wall, while keeping the Israeli Army in the area for security reasons and, at the same time, keeping the big settlement blocks and Greater Jerusalem in the hands of Israel. This scenario was moved from the Israeli political table after last war in Lebanon.

The results of this scenario, which was supported by the leaders of the centrist Kadima Party and justified by the unwillingness to make concessions to a Hamas-led government, will include: continuation of the occupation, continuation of the separation between the West Bank and Gaza, continuation of the wall and the build up of the big settlements blocks and all the other aforementioned policies. With that, the Palestinian response will be a refusal to recognise the existence of Israel as an independent state until it recognises the same right for the Palestinians. The strong likelihood of a third violent Intifada cannot be excluded in this scenario, with the idea of Jihad gaining more support.

If this scenario is presented as an offer for negotiation with the Palestinian President Abu Mazen, and considering the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, it will be considered a non-starter; therefore Israel will either implement it unilaterally with all the results mentioned above, or remove it completely from the table.

If implemented unilaterally by Israel, this scenario might lead the Palestinians to dissolve the PA and to replace it with a National Unity leadership that will lead the resistance against Israel.

Scenario Two:
Israel partially disengages with the settlements, along with the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders as stated in the second stage of the Road Map. This scenario is less likely than the first, because the Israeli government might consider the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders in the area east of the wall as a concession to Hamas. In the unlikely chance that this scenario will be implemented, the Palestinians will consider it problematic because it includes the same deficiencies as scenario one, therefore the results will be Jihad, resistance and a third violent Intifada. This option will not be considered by Abu Mazen as a basis for negotiation. While he has declared several times that he wants to negotiate about the permanent status, it should be noted that the state with provisional borders is an option and not obligatory according to the Road Map.

Scenario Three:
Israel partially disengages from the settlements and transfers the area east of the wall to an International Peacekeeping Force. This scenario has the same deficiencies as the previous ones. It will create Palestinian resistance against Israel in order to "liberate" Jerusalem and the big settlement blocks. It might also lead to clashes between the Palestinians and the international forces, who will be considered by the Palestinians as a new occupying power and also as protectors of the Israeli occupations in the other areas retained by Israel.

Alternative Scenario:
This alternative scenario is built on the assumption that both peoples have an equal right to exist and also equal rights with regard to peace, security and personal safety for all citizens on both sides. With these assumptions, the above-mentioned challenge of working with Hamas for political moderation and democratisation should be transformed into a plan of action, in which all parties concerned should take part.

On the one hand, the Israeli disengagement process should be pushed to its logical end to become a full disengagement from the Israeli settlements (or keeping some of them while making 1:1 land swaps according to the Clinton parameters). A full withdrawal of the Israeli Army, while establishing an International, Islamic and Arabic coalition for the democratisation and moderation of Hamas and for helping the Palestinians in state building should also be part of such a plan. This coalition will include the Quartet, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Such a coalition will not be rejected by Hamas who, in their electoral platform stressed the importance of co-operation and security coordination with "the Arabic and Islamic Nation." In this regard, it will not be surprising if Hamas calls for a reconsideration of the 1988 disengagement with Jordan, which was seen as a good move by Fatah as a Palestinian national movement, while it was seen negatively by Hamas, which considers itself to be first Islamic, second Arab and only thirdly as Palestinian.

The idea here is to use the good offices of the Arab and Islamic moderate countries to help the Israelis and Palestinians out of their impasse. From its perspective, Israel might want to withdraw for security and demographic reasons, but does not want to do so in a way that seems to grant success to Hamas, while Hamas and all the Palestinians want to end the occupation. While the two sides cannot fulfil each other's wishes for now, a third Islamic Arabic party can do it for them.

The preferred process as a response to this is an approval of Israel and Abu Mazen to the Clinton Parameters, Moratinos non-paper and the Arab League Peace Plan, followed by two referendums around the agreement. However, if the two parties fail to achieve this, they might be willing to deliver to a third party of Arabic and Islamic states.

The delivery of the West Bank and Jerusalem to the Islamic and Arab Peacekeeping force might be done in one, two or three stages. During these stages the process of building trust between the Israelis and Palestinians will be promoted in a way that will lead them to get together in order to answer the 'peace question'. The moment they answer this question, the Peacekeeping force should withdraw.

The work of this Peacekeeping force might begin after a UN Security decision that calls for its establishment. This is an option for short term arrangements and also for future reconciliation. In the case of a failure to reach a final status solution, the vacuum will be filled by a religious war whose length no one can predict.

Walid Salem

*The current ongoing strike of the governmental employees in the PA, already two months long, although led by Fatah in order to create controversy with Hamas, still raises two slogans. One: Stop the Sanctions, directed to the Donor community, and the second: Give us our salaries, directed to the PA.

Originally published by the University of Pretoria Centre for International Political Studies (CIPS) http://www.up.ac.za/academic/cips .