For those who support the Palestinian cause, the document has all the right buzzwords. On the other hand, it calls for a state in 1967 borders. It looks like a national manifesto, but is it?

For the Arab league, the document refers to "Arab legitimacy." That might be a reference to the Arab peace initiative, but is it?

Israel has more or less rejected the document as a basis for negotiations because it is understood as alluding to of right of return of the Palestinian refugees to Israel, because it insists on 1967 borders and calls for continued resistance and for other reasons. Both Israeli and Palestinian commentators have noted that this is not a comfortable document for Israel. In Al Jazeera, Khaled Amayreh predicted that Hamas might find a way to adopt and adapt the Prisoner's document, emphasizing that the document insists on right of return of refugees to Israel. In Yediot Ahronot, Moshe Elad noted likewise that the document is uncompromising about the refugee issue, and likewise uncompromising about 1967 borders, without a hint of explicit recognition for Israel. The document is in fact deliberately ambiguous, and much of its import is in the eyes of the beholder. An optimist will say that the reference to "international legitimacy" points to UN Security Council Resolution 242, and that the elliptical reference to "Arab legitimacy" points to the Arab peace initiative, both of which implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist. The fact is, however, that the document doesn't say anything about recognition of Israel. That is not surprising. It was not intended to be comfortable for Israel. It was not intended to be a peace manifesto either, but rather a political instrument for uniting Palestinian society. It is the creation of Barghouti, whose main political aim has always been to neutralize both the moderate factions of Fatah and the extremists of the Hamas, and to build a political force around his National and Islamic Front, where Marxists and Islamists live side by side in peace and harmony. From that point of view, the document, if adopted, will create a serious problem for Israeli diplomacy, and also may be an obstacle to peace negotiations rather than a support. It looks like a peace document, but is it?

Assuming the document is eventually adopted, the question is, what happens next? Ehud Olmert has promised to pursue negotiations with the Palestinians seriously. He made the promise both to President Bush and more recently to President Mubarak. With the adoption of the Prisoners' document by the Palestinians, it might appear that all the pieces would fall into place for renewal of the peace process. Not the same film as the Oslo process, but perhaps a remake, or a sequel. Or would they really? Right now neither Hamas nor the Fatah PLO seem capable of maintaining order in Gaza. Missiles continue to rain down upon southern Israel. The Prisoners' document legitimizes this "resistance," which is not going to be conducive to political concessions on Israel's part. If Abbas and the Palestinian authority cannot deliver peace and quiet, Olmert will be able to say "there is no peace partner."

An even worse dilemma lurks in the process of politicization of the Hamas. They have not yet changed their hard line stance, which officially refuses to recognize Israel. However, the very fact that Hamas were willing to join the political superstructure unleashed a sinister process of radicalization and splintering. As I related elsewhere, the Al Qaeda or the "International Jihad" is now installed in the West Bank. This was announced by Israeli security services head Yuval Dichter recently, but it was foreseen in a remarkable two part series by Al Hayat. The politicization of Hamas was an indication that their leaders concluded that their cause could no longer be served by violence. However, al Hayat explained that politicization of the Hamas had alienated a hard core of Hamas terrorists who were intent on pursuing violence regardless of political goals. They are in the violence business. If the Palestinian cause, or the Hamas cause, could no longer be served by violence, they would find a different cause: the a-national Islamic Jihad. Given the chaotic nature of Palestinian governance, al-Qaida like movements have a tremendous potential for creating mayhem -- even more so than in Iraq. The "Iraqization" of Palestinian society could be worse than the Lebanonization of Iraq. Thus, the greatest dilemma is created by the paradox that the closer Palestinian political leadership and the Palestinian majority moves toward peace, the closer Palestinian society moves toward civil war, anarchy, extremism and violence.

Restoring order in Palestinian society must therefore take precedence over peace negotiations and grandiose schemes for economic development. Or is it? The chaos is itself fed by the absence of peace and Israeli closures and punitive measures -- yet another dilemma.

Ami Isseroff