It is clear from that preamble that Hamas raises new concepts regarding security and economic development. In regard of security it is no longer the security of the Palestinians separated from the Arabic- Islamic nation while linked with Israel, but it is the security of the all that nation, that should be built together. Moreover it is not a process to ensure the security of the peace process, but a process to ensure the security of the nation and its citizens.

In regard to the economy the preamble mentions Islamic Arabic investment prior to international investment, which is mentioned in the third place. That includes Iranian funding and funding from other Islamic sources, in addition, they will pressure Arab Countries to increase their financial support to the Palestinians. Moreover the program speaks about supporting the poor, where the "Zakat" monies will be used in this direction. It also mentions promoting voluntary work which reminds one of the seventies of the previous century when the voluntary work of grassroots organizations who do not get any funding from outside was contributing to the Palestinian national economy. Moreover the platform promises about equal opportunities to the Palestinians.

With a title that mentions "reform", followed by a verse from Quran about reform, it is clear that the program is about two main fields of reform discussed in the preamble. One is the security reform and the second is the economic reform, neither of which have anything to do with negotiations or establishing relations with Israel. These represent the unilateral aspects of Hamas program. In addition to these two main sectors of reform, the Hamas program states in the preamble that the prisoners should be released, human rights should be protected, dialogue should be promoted, and also the internal fighting should be prohibited.

In the 12 issues included in the Hamas program, one can find that Hamas speaks in the beginning about its consideration "that the security cooperation with Israel is a big national crime, and those who commit it should be punished severely." This point is again about the Hamas priority to change the concept of security. It also clarifies the positions of Hamas leaders after the elections that the Ministry of Interior should be in their hands, and that the security departments should continue to follow that Ministry and not to be moved to the Authority of Abu Mazen as the leaders of these security departments are calling for, in contradiction to the Basic Law which give the authority over the internal security departments to the Ministry of Interior. These people of these security departments want to follow Abu Mazen because they want to be protected from Hamas punishment for their previous cooperation with Israel. Also, they want to save their salaries.

The program also speaks in the beginning about "resisting normalization with Israel", and later on the issue of "resisting cultural normalizatio,n is mentioned under issue number 8 about Hamas's "Cultural and Media policy". This means that joint Israeli-Palestinian projects will come under severe attack, which will require those engaged in these projects to join forces and also to widen their constituency in the Palestinian society.

Regarding "Political reform and the legislative policy" (point number 5 in Hamas program), Hamas speaks about "Accepting the principle of rotation of authority" and "separation of authorities", which both are fine, then it adds that "new legislation, will be released in order to link all the Palestinians wherever they exist together". That means that Hamas will work for all the Palestinians people and not only to those of West Bank and Gaza Strip.

But, in contradiction to democratic principles, point number 6 is about the "Public freedoms, Judiciary and human rights." Hamas advocates "Making the Islamic Sharia the main source of legislation, and also "work to represent the Sharia courts in the Constitutional Court with a reasonable percentage.". This means that Constitutional Court decisions should be in accordance with Islam. However, Hamas might not rush to implement this point in its program because of the expected resistance from the secular civil society, women's organizations, and Palestinian Christians.

Point number 7 is about Hamas's education policy, stating that "Education should be based on Islam as a comprehensive system for all the aspects of life". Again this policy will face a strong resistance from the Palestinian liberal-democratic, secular and secular groups.

Point number 8 about the "Cultural and edia policy" speaks also about protecting youth against corruption, westernization, and cultural invasion". This point also will face strong resistance in regard to the right of freedom of thinking and freedom of expression.

Point number 9 about "social policies", speaks about "inaugurating laws for social security and combating poverty" which is fine, then it combines "combating drugs and drinking wines" together followed by a pledge to "develop the Zakat Committees".

Point number. 11 speaks about equal citizens rights for the Christians" which is fine, but then point number 12 about women rights limits these rights to those "granted to women by the Sharia." Then the program calls for justice towards women by not "depriving them of the rights allowed by the Sharia", followed by asking women to be righteous and modest, insuring that women are partners to men in the 'Jihad, resistance, building and development".

Thus, the program is fully unilateral towards Israel. Moreover, it has also a lot of unilateralism towards the Palestinian society in a sense that it includes policies that Hamas wants to impose (even if gradually) on Palestinian society.

Conclusion with regard to Peace: Israel and Hamas

Amazingly enough, the Road Map plan to promote a Palestinian process of political legal, administrative, financial, economic, social and security reforms, which was called for in our previous series about the post disengagement period as a "Palestinian Unilateral Track", might be fulfilled now by Hamas in its own way and without American and European funding. Thus, it would ending the period of Fatah failure earlier to fulfill these tasks that are important for functional viability of the future Palestinian state.
The Palestinian unilateral track (Hamas edition), will not of course be very easy. Many of risks, obstacles, threats and challenges are ahead, some of them are internal, and some are external. Moreover there are problems in regard to the content of Hamas reform programs that Palestinian secular society will not be happy with, as noted.

From now on we will have for the first time two unilateral tracks, one Israeli that began last year, and one Palestinian.The second will not accept now to be dealt with as inferior, or unequal, also this second track believes in reciprocity (such as reciprocal Tahdiya calmness with Israel), and deterrence.

This last characteristic might play according to Hamas's understanding of the role of deterring the other side from attacking the Palestinians severely, because of the fear of Hamas retaliation. If this assumption will be proven true, then we will be moving to a new context, where each side will take into consideration in advance the needs of the other side when each side initiates unilateral acts.
In this regard, several Israeli responses to Hamas success are strikingly positive. For instance the Israeli Minister of Defense praised Hamas on 30/1/2006 because it is "showing responsibility" as he said, while Shimon Peres spoke in Davos about a possibility of negotiating with Hamas if it stops its attacks in Israel." Other Israelis are waiting or speaking about giving Hamas time and a chance ...etc. Only a few showed panic. Thus, it looks like the two sides might be for the first time on the track of two unilateral processes conducted without negotiations. However most importantly, we hope, they will try not to initiate severe attacks against each other.

Walid Salem

Previous article in this series:
Hamas Victory - How it Happened, What is to be done?

Walid Salem is the director of Panorama, the Center for the Dissemination of Democracy and Community Development, East Jerusalem office. He is also the author of books and articles on such issues as democracy, citizenship, youth rights, civil society development, Israeli-Palestinian peace-building, and the right of return. Together with Paul Scham and Benjamin Pogrund, he is author of SHARED HISTORIES: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue, Left Coast Press, 2005.

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