Sadly, once again we see a NIC, and perhaps an entire Intelligence Community, committed to maneuvering between three poles: first, their best estimate of the situation; second, flattery and accomodation to the very different views of their political masters; and third, a very unfortunate reluctance to deviate too far from conventional wisdom. The NIC is a nail that hammers itself down before it can even be struck. Mr. Hutchings mutters truth to power under his breath.

Here is the text of Hutchings' section on the Middle East, with my assessments interspersed along the way.

Regional Issues

Within the region, we can expect a near-term spike in anti-American terrorist activity and an expansion of the recruitment pool of extremist groups and would-be terrorists. Over the longer term, there will be two kinds of effects: those springing from regime change in Iraq, and those coming from the U.S. military action and occupation.

A prolonged U.S. military presence would evoke in Arab minds the 13th century Mongol occupation of Baghdad. These effects would be mitigated by "nativization" via a swift transfer to Iraqi authority or by "internationalization" via the visible presence of UN and NGO representatives. The Administration has already made clear its determination to hand over power as quickly as possible to an Iraqi interim authority, and President Bush affirmed a "vital role" for the UN at his press conference this morning.

Democratic change within the region will not come quickly. In Iraq itself, it is not unreasonable to hope that an interim authority together with a stabilizing U.S. security presence will enable the country to move toward an open and participatory political system governed by the rule of law and pursuing cooperative relations with its neighbors. Stable democracy, as we know from many examples, will not be achieved overnight, however. In Iraq and elsewhere in the region, progress will be constrained by enduring realities unrelated this conflict: lack of democratic political culture, weak civil society, and strong vested interests against reform.

Possibly these cop-outs are the price exacted for delivering public, unclassified versions of these presentations. If that's so, it tends to call into question the value of public briefings by intelligence officials.

However, one should not undervalue the removal of a despotic and threatening regime and its replacement with one that is more open, lawful, and cooperative. This will enhance the security environment for moderate Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, though it may be unsettling internally at least in the near term. How it plays in Syria and Iran is harder to gauge. One hopes those regimes will conclude they should cease supporting terrorists and pursuing weapons of mass destruction, but it is an open question whether they will draw those lessons.

Regional attitudes will turn in large measure on the state of Arab-Israeli relations. Positive developments in the Palestinian leadership run up against a continuing climate of bitter hostility that militates against a breakthrough, but the perception that the United States was making a strong effort to broker a settlement would itself help to temper anti-American suspicions and animosities in the Arab world. At their joint press conference this morning, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair reaffirmed their determination to do so.

[Section ends]

Let's consider just the broad outlines of the situation. Along with a few incidental partners, the United States of America, with all of its armed might, has (in the typical Arab view) arbitrarily invaded and swiftly conquered Iraq, a large, centrally located Arab country. It now occupies Iraq. While battling an insurgency, the United States is moving to install a new and friendly government supported by native security forces. But American troops are likely to remain there for a good long while. As one Robert L. Hutchings put it, "Over the longer term, there will be two kinds of effects [on anti-American terrorist activity]: those springing from regime change in Iraq, and those coming from the U.S. military action and occupation."

But now, lo and behold! comes a third, overridingly important effect, forgotten until now: "Regional attitudes [toward America] will turn in large measure on the state of Arab-Israeli relations." When they think of the U.S., Hutchings now says, Arabs won't contemplate the 100,000 American soldiers occupying Iraq as much as the state of Israeli-Palestinian relations. If that's what The New York Times is saying lately, it must be true.

Let me be brutally blunt. Hutchings knows that two things are a pretty good bet. One is that, after the invasion of Iraq, America's popularity in the Arab world is at an all-time low, and it isn't liable to see dramatic improvement anytime soon. Another is that Israeli-Palestinian relations are not particularly on the upswing either. The first didn't cause the second; the second didn't cause the first. But pretending otherwise offers an excellent excuse for failure. Excellent because it agrees with what all the folks in the know already are saying, not because it makes any sense.

(See here for a different assessment of the Middle East's enduring problems.)

A final thought. As the "independent and bipartisan" panel appointed exclusively by the White House conducts its "examination" of intelligence on Iraq, let's be sure to recall this farcical performance. After all, the NIC is the same body that oversaw the production of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq. Here we see a prominent element of the U.S. Intelligence Community with its finger to the wind, delivering views seemingly against its own better judgment. Is this representative of a broader phenomenon? You decide.

Analyst