The report itself -- the best copy available to the public is at the website of the Federation of American Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/iaea1103.pdf -- is the third in a series of unusually visible reports of the Director-General on Iran's nuclear program presented to the IAEA board. It documents a flurry of behind-the-scenes activity in the month before the IAEA's October 31 deadline for Iran's full cooperation. It is also a stunning catalogue and chronology of Iranian concealment of and deception about virtually all aspects of its nuclear program. Some acts of deception continued almost up to the last moment. And unfortunately, some acts of deception appear to persist. Chances are, we'll know the truth before the year is out. And then it may be difficult to sustain the balancing act that has brought us to this point.

The new disclosures began with a letter from the Iranian government to the IAEA on October 9 that confessed to some previously hidden activities. But the real turning point seemed to come a week later:

On 16 October 2003, at the invitation of the Iranian Government, the Director General met in Tehran with H.E. Dr. H. Rohani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, to discuss the open issues requiring urgent resolution... At this meeting, Dr. Rohani stated that a decision had been taken to provide the Agency, in the course of the following week, with a full disclosure of Iran's past and present nuclear activities....

As a follow-up to the 16 October 2003 meeting, in a letter to the Director General dated 21 October 2003 and received on 23 October 2003, H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the AEOI, reaffirmed that "the Islamic Republic of Iran ha[d] decided to provide a full picture of its nuclear activities, with a view to removing any ambiguities and doubts about the exclusively peaceful character of these activities and commencing a new phase of confidence and co-operation in this field at the international level." Mr. Aghazadeh stated further in his letter that Iran was prepared "to provide, in full transparency, any additional clarifications that the Agency may deem necessary."

Agency inspectors were told in early October 2003 that all of the centrifuges from the Kalaye Electric Company had been scrapped, and therefore were not available for inspection, whereas it became clear later that the centrifuges had in fact been stored at another location in Tehran and were finally shown to the inspectors at Natanz on 30-31 October 2003, at which time Agency experts examined the centrifuges and associated equipment, and took environmental samples. All major imported and domestically produced components, as well as various pieces of manufacturing equipment have now been sampled. The results of the sample analyses are not expected to be available before December 2003.

The nuclear material held in this equipment will be verified during the forthcoming inspections. The Agency has now also obtained information about the source of the components that Iran claims to have been contaminated.

In the view of this writer, some observers are too eager to see this result. If Iran is subjected to sanctions for violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is perfectly capable of withdrawing from the NPT and completing its nuclear weapons program, sanctions or no sanctions. It probably no longer needs much, if any, outside help. The Iranians saw how India and Pakistan weathered sanctions after their 1998 nuclear tests, and they may be sorely tempted to tread the same path. North Korea, too, has since set a bad precedent by withdrawing from the NPT in 2002, an example that some Iranian hardliners have already made clear that they would be pleased to follow.

If, as seems altogether too likely, Iran's latest version of the facts proves just as transitory as the last three or four, there may still be a way to avoid a confrontation that can end only with Iran's going nuclear or in violent confrontation between Iran and the United States. Essentially, Iran, which so far has only agreed to freeze its uranium- and plutonium-related activities, would have to commit to dismantle them completely, and rely solely on external suppliers such as Russia for reactor fuel. This would be the only persuasive way left for Iran to foreswear its transparent ambition to obtain nuclear weapons while avoiding the embarrassment of total denuclearization. Indeed, if Iran were to give up on the nuclear fuel cycle, it would smooth the path for European and other partners to build and supply additional new reactors in Iran.

Analyst