December 2002 ý

By all accounts the Oslo Peace Process can be defined as a failed peace process. There ýare many arguments and assessments of what went wrong with the Oslo Peace Process ýý(OPP) and there are equally many attribute of blame for its failure. Several detailed ýpapers have been written detailing the failures and trying to assess what went wrong ýý(Pundak, Baskin, Adwan, and more). Very little analysis has be conducted on ýdetermining what are the lessons to be learned from the failed peace process and what ýmust be done in order to help assure success in the future of the Israeli-Palestinian ýconflict resolution process. The lessons learned from the failure of the OPP might also be ývaluable to conflict resolution practioners in other parts of the world as well. Most ýimportantly, in writing this paper, it is hoped that some of the assessed lessons learned ýpresented here might help negotiators and policy makers, in Israel and Palestine and ýaround the world avoid similar errors in the future. ý

This brief essay is by no means a comprehensive assessment of all of the lessons that ýshould be learned from the failed Oslo Peace Process. It is only a first attempt to ýverbalize what might be considered obvious. The lessons learned that are listed here are ýnot in any particular order. The observations and assessments are those of the author ýalone. It is the hope of the author that this essay will provoke additional discussion and ýresearch on this issue. ý

Lesson Learned: In protracted conflicts it is not sufficient to only detail the ýbeginning of the process; it is important, and perhaps essential to reach agreement ýon at least the principles of longer-term final or permanent status issues. ý

The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed on September 13, 1993 ýprovided a framework for mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the ýPalestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This signed agreement, it was hoped, would ýprovide the sides with the framework and the mechanism to begin a process of ýnormalization, mutual recognition, mutual confidence building, and to lead to future ýnegotiations. The DOP also listed the main issues in conflict that must be resolved within ýthe final or permanent status between the two sides. The DOP dealt with procedural ýissues regarding the longer term while in the short term the DOP and the second Oslo ýAgreement only dealt with interim or temporary status issues, leaving the core issues of ýthe conflict for later stages. The two sides adopted the Kissengerian notion of ýý“constructive ambiguity” in order to “sell” the agreements to their own constituencies. In ýdoing so, each side was also allowed to interpret what they perceived to be unwritten ýagreements regarding the final or permanent status that will emerge at the end of the ýprocess. ý

The main issues of the conflict: borders, Palestinian sovereignty or statehood, Jerusalem, ýIsraeli settlements, refugees, etc. were not included at all in the initial negotiations. They ýwere left out of the agreement to be dealt with at a later stage. These issues are the heart ýof the conflict. By not reaching at least a declaration of principles on these issues at the ýbeginning of the process, each side was free to develop amongst their own constituencies ýdisparate understandings of what the final outcome would be. Rather than coming closer ýtogether on most of the core issues, the gaps in understandings grew throughout the years ýwhen no negotiations took place regarding the final status. Along with disparate ýunderstandings were also political manipulations that added to the adoption of more ýextreme positions on these issues. This process widened the gaps between the sides and ýmoved them further away from peace. As the most significant case in point one could ýpoint to the refugee issue where the gaps between the positions of the sides grew wider ýand wider over time as this issue was only addressed in the very final stages of ýnegotiations. ý

Some analysts suggest that at the time of the DOP it would have been impossible to reach ýagreements of principle on the core issues. If this is the case, then perhaps the signing of ýthe DOP should have been postponed until a declaration of principles on core issues ýcould be reached. Another alternative would have been to agree on a much shorter ýtimeline to reach mutual understandings on the framework of final status. Leaving the ýend game completely open helped to add to the growing distrust between the sides while ýalso allowing for new facts to be created on the ground that impacted upon or limited the ýchances of reaching agreed upon final status arrangements. ý

Lesson Learned: Dates are Holy!ý

The DOP set up a timeline for implementation. The basic timeline determined that there ýwould an interim period of five years and that negotiations on permanent status “will ýcommence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the ýinterim period”. The DOP also set forth a schedule for Palestinian elections and Israeli ýredeployments or withdrawals from Palestinian territories. The second Oslo Agreement ýset up a more rigid schedule for further implementation of Israeli withdrawals. Very ýearly in the process, in early 1995 Prime Minister Rabin, following a series of terrorist ýattacks, assured the Israeli Knesset that there are “no holy dates” and that further Israeli ýredeployments would not be implemented according to the schedule set forth in the ýagreements. From that time on, throughout the OPP implementation of agreements were ýnot kept according to what had been the agreed upon dates. A process of mutual ýbreaching of the agreements began as each side came to understand that if then other side ýdoes not comply with the signed agreement, then they too are not bound to what they ýsigned. ý

The entire process was predicated on the implementation of the agreements on a time ýframe that demanded that each side fulfill its part of the deal on time. A unilateral Israeli ýdecision to breach the agreement on the time table of implementation led the Palestinians ýto breach other elements of the agreement. The Israeli decision was based on the belief ýthat the Palestinians were not undertaking a sincere battle against terrorism. The ýPalestinians argued that their best weapon against terrorism is the progress of the peace ýprocess and the Israeli withdrawals from Palestinian territories, and thus a “catch 22” ýcycle of breaches following breaches ensued and progressed until the final breakdown in ýthe end of 2000. Permanent status negotiations did not begin as scheduled. Israeli ýwithdrawals did not take place on schedule, while at the same time violence increased, ýopposition on both sides gathered support and breaching the agreements became the ýnorm.ý

Lesson Learned: Protracted conflicts in which there is little or no trust and ýconfidence require external mechanisms for verification of implementation of the ýagreements, external mechanisms for insuring compliance and external mechanisms ýfor external dispute resolution.ý

The DOP and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian agreements were absent of any external ýmechanisms of verification of implementation, external mechanisms for insuring ýcompliance with the agreements and external mechanisms for dispute resolution. The ýDOP stated: “Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration ýof Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be ýresolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) to be ýestablished….Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a ýmechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.” What happens when and if ýthe sides cannot resolve the disputes or disparate interpretations of the agreements ýthrough agreement? What happens if the sides are not capable of reaching an agreement ýon the mechanism of conciliation? This is precisely what happened. Each side breached ýthe agreements or interpreted their obligations or the obligations of the other side in ýdifferent ways and then issued statements against the other side. The Joint Liaison ýCommittee that was established was simply incapable of resolving the disputes because ýthe JLC became the forum through which each side raised it claims against the other – ýnot for the purpose of resolving the dispute but for the aim of “scoring points” against the ýother side. ý

When the breaches “piled up” so high, the JLC ceased to function, as did most of the ýjoint bodies that were formed through the agreements. There was no mechanism ýestablished that could fairly determine which claims were valid and which were less ývalid. There was no external mechanism established that could help the sides to comply ýwith the commitments that they had taken upon themselves. There was no external ýmechanism that could help bring about resolution of the disputes and thus once the ýprocess of breaching the agreement became the norm, there was little or no value in ýsigning new agreements. Signing new agreements nevertheless became part of the ýprocess – these agreements mainly stating that the sides would undertake the ýimplementation of agreements already signed in the past. At least two formal agreements ýwere subsequently signed that were aimed at repairing the damages of formerly breached ýagreements (The Wye River Protocol and the Sharm el Sheikh Agreement), yet these ýagreements were also breached. Throughout the process, the failure to resolve the ýdisputes also emanating from a lack of external mechanisms led to further breakdowns in ýtrust and confidence that further limited the ability of the sides to continue negotiations ýon the core issues. ý

It seems that had the sides invented mechanisms involving acceptable third parties for ýprocesses of verification of implementation, compliance assurance and dispute resolution, ýperhaps breaches of the agreement would have been resolved from the very first breach ýand future disputes would have been contained and resolved. By leaving the verification, ýcompliance assurance and dispute resolution means to the two disputing parties alone ýsabotaged the process from within. ý

Lesson Learned: Maps are important!ý

Much of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has territorial dimensions. Everyone can easily ýrecall the ceremony of signing the Oslo II Agreement in Cairo when Yasser Arafat was ýreluctant to put his signature to the maps. Throughout the process, the use of maps was ýhaphazard and at times even not on the table. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on territorial ýissues often took place with the absence of maps on the table. The sides resorted to ýtalking about principles and percentages and only in the final stages of negotiations did ýthe Israeli side (usually) produce a map, which on every occasion was rejected by the ýPalestinians. The use of maps was extremely selective, secretive and often manipulative. ýThe two sides were negotiating areas of Israeli withdrawal and redeployment and areas ýwhere the Palestinian Authority would take over control – administrative or more. Yet, ýrather than sitting around a single map or sharing data – digital or otherwise, the two ýsides usually worked with different maps, different scales of dimension, different data. ýPalestinians often did not even have access to up-to-date maps and were not always able ýto secure Israel agreements to purchase accurate digital aerial photographs. Some of the ýdonor nations helped the Palestinians to secure maps and data and then received Israeli ýapproval, but this process of having to “beg” for maps and data impaired on the process ýitself. ý

The Israeli-Palestinian agreements spoke about Israeli withdrawals and redeployments, ýbut they did not specify from exactly where this would occur. As a result, Palestinians ýand Israelis interpreted the agreements differently and in the end the decision on ýwithdrawals and redeployments became an Israeli unilateral decision. This kind of ýagreements should not have been signed without accompanied signed maps. The lack of ýagreed upon signed maps left the door wide open to intensive disputes and once again ýcontributed greatly to the loss of confidence in the peace process by both publics. ý

Lesson Learned: Agreements must be as explicit as possible.ý

Too much of the Oslo Agreements was open to too many varied and opposing ýinterpretations. Several of the best examples relate to territorial and settlement issues. ýPalestinians understood that upon signing the DOP Israeli settlement activity would cease ýin the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The Palestinians believed that Israeli ýagreement to specify that the process was based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, ýthat the process would not prejudice the outcome of final status agreements, that the ýIsraelis agreed to mention the integrity of Palestinian territories and that the Palestinian ýCouncil would have authority over all areas of the West Bank and Gaza “except external ýsecurity, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations….” meant that Israel would sustain from ýthe construction of new settlements or from expanding existing ones. This, however, did ýnot happen. The Israeli claimed that no where in any of the agreements did Israel agree ýto cease settlement construction. Israel further claimed that the construction of new ýsettlements, by-pass roads or the enlargement of existing settlements did not prejudice the ýoutcome of the permanent status agreements because their construction did not impinge ýon the possibility that these would either remain under Israeli sovereignty by agreement ýor be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, by agreement. According to the letter of the ýagreements, Israel is correct. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the continuation ýof the settlement construction, the continued confiscation of Palestinian lands by Israel, ýand the construction of by-pass roads was one of the major factors that led to the end of ýthe Oslo Process. One can only ponder why then did the Palestinians not demand an ýexplicit reference to the cessation of all settlement construction in writing as part of the ýagreement?ý

Another example of so-called “constructive ambiguity” appears in Oslo II where there is ýreference to further Israeli redeployments to specified military locations”. The agreement ýalso states that “the two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single ýterritorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim ýperiod” (Article XI, paragraph 1). Furthermore, the agreement states “the two sides agree ýthat West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in ýpermanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian ýCouncil…” (Article XI, paragraph 2). From these statements the Palestinians understood ýthat Israel would withdraw from all territories of the West Bank and Gaza except for ýsettlements and military basis prior to the beginning of permanent status negotiations and ýthat approximately 90% of the West Bank and Gaza would be under their control leaving ýonly an additional 10% of the territory open for negotiations. The Israeli understanding ýwas different. While the built up areas of settlements accounted for only 2-3% of the ýterritory, the zoning maps of the settlements that Israel had authorized through its various ýplanning bodies accounted for more than 40% of the West Bank and Gaza. With regards ýto “specified military locations” Israel later stated (under Prime Minister Netanyahu) that ýthis referred to “security zones” and not military bases. The specified military locations ýwould account for about 6-% of the territories while “security zones” can be anything and ýas such, Israel related to the entire Jordan Valley as a “security zone” and therefore ýprecluded that there would be no further redeployment from that area.ý

There is no problem to provide additional examples where non-explicit language may ýhave made the signing of an agreement possible, but made the amenable implementation ýof the agreement impossible. ý

Lesson Learned: Political violence cannot be tolerated.ý

The Oslo process was marked from the outset with out outrageous violence beginning ýwith a Jewish terrorist who massacred Muslim prayers in the Ibrahimia Mosque in ýHebron to many acts of fundamentalist Islamic suicide bombers who murdered Israelis ýindiscriminately. These acts of violence created an impossible situation for the political ýleaders who stood behind the peace process on both sides. There is no simple known ýformula for what leaders should do when their citizens fall victim to terrorism aimed at ýhalting a peace process. Ceasing the process would only award those who seek through ýtheir terror to achieve precisely that result. It was Prime Minister Rabin who articulated ýthe policy that the fight against terror would continue as if there were no negotiations and ýthat the negotiations would continue as if there was no terror. Other than agreeing with ýthat basic formula, there are probably at least two additional points that could be raised ýand may point to some lessons that should be learned. ý

First, it was probably a mistake to call the victims of terror “the casualties of peace”. ýFirst, this is wrong – they were casualties of continued warfare and not casualties of ýpeace. The notion that these victims of terrorism suffered as a result of a peace process ýonly served to strengthen the opposition to the peace process in both publics. Words are ývery important and very powerful. ý

Second, at almost no time during the peace process did the two sides work honestly and ýsincerely together, in partnership, to confront the problem of terrorism and violent ýopposition to the peace process. Had the two sides worked together against the problem, ýrather than the two sides working against each other, there is a chance that the results ýcould have been more positive. More often than not, Arafat was blamed by the Israelis ýfor not preventing terrorism emanating from areas that were not even under his security ýcontrol and responsibility. Without opening the argument of whether or not Arafat was ýever really sincere in fighting against terrorism, the likelihood of a real Palestinian effort ýagainst its own extremists could have been enhanced through a cooperative approach ýrather than the antagonistic approach that was employed. The more that Israel blamed the ýPalestinian Authority, its leaders and its security chiefs for failing to prevent terrorism, ýthe more these same people were presented in their own media as agents of Israel, as they ýsuddenly responded to Israeli demands to “round up” some extremists and imprison ýthem. ý

There is no doubt that the leaders on both sides failed to find a positive and effective way ýof confronting the spoilers, the extremists and the killers on both sides. There are no ýsimple recipes here and this brief essay cannot attempt at even providing some reasonable ýanswers, yet it seems that much of what was done achieved the exact opposite results. ýThere is a great need for conflict resolution practioners from around the world to confront ýthis issue together. This is not a problem that has surfaced only in the Israeli-Palestinian ýcontext – it is a problem that has become one of the most significant dangers to peace ýmaking around the globe. ý

Lesson Learned: The public must be involved and informed

Under the pretext that agreements could only be reached through secret negotiations, ýmuch of the Oslo Process was devoid of any real public debate or involvement. The ýpoliticians and negotiators often spoke one language to their publics through their media ýand an entirely different voice in the negotiations. This could only lead the negotiators ýthemselves to question: which is the real voice (that they hear from the other side). When ýEhud Barak boarded the plane to Camp David he once again stressed that united ýJerusalem would remain the undivided eternal capital of the State of Israel and would ýremain united under Israeli sovereignty. In Camp David, Barak began the process of ýnegotiating Jerusalem whereby parts of the city would be brought to Palestinian ýsovereignty. ý

There are many examples where due to the perception that the negotiations would be ýmore successful, or where one side believed it would get a “better deal” if they did not ýý“expose” themselves too much in public, where as a result, great gaps were created ýbetween where the process was or needed to go and to where the public was and thought ýit should stay. Public debate and public involvement in the issues was viewed negatively ýby both sides. This is most particularly true with regards to the issues of Israeli ýsettlements, the right of return and Jerusalem. ý

The gaps between public opinion (and public knowledge) about the issues and the ýcompromises necessary to reach agreements remained too wide throughout the peace ýprocess. Institutionalizing public input and encouraging public debate could have served ýseveral important functions. It could have helped to prepare the publics for compromises. ýIt could have made a contribution to the creation of new ideas and new thinking. It could ýhave given the publics a sense that they are partners to the public rather than effected ýsubjects or silenced victims. ý

Institutionalized public involvement can take many forms. There could have been the ýestablishment of a Ministry for Peace or a “clearing house” for collecting ideas, ýproposals, suggestions, and criticisms from the public with a means for sharing these with ýdecision makers and the public. The political circles could have encouraged the local ýwritten and electronic media to contribute to constructive debate. The leaders could have ýaddressed the public opening and honestly with dilemmas that the two nations must face ýin the negotiations. But instead, the leaders chose the worse possible option – they lied to ýthe publics and tried to keep them in the dark and in the end, not only the leaders suffered ýa loss of public support, the two peoples suffered from the destruction of the peace ýprocess. ý

Lesson learned: Better agreements are reached then the negotiators on both sides ýdecide to share information, data, ideas and proposals ý

This is the first lesson in any text book on negotiations. It is a lesson that was never ýpracticed by negotiators in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace process. Israeli and Palestinian ýnegotiators never approached their task as a mission of joint problem solving. The ýnegotiators often adopted the “correct language” and spoke of “win-win” agreements, but ýin practice, they negotiated as classic Middle East Bazaar negotiators in a zero-sum ýgame. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were not honest with each other. They should ýnot share information and ideas with each other. They did not speak about real interests – ýthey hid real interests through “inflated” positioning. There were very few attempts to ýhonestly understand each other’s real needs, fears, and real interests. When I once ýquestioned an Israeli negotiator about a particular point in one of the agreements where ýthe Palestinians did not reach a certain achievement that would have been beneficial for ýboth sides, I was told by the Israeli negotiator: “we were prepared to give it to them, but ýthey never asked for it!” ý

Even after years of negotiating together, the style of negotiations did not change – in fact, ýover time it became more and more adversarial and perhaps because of this (among other ýreasons) failed to produce agreements. ý

Lesson learned: Democracy and democratic institution building is essential

Many observers attribute one of the failings of the Oslo Peace Process to the lack of ýdemocracy in the Palestinian Authority. These observers believe that when the time for ýmaking hard decision came in the final days of negotiations, the very fact that there was ýno democratic regime in Palestine with a public constituency that had to be taken into ýaccount, allowed for the leader to avoid making the difficult decisions. The lack of ýaccountability, the lack of transparency and the centralistic control of both decision ýmaking and of the economy have all been pointed to as failings in the Palestinian ýAuthority. ý

Israel has also played a role in critiquing the lack of democracy in Palestine over the ýyears. However, it could also be noted that the various governments of Israel viewed ýArafat’s ability to take actions against anti-peace forces in Palestine as overriding any ýneed for Palestinian democracy. This was articulated by Prime Minister Rabin’s famous ýsentence – “bli bagatz u’bli btzelem” – without the Supreme Court and without Betzelem ýý– meaning that Arafat could arrest, detain, and even execute anyone, without any real due ýprocess of law.ý

Israel was also afraid of the Palestinian Legislative Council being able to legislate ýPalestinian laws that are against Israel’s interest or against agreements so that Israel never ýchallenged Arafat when he declared in private meetings that he could not sign the ýý“Palestinian Basic Law” – the Palestinian Constitution - into law because of Israeli ýobjections. This Constitution would have given some real basis to the rule of law in ýPalestine and would have created some semblance of the separation of authorities and ýsome measures of checks and balances. Many appeals were made to Rabin, Peres and ýNetanyahu to issue public declarations that Israel viewed the “Palestinian Basic Law” ýfavorably – something that never happened.ý

It should also be noted that there was wide ranging Israeli involvement in the ýdevelopment of the centrally controlled, monopolistic and corrupt Palestinian economic ýsystem. Despite constant warnings by this author and many others of the dangers of direct ýIsraeli involvement in Palestinian corruption, Israeli officials facilitated and encouraged ýwhat must be called “the ripping off of the Palestinian people” through shady deals and ýschemes conducted in broad day light by tens of former Israeli security officials with ýagents of the Palestinian Authority including Palestinian intelligence officers, policemen ýand “advisors” working on behalf of themselves and on behalf of Arafat directly. At least ýsome of these deals, if conducted in Israel proper would have ended with indictments and ýjail penalties. But in this case, they were conducted in “the interest of peace”. This is ýperhaps one of the most cynical elements of what emerged over the years of the Oslo ýPeace process. ý

It is also necessary to point out that the State of Israel has also been suffering from a less ýthan healthy democracy. Problems with Israel’s election laws have created unstable ýgovernments leading to elections nearly every 18 months. Issues that were taboo in Israeli ýsociety in the past, such as “transfer” – a euphemism for racist ethnic cleansing, are now ýlegitimately debated within the Israeli Parliament and Government sponsored by political ýparties that are members of the ruling coalition. Israeli democracy is in a state of high ýrisk, this is definitely exacerbated by the continuing violence between Israel and the ýPalestinians. ý

There is an argument in the professional literature regarding the claim that democracy is a ýprerequisite for peace. It is difficult to make concrete categorical claims that this is 100% ýtrue. Nonetheless, it seems to be common wisdom, at least amongst Palestinian ýintellectuals that the lack of democracy in Palestine was one of the causes of the failure of ýthe peace process. This issue needs to be investigated in greater depth. ý

Lesson Learned: Peace must pay – peace must have a constituencyý

There were many promises that peace would pay. From the day after the signing of the ýDOP in Washington on September 13, 1993, President Clinton convened a “donors ýconference” in order to provide large financial resources for the development and ýreconstruction of Palestine. Shimon Peres spoke about a new Middle East that would ýflourish with the fruits of peace. A lot of money was pumped into the process and ýeconomic development projects and large scale infrastructure development projects were ýlaunched. At the same time, in response to a continuation of terrorism, the various Israeli ýgovernments imposed new systems of closures limiting Palestinian access to Israel and to ýIsraeli markets. The most effected sector was that of the export of Palestinian labor to ýIsrael. Economic data point to the fact that the losses to the Palestinian economy equaled ýand even surpassed the total amount of donor funds that were pumped into the process. ýThe result on the ground was a continual shrinking of the Palestinian economy (with the ýexception of 1999-2000). The common Palestinian citizen became poorer and the ýPalestinian economy actually suffered significant losses after September 1993. In short ýthe fruits of peace were never delivered to the plates of the average Palestinian citizen. As ýa result, most Palestinians clearly associated the OPP with economic suffering, instead of ýthe opposite result whereby they would have profited from peace.ý

The slogans of economic benefits remained slogans amidst a worsening economic ýsituation. Most Israeli security experts concur that the closures did very little serve real ýIsraeli security needs. Most concur that they were imposed for internal Israeli political ýconcerns – to show the Israeli public that the governments were responding to real ýsecurity needs. In the end, the closures probably contributed more to the worsening of the ýsecurity needs of Israel by creating more enemies of the peace process and by increasing ýPalestinian poverty. From this it seems quite clear that peace processes must improve the ýlives of the average citizens. They must feel the benefits at home in order to build a ýconstituency for peace.ý

Lesson Learned: Mediators must be ready and prepared to play bridging roles ýwhen required.ý

For most of the Oslo Peace Process the Americans were perceived as a kind of mediator. ýIsraeli and Palestinian negotiators more often than not requested that the American serve ýa convener role and not a mediator role. There was great reluctance to invite the ýAmericans or others to submit bridging proposals or to engage in mediation. The ýPalestinians feared that the Americans were too close to the Israeli positions and the ýIsraelis have always had a fear of too much intervention by any outside parties. As such, ýboth sides forfeited the valuable roles that credible mediators can play. Even at Camp ýDavid, the sides were reluctant to request US proposals and when they were finally asked ýfor, the Americans hesitated for too long for their proposals to have enough time to ýcrystallize and be accepted by the sides. ý

Peace processes that are as entrenched and complex as the Israeli-Palestinian example ýrequire outside intervention by credible neutral parties that are ready to back their ýproposals with political and economic weight. The OPP would have benefited greatly by ýthe active participation of credible and experienced mediators. ý

Mediators will always ask themselves if their presence is desired. They will often ýhesitate before putting proposals down on the table. In the Israeli-Palestinian context, ýpotential mediators will be intimidated and even told that their presence is not desired. In ýmost conflict contexts, one side will usually feel that the mediators are not balanced or ýeven handed. When the mediator represents a government, like the United States, and ýthere is recognition of the need for mediation in the conflict as part of an ongoing peace ýprocess, the mediator should understand that intimidation and off-handed rejection of ýproposals is part of the process. The American peace team in the Oslo Peace Process ýadmits today that they should have insisted on putting their proposals on the table ýthroughout the years. They should have refused to serve only as conveners. They should ýhave served mediating roles rather than messengers. ý

Cooperation between former enemies requires assistance

The Oslo Peace Process created about 30 joint bodies and coordination committees for ýcooperation. These dealt with every field of cooperation imaginable – from security to ýall forms of cooperation in the economic, scientific, cultural, environmental and technical ýfields. Today, only one joint body continues to work – the joint water committee. One of ýthe reasons for the failure of these joint bodies is the lack of third party involvement. ýThese bodies were formed to facilitate and coordinate cooperation between the sides. The ýidea behind their establishment was sound and there were a lot of good intentions and ýgood will. There was a lot of optimism that through these cooperative committees real ýpeace would emerge. From the early years of the peace process many of the cooperative ýbodies never worked. They either didn’t meet at all or they could never agree on much of ýthe agenda. The joint scientific environment committee is an example in point. The head ýof this committee from the Israeli side says that in spite of reviewing tens of joint ýenvironmental projects, not one project was approved and nothing new was built on the ýground, despite the many generous offer of international donors to support many joint ýprojects. The forum became a debating arena for pointing blame at who was more ýresponsible for harming the environment – Israel or the Palestinian Authority. ý

On the other hand, there is one joint body which has continued to work throughout the ýpeace process and beyond into the intifada. This is the joint water committee. The body ýhas even issued at least two joint statements co-signed by the heads of the committee ýregarding their decision to keep water out of the bounds of the intifada. The committee ýcontinues to meet and continues to authorize new projects. The reason for this success is ýthat the committee quickly became a tri-lateral committee with direct US participation. ýThe nature of the committee changed with the addition of the Americans, however, in ýessence, this committee is doing what it was set up to do. During these difficult times, ýthe committee would not meet if there was no third party convener. The Americans serve ýas inviters as well as deliverers of messages between the sides. The Americans also host ýthe meetings, facilitate the discussions and the follow-ups and also provide the funding ýfor most of the projects agreed upon between the sides. Without the American ýinvolvement in this committee, there would be no joint water committee today (by the ýway, the Americans, at least, insist on not calling it the joint water committee).ý

Lesson Learned: Peace processes must be “civilized” – the role of the military must ýbe reduced.ý

The Oslo peace process, after the first stage of negotiations was controlled primarily by ýmilitary and security personnel on both sides. As time passed, the role of the military-ýsecurity forces in controlling the relations between the sides became more and more ýentrenched and institutionalized. The military-security forces participated far beyond the ýrealms of military-security issues. All of the joint committees and bodies had high level ýparticipation from the military-security forces. The “civil affairs” coordination between ýIsrael and the Palestinians was controlled by the office of the Coordinator of Government ýAffairs in the Territories – a military officer at the rank of General with a relatively large ýstaff below him. Even though the coordinator dressed in civilian clothes for meetings ýwith the Palestinians, it was clear that it was still the IDF and the Ministry of Defense on ýthe front line. Even in issues where there were no military-security questions on the table, ýthe military-security presence was there and often took control. The same thing ýhappened on the Palestinian side – the Israeli military presence in the discussions brought ýthe Palestinians to bring on board their own military personnel. In the end, the role of the ýcivilian ministries and officials became minimized in favor of the military.ý

Instead of de-militarizing the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the ýmilitarization of the relations impacted deeply on the down-spin that occurred each time ýthere were difficulties. Military personnel are not usually trained in the arts of peace ýmaking. They usually lack the sensitivities necessary for transforming relations that were ýbased on conflict and animosity into relations of peaceful neighbors. The heavy handed ýcontinued presence of the military also signaled to Israelis and Palestinians alike that the ýbasic dynamics of the relations did not change after signing peace agreements. The ýmilitary occupation simply changed its clothes, as was stated by many Israeli and ýPalestinian civilians. ý

Another complicating factor was that with the peace process the Israeli civil ýadministration (another euphemism for military government) was officially disbanded ýand many Israeli military personnel were threatened with the loss of their jobs. Instead of ýremoving the military government entirely and transferring all of the relations to civil ýministries, the employees of the military government became “civilians” carrying on their ýsame tasks under new titles – nothing really changed. Everyone knew that the Israeli ýý“civil affairs” personnel still had the last word. ý

There were great expectations that the peace process would end the occupation and the ýmentality of occupation. One of the contributing factors to the failure of the peace ýprocess was that the mind-set of occupation did not end with the redeployments of Israeli ýforces outside of Palestinian cities. There should have been a conscious decision to ýtransfer all coordination and cooperation outside of direct military-security matters to ýcivilian ministries. Coordination of agricultural affairs should have been dealt with by ýthe two Ministries of Agriculture, tourism by the Ministries of Tourism, etc. without ýmilitary presence overriding decisions and setting the tone. Peace processes must be ýcivilized and de-militarized.ý

Lesson Learned: Personal relationship building is important

It might sound a bit too obvious but it must nonetheless be stated explicitly – peace is ýbuilt first and foremost of the personal relationships of individuals. Looking backwards ýfrom today into the past, it is clear that not all Israeli-Palestinians relationships have ýdisappeared as the violence of the past two years increased. Even on the official level, ýthere remain some working relationships that have played a crucial role over the past two ýyears. In all cases, these working relations were based on personal friendships that ýdeveloped during the years of peace making. Those friendships went beyond the working ýrelations. After the crisis began in September 2000, these personal friendships are what ýbrought people to call their friends to ask about their welfare and their wellbeing of their ýfamilies. After terror attacks in Israel or after Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities, ýthese few personal relationships demonstrated the kind of humanity that one would ýexpect from a peace process. It was this demonstration of humanity that has managed to ýsustain personal relations despite an atmosphere of increasing hatred, fear and anger ýovertakes both societies. ý

The Oslo process created a mechanism called “joint patrols”. These joint patrols were ýIsraeli and Palestinian military personnel patrolling main roads in Palestinian areas ýtogether. Usually, personal relations between the Israeli and Palestinian soldiers did not ýdevelop. The Israelis traveled in their own jeeps and the Palestinians in theirs. When ýthey stopped on the side of the road for coffee breaks, they would part some 50-100 ýmeters from each other and drink their coffee separately. Not all of the officers in the ýjoint patrols even knew the names of their colleagues from the other side with whom they ýpatrolled everyday. When crises occurred and violence broke out, even before September ýý2000, in many cases, the joint patrols ceased to function. When these joint patrols were ýmost needed – for the exact circumstances for which they were created, they were unable ýto function. There were of course exceptions to the rule. It has been reported that the ýjoint patrol that worked in the Jenin area until September 2000, continued to function ýthroughout all of the prior crises, even when joint patrols in other areas were not ýfunctioning. A researcher who looked into the workings of the joint patrols discovered ýthat the commanders of the Jenin joint patrol on both sides had become close personal ýfriends. They had visited each other at home after work and on holidays. Their families ýknew each other and they liked each other. When crises occurred, they picked up the ýphone and spoke with each other. They were able to raise their complaints with each ýother and then they continued to work together, and their work was much more effective.ý

I often lectured to the Israeli officers who commanded joint patrols. In one of my ýlecturers when I emphasized the importance of developing close personal relationships ýwith their Palestinian counterparts, I was told by the commander that this was against ýinstructions. From that point on I concluded all of my lectures to the joint patrols by ýstating that what I have to say may be against orders, but nonetheless, if they forget ýeverything I told them, they should remember one thing: on all of your breaks, sit with ýyour Palestinian colleagues, drink coffee and talk about everything and anything except ýwork. Get to know the Palestinian officers as people and try to befriend them. For many ýof the Palestinian and Israeli officers, just a short time ago, the officers of the other side ýwere their most ardent enemy. Now they must work together, and for them it is as ýdifficult as it is for you. The development of good and friendly personal relations is the ýcornerstone of peace making.ý

Lesson Learned: Ongoing contact between leaders is essential

There was never a “hotline” between the office of the Israeli Prime and the office of the ýPresident of the Palestinian Authority. The “hotline” is not only the technology of a ýspecial phone line – it is a concept. When there is an emergency, pick up the hotline and ýdeal with the crisis quickly and directly. This did not exist in the Israeli-Palestinian ýrelationship. Crises brewed, perked and then exploded. They were then allowed to fester ýuntil “enough” suffering had occurred or until the international community intervened ýand pushed the sides to end the crisis. Even during the beginning of the events of ýSeptember-October 2000 there was no direct contact between Ehud Barak and Yasser ýArafat. Despite the attempts of many to bring about direct contact, either by telephone or ýa face-to-face meeting, including efforts by IPCRI led to no direct contact. At the time ýwhen direct contact could have been the most potentially powerful means of putting an ýend to the crisis and the violence, the resistance to that contact due to the total lack of ýtrust and confidence between the leaders meant that the leaders essentially preferred to ýescalate the conflict through vociferous mutual criticisms rather than overcoming their ýmutual dislikes of each in favor of the larger interests of their people. ý

On the fourth night of the intifada, IPCRI had almost succeeded in bringing about a face-ýto-face meeting between Barak and Arafat through the good offices of Jabril Rajoub. ýArafat agreed to and even proposed hosting Barak in Rajoub’s office in Ramallah. But ýBarak rejected the offer and in the coming days the violence continued to escalate leading ýto the first direct attack by the IDF on the Palestinian Authority after the lynch of two ýIsraeli soldiers by a mob that was assisted by Palestinian police. Had there already been a ýmeans and a tradition of direct and immediate contact between the leaders perhaps the ýsituation would not have escalated beyond control. ý

Lessons learned: Peace processes must also take place from the bottom-up.ý

The Oslo Peace Process was largely framed as a “top-down” strategy for achieving peace ýbetween Israel and the Palestinians. The strategy was based on reaching political ýagreements between the Government of Israel and the PLO. The expectation was that ýpolitical agreements between the leaders would significantly change the realities on the ýground and the peoples of both sides would almost automatically support the process. As ýan afterthought, the sides added to the Oslo II agreement an annex calling for the ýinstitution of People-to-People projects as a means of strengthening peace between the ýtwo peoples. The international community embraced the agreements and the idea of ýPeople-to-People projects. However, during all of the years of the peace process (until ýSeptember 2000) an estimated $20-$25 million dollars only was allocated for funding ýpeople-to-people projects mainly through NGO’s and Civil Society Institutions in Israel ýand Palestine. Most projects were one-time events as almost none of the donors provided ýmulti-year funding allowing for the development of a clear and coherent strategy for ýaffecting changes of public opinion. In the final assessment, the people-to-people process ýwas not taken seriously, not by the donors and not by the Israeli government or the ýPalestinian Authority which allocated almost no funding at all to this process and paid ýonly lip service to it politically. ý

Most Israelis and Palestinians never participated in a people-to-people program. Most ýIsraelis and Palestinians never even knew about people-to-people programs and activities. ýThe local and the international media almost completely ignored these activities as they ýseemed to them to be common place and not news worthy – good news doesn’t sell ýnewspapers. Only after the peace process collapsed did people begin to ask where were ýall of the people-to-people contacts that should have built peace from the bottom-up. The ýsuccessful people-to-people programs did continue into the intifada and have been ýsustained up to today. The main people-to-people NGOs that conducted and organized ýthese programs remain today as the only foundation for peace making on the ground ýbetween Israelis and Palestinians.ý

At the time of the outbreak of violence, most of the donors froze their support for these ýprojects taking a “time-out” for assessment and evaluation. Just when these funds were ýneeded more than ever, they became more and more difficult to find.ý

Peace building and peace making must be a top-down process with governments and ýrepresentatives making political agreements. It must also be a bottom-up process ýinvolving critical masses of people from both sides of the conflict. The governments and ýrepresentatives must provide real and substantial political and financial support for these ýactivities. This aspect of peace making must be taken a lot more seriously than it was in ýthe Israeli-Palestinian process. While its direct impact may be difficult to measure, and ýthis is perhaps one of the reasons why some donors are reluctant to fund it, the conclusion ýthat these activities are of great value is based on more than logic and good intentions. ýThe people-to-people NGOs have played a most significant role in the past two years in ýkeeping contacts between the sides alive and viable. Without them there would be almost ýno positive contacts at all today between Israelis and Palestinians. There must be ýrecognition by the governments and representatives of the value of this work and when ýthe sides come back to the negotiating table, they should invest a lot more energy and ýthought into how to integrate the bottom-up peace making process within their overall ýstrategies.ý

ý* Dr. Gershon Baskin is the Founder and Co-Director of IPCRI – Israel/Palestine Center ýfor Research and Information