Mideastweb: Middle East

UNMOVIC AND IAEA IRAQ INSPECTION REPORTS 
January 27, 2003

Middle East

news

peacewatch

top stories

books

Documents

culture

dialog

links

more links

donations

Introduction

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1441, the inspection teams were supposed to report back to the UN regarding results of inspections following the submission of the Iraqi Report. These reports were filed January 27.  Hans Blix of UNMOVIC noted that the Iraqi report had not accounted for large quantities of illegal weapons and materials that had been tallied in previous UN reports, and further noted that the Iraqi report of December 7, 2002 that was to have produced full disclosure, was unsatisfactory. Perhaps the most alarming finding was that Iraq had continued to import forbidden missile components as late as December of 2002, while the inspections had already resumed.

The IAEA issued a report on January 27, noting that there was no evidence of Iraqi nuclear weapons development, but that a number of questions remained unresolved. A separate statement by the IAEA on January 27 noted only that there was no evidence of Iraqi nuclear weapons development. Both the head of the IAEA, Mohamed El-Baradei, and the Chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, asked for more time to continue inspections. However, the USA appeared determined to go to war with Iraq based on the evidence of non-compliance in the UNMOVIC report, and on US intelligence, indicating substantial illegal weapons development.

Highlights of the UNMOVIC Report:

On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002)....

One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent commentators have often cited.

While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current “unresolved disarmament issues” and “key remaining disarmament tasks” in response to requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.

They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq’s letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.

....

The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.

Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.

There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.

....

I would now like to turn to the so-called “Air Force document” that I have discussed with the Council before...

... The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.

The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.

The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

....

Missiles

...  Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.

The Al Samoud’s diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles....

These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles.

In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km.

Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2.

Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.

 

In his State of the Union address on January 28, US President George Bush emphasized that Iraq had not made full disclosures of its weapons programs, and promised that Secretary of State Powell would disclose information about weapons programs and ties to international terror organizations in a speech to the Security Council to be delivered February 5.

 


Notice - Copyright

This introduction is copyright 2003 by MidEastWeb http://www.mideastweb.org and the author. Please tell your friends about MidEastWeb and link to this page. Please do not copy this page to your Web site. You may print this page out for classroom use provided that this notice is appended, and you may cite this material in the usual way. Other uses by permission only.  The source material below is placed in the public domain and is free of copy restrictions.


THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 27 JANUARY 2003:

AN UPDATE ON INSPECTION

Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix

 

The governing Security Council resolutions

 The resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in November last year asks UNMOVIC and the IAEA to “update” the Council 60 days after the resumption of inspections. This is today. The updating, it seems, forms part of an assessment by the Council and its Members of the results, so far, of the inspections and of their role as a means to achieve verifiable disarmament in Iraq.

 As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be appropriate briefly to provide some background for a better understanding of where we stand today.

With your permission, I shall do so.

 I begin by recalling that inspections as a part of a disarmament process in Iraq started in 1991, immediately after the Gulf War. They went on for eight years until December 1998, when inspectors were withdrawn. Thereafter, for nearly four years there were no inspections. They were resumed only at the end of November last year.

While the fundamental aim of inspections in Iraq has always been to verify disarmament, the successive resolutions adopted by the Council over the years have varied somewhat in emphasis and approach.

 In 1991, resolution 687 (1991), adopted unanimously as a part of the cease-fire after the Gulf War, had five major elements. The three first related to disarmament. They called for :

  declarations by Iraq of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles;

  verification of the declarations through UNSCOM and the IAEA;

  supervision by these organizations of the destruction or the elimination of proscribed programmes and items.

After the completion of the disarmament :

· the Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting of the sanctions (economic restrictions); and

  the inspecting organizations would move to long-term ongoing monitoring and verification.

Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.

As we know, the twin operation ‘declare and verify’, which was prescribed in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a game of ‘hide and seek’. Rather than just verifying declarations and supporting evidence, the two inspecting organizations found themselves engaged in efforts to map the weapons programmes and to search for evidence through inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers and intelligence organizations. As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed in the short time expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the gradual development of that programme mitigated the effects of the sanctions.

The implementation of resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought about considerable disarmament results. It has been recognized that more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this resolution than were destroyed during the Gulf War: large quantities of chemical weapons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision before 1994. While Iraq claims – with little evidence – that it destroyed all biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons production facilities in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.

One of three important questions before us today is how much might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors left; and the third question is how it can be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future.

In December 1999 – after one year without inspections in Iraq – resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted by the Council with 4 abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for “cooperation in all respects” for a specified period of time, including progress in the resolution of “key remaining disarmament tasks”, it opened the possibility, not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.

For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC. It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and Arab States and pressure by the United States and other Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September last year that it would again accept inspections without conditions.

Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The resolution contained many provisions, which we welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.

UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be required. The resolutions also point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal.

As a subsidiary body of the Council, UNMOVIC is fully aware of and appreciates the close attention, which the Council devotes to the inspections in Iraq. While today’s “updating” is foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), the Council can and does call for additional briefings whenever it wishes. One was held on 19 January and a further such briefing is tentatively set for 14 February.

I turn now to the key requirement of cooperation and Iraq’s response to it. Cooperation might be said to relate to both substance and process. It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, notably access. A similar decision is indispensable to provide cooperation on substance in order to bring the disarmament task to completion through the peaceful process of inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course. An initial minor step would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required by the resolutions.

I shall deal first with cooperation on process.

Cooperation on process

It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms, infrastructure and practical arrangements to pursue inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While inspection is not built on the premise of confidence but may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the very beginning in running the operation of inspection.

Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this field. The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. We have further had great help in building up the infrastructure of our office in Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane and our helicopters have been good. The environment has been workable.

Our inspections have included universities, military bases, presidential sites and private residences. Inspections have also taken place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas day and New Years day. These inspections have been conducted in the same manner as all other inspections. We seek to be both effective and correct.

In this updating I am bound, however, to register some problems. Firstly, relating to two kinds of air operations.

While we now have the technical capability to send a U-2 plane placed at our disposal for aerial imagery and for surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq that we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled. As these conditions went beyond what is stipulated in resolution 1441 (2002) and what was practiced by UNSCOM and Iraq in the past, we note that Iraq is not so far complying with our request. I hope this attitude will change.

Another air operation problem – which was solved during our recent talks in Baghdad – concerned the use of helicopters flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted on sending helicopters of their own to accompany ours. This would have raised a safety problem. The matter was solved by an offer on our part to take the accompanying Iraq minders in our helicopters to the sites, an arrangement that had been practiced by UNSCOM in the past.

I am obliged to note some recent disturbing incidents and harassment. For instance, for some time farfetched allegations have been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors were of intelligence character. While I might not defend every question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and Iraq should not say so.

On a number of occasions, demonstrations have taken place in front of our offices and at inspection sites.

The other day, a sightseeing excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was followed by an unwarranted public outburst. The inspectors went without any UN insignia and were welcomed in the kind manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken around. They asked perfectly innocent questions and parted with the invitation to come again.

Shortly thereafter, we receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about an unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for these events. They do not facilitate an already difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the same time, correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner.

Cooperation on substance

The substantive cooperation required relates above all to the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction and either to present items and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed remains.

Paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002) states that this cooperation shall be “active”. It is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a game of “catch as catch can”. Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the purpose of creating confidence. It is not built upon the premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if there is both openness to the inspectors and action to present them with items to destroy or credible evidence about the absence of any such items.

The declaration of 7 December

On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002) and within the time stipulated by the Security Council. In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.

One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent commentators have often cited.

While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current “unresolved disarmament issues” and “key remaining disarmament tasks” in response to requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.

They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq’s letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.

I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be answered and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons

The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.

Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.

There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.

I would now like to turn to the so-called “Air Force document” that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC.

The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.

The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.

The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.

The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further 4 chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.

I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.

Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.

Biological weapons

I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one.

Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.

There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.

As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq’s submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.

In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq’s Foreign Minister stated that “all imported quantities of growth media were declared”. This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax.

Missiles

I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles.

There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions.

Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.

The Al Samoud’s diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.

During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km.

These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles.

In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km.

Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2.

Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.

Mr. President,

I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and that need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have pointed to some during my presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more systematic. Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is presented to the contrary they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent. UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but nor is it – or I think anyone else after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 – presuming the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and full transparency may help. Let me be specific.

Find the items and activities

Information provided by Member States tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up any credible leads given to us and report what we might find as well as any denial of access.

So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122 mm warheads for chemical weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine. Why not extend the search to other items? Declare what may be found and destroy it under our supervision?

Find documents

When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have all too often met the response that there are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have been presented, we are told. All documents relating to the biological weapons programme were destroyed together with the weapons.

However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on how they have been used. It should also have letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of material.

In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons programme. Potentially, it might help to clear some open issues.

The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their work places. On our side, we cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by placing them in private homes.

Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter.

Find persons to give credible information: a list of personnel

When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of documents is not available, it ought at least to find individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify about their experience. Large weapons programmes are moved and managed by people. Interviews with individuals who may have worked in

programmes in the past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they are now employed in peaceful sectors. These were the reasons why UNMOVIC asked for a list of such persons, in accordance with resolution 1441.

Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons programmes as well as their missile programmes were provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over 3,500 names of people associated with those past weapons programmes that UNSCOM either interviewed in the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources. At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to supplementing the list and some 80 additional names have been provided.

Allow information through credible interviews

In the past, much valuable information came from interviews. There were also cases in which the interviewee was clearly intimidated by the presence of and interruption by Iraqi officials. This was the background of resolution 1441’s provision for a right for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to hold private interviews “in the mode or location” of our choice, in Baghdad or even abroad.

To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that the individual will only speak at Iraq’s monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews “in private”, that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed. However, we hope that with further encouragement from the authorities, knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews, in Baghdad or abroad.

UNMOVIC’s capability

Mr President, I must not conclude this “update” without some notes on the growing capability of UNMOVIC.

In the past two months, UNMOVIC has built-up its capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries. This includes approximately 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff, medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field office. All serve the United Nations and report to no one else. Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our training programme continues — even at this moment we have a training course in session in Vienna. At the end of that course, we shall have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to draw inspectors.

A team supplied by the Swiss Government is refurbishing our offices in Baghdad, which had been empty for four years. The Government of New Zealand has contributed both a medical team and a communications team. The German Government will contribute unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and a group of specialists to operate them for us within Iraq. The Government of Cyprus has kindly allowed us to set up a Field Office in Larnaca. All these contributions have been of assistance in quickly starting up our inspections and enhancing our capabilities. So has help from the UN in New York and from sister organizations in Baghdad.

In the past two months during which we have built-up our presence in Iraq, we have conducted about 300 inspections to more than 230 different sites. Of these, more than 20 were sites that had not been inspected before. By the end of December, UNMOVIC began using helicopters both for the transport of inspectors and for actual inspection work. We now have eight helicopters. They have already proved invaluable in helping to “freeze” large sites by observing the movement of traffic in and around the area.

Setting up a field office in Mosul has facilitated rapid inspections of sites in northern Iraq. We plan to establish soon a second field office in the Basra area, where we have already inspected a number of sites.

Mr. President,

We have now an inspection apparatus that permits us to send multiple inspection teams every day all over Iraq, by road or by air. Let me end by simply noting that that capability which has been built-up in a short time and which is now operating, is at the disposal of the Security Council.
Source:  http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm


IAEA UPDATE REPORT FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1441 (2002)

1. This report is submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the Security Council in accordance with resolution 1441 (2002), adopted on 8 November 2002, in paragraph 5 of which the Council requested the IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to resume inspections in Iraq no later than 45 days following adoption of that resolution, and to update the Council 60 days thereafter. Inspections in Iraq pursuant to resolution 1441 (2002) were resumed by the IAEA and UNMOVIC on 27 November 2002.

I. BACKGROUND

2. In resolution 687 (1991), the IAEA was tasked with mapping out and destroying, removing or rendering harmless, the components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. It was also tasked with ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under that and other relevant resolutions. The IAEA's plan for such ongoing monitoring and verification (the OMV Plan) was approved by the Security Council in resolution 715 (1991). Among the other relevant resolutions is resolution 707 (1991), pursuant to which Iraq is prohibited from engaging in any nuclear activities, except the use of radioisotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes, until such time as the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), and the IAEA determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the Agreement between Iraq and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement).

3. On 16 December 1998, IAEA inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq. This action was taken after the decision by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), on whose logistic support the IAEA's activities in Iraq were dependent, to withdraw all of its personnel from Iraq, and out of concern for the safety and security of our personnel in anticipation of imminent military action.

4. By the time the inspectors were withdrawn, the IAEA had been able to draw a comprehensive and coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme, and to dismantle the programme. The IAEA had destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all of the physical capabilities of Iraq to produce amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. The IAEA had concluded with respect to Iraq's past nuclear programme that:

  1. There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had been successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons.
     

  2. All nuclear material of significance to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was verified and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) was removed from Iraq.
     

  3. Iraq had successfully concentrated uranium from its own ore and produced industrial quantities of feed material (UCl4) for electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS). There were no indications that the production of feed material for centrifuge enrichment (UF6) went beyond laboratory level.
     

  4. Iraq had been at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of high enriched uranium through the EMIS process and the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines. However, there were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material through its indigenous processes.
     

  5. Iraq had explored several other enrichment routes, including gaseous diffusion, chemical enrichment and laser enrichment without achieving any significant progress.
     

  6. Iraq had made major progress in the area of weaponisation, but still had significant hurdles to overcome before being able to complete the fabrication of a first nuclear implosion device.
     

  7. There were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.
     

  8. There were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD) submitted by Iraq to the IAEA, pursuant to resolution 707 (1991), in 1996, and supplemented in 1998.

5. As of December 1998, there were no key outstanding disarmament issues in the nuclear area, although there were a number of questions and concerns about Iraq's past nuclear programme the clarification of which by Iraq would have reduced the uncertainty in the completeness of the IAEA's knowledge and understanding. These remaining questions and concerns related to: the uncertainty about the progress made in weapons design and centrifuge development due to the lack of relevant documentation; the extent of external assistance from which Iraq benefited; and the lack of evidence that Iraq had abandoned definitively its nuclear programme.

6. In the four years following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors, the IAEA's activities in Iraq were limited to annual verification, pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement, of the nuclear material (several tons of yellow cake and other natural uranium and some low enriched and depleted uranium) that remained in Iraq under IAEA seal.

7. During that intervening period, the Security Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999), which, inter alia, established UNMOVIC, reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, established procedures and time frames for the implementation by the IAEA and UNMOVIC of their respective mandates and provided for the possibility of the suspension of sanctions in Iraq.

8. On 16 September 2002, the Foreign Minister of Iraq informed the Secretary-General that Iraq had decided to "allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions". On that basis, talks were held in Vienna on 30 September and 1 October 2002 between representatives of Iraq on the one hand and the IAEA and UNMOVIC on the other on practical arrangements necessary for the resumption of inspections.

9. On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted resolution 1441 (2002). In paragraph 9 of that resolution, the Council demanded that Iraq confirm, within seven days of notification by the Secretary-General of the adoption of the resolution, "its intention to comply fully with" that resolution. The Council demanded further that Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA." In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 13 November 2002, Iraq stated that it would "deal with resolution 1441 (2002)", and that it was "ready to receive the inspectors so that they can perform their duties and ascertain that Iraq has produced no weapons of mass destruction in their absence from Iraq since 1998".

10. The Security Council also decided, in paragraph 3 of that resolution, that, in addition to submitting the biannual declarations required under the OMV Plans of the IAEA and UNMOVIC, Iraq was to provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Security Council, not later than 30 days from the date of the resolution, "a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems … , including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material".

11. In paragraph 5 of resolution 1441 (2002), the Security Council instructed UNMOVIC, and requested the IAEA, to resume inspections in Iraq no later than 45 days after adoption of that resolution. An advance team of IAEA and UNMOVIC personnel, including the Director General of the IAEA and the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, visited Baghdad on 18 and 19 November 2002 for a meeting with their Iraqi counterparts, led by Dr. Amer H. Al Saa'di, Adviser to the Presidency, to further discuss logistical arrangements and to re-instate the inspectorates' office in Baghdad.

12. The IAEA and UNMOVIC resumed inspections on 27 November 2002.

13. On 8 December 2002, the IAEA received at its Headquarters in Vienna, under cover of a letter dated 7 December 2002 from Dr. Al Saa'di, the nuclear-related declaration submitted by Iraq, in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002), as its "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD). The CAFCD consisted of seven volumes, the first six of which were entitled "The past Iraqi nuclear programme" and covered Iraq's nuclear activities prior to 1991, and the seventh of which was entitled "Nuclear programme from 1991 up to 2002".

II. IAEA ACTIVITIES SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF INSPECTIONS

A. INVO and the Start-up of the Baghdad Field Office

14. The IAEA core team for the implementation of the IAEA's Security Council mandate in Iraq (formerly known as the UNSCR 687 Action Team, now renamed the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, or INVO) has increased its staff and is proceeding with an intensive recruitment effort to ensure that the team is composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available.

15. The IAEA, with the assistance and co-operation of UNMOVIC as foreseen in resolution 1441 (2002), has re-established its field office in the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC). In addition to logistical support provided by UNMOVIC to the IAEA inspection teams, such as air transport, vehicles, radio communications and medical support, the IAEA has installed a secure computer network, secure storerooms and radiometric measurement laboratories.

B. Declarations

1. Backlog of semi-annual declarations

16. Under the IAEA's OMV Plan, Iraq is required to submit semi-annual declarations, on 15 January and 15 July of each year, containing, inter alia, information on: nuclear material; relevant facilities, installations and sites; material, equipment and items identified in Annex 3 of the OMV Plan; and isotopes. Semi-annual declarations were provided by Iraq between 1994 and 1998, but none were submitted following the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq in December 1998.

17. During the meeting held in Vienna on 30 September and 1 October 2002 between Iraq, UNMOVIC and the IAEA, Iraq provided the IAEA with the backlog of semi-annual declarations that had been due between January 1999 and July 2002. Iraq subsequently provided corrections to those declarations, along with explanations of some of the changes related to items reported in the declarations. Iraq has also recently submitted to the IAEA the semi-annual declaration, due in January 2003, covering the second half of 2002.

2. The "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD)

18. As indicated above, Iraq submitted its nuclear-related CAFCD to the IAEA in December 2002, as required pursuant to resolution 1441 (2002). In carrying out its preliminary assessment of the Iraqi declaration, the IAEA concentrated on:

  1. a comparison of Iraq's current declaration regarding its nuclear programme prior to 1991 with Iraq's 1998 FFCD; and
     

  2. the review of Iraq's declaration regarding its nuclear programme over the period 1991 to 2002, with particular emphasis on Iraqi activities since late 1998.

19. In the CAFCD, Iraq states that: "No activities of any substance related to the former [Iraqi nuclear program] were carried out during and beyond April 1991. All nuclear program activities were practically terminated and abandoned during April 1991 and only reports of previous accomplishments and new missions (non-proscribed) were issued later." (Extended Summary, page 86/113)

20. Iraq's CAFCD regarding its nuclear programme prior to 1991 contains no substantive differences from the FFCD provided to the IAEA in 1998. The CAFCD contains numerous clarifications. It does not include, however, additional information related to the questions and concerns referred to in paragraph 5 above.

21. With regard to the period between 1991 and 2002, the CAFCD states that Iraq's nuclear activities were limited to the use of radioisotopes for non-proscribed purposes (i.e. medical, agricultural and industrial uses), in conformity with Security Council resolution 707 (1991). The remainder of the declaration covering the post-1991 period provides a description of the activities which were or are being conducted at current and former Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) sites, at locations established since 1991 to which a number of former IAEC personnel were transferred, and at other industrial locations that supported the weapons development programme in the past. All of these sites and locations were previously known to the IAEA and were subject to on-going monitoring and verification prior to 1998.

22. The IAEC sites were heavily damaged during the Gulf War. Pursuant to the Security Council mandate in resolution 687 (1991), IAEA inspection teams eliminated all remaining weapons development infrastructure at these sites. In its CAFCD, Iraq declared that the current and former IAEC sites, as well as the locations to which former IAEC personnel were transferred, are now devoted to the conduct of non-nuclear commercial activities. The other industrial locations that had supported the past weapons programme were declared as now being involved in a variety of industrial and military applications.

23. From the IAEA's assessment to date of the Iraqi declaration, the following conclusions have been drawn:

  1. The part of the CAFCD which concerns Iraq's past nuclear programme (that is, the programme prior to 1991) contains no substantive differences from its earlier FFCD and appears to be consistent with the IAEA's understanding of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme (as reported to the Security Council in S/1997/779, S/1999/127 and S/2002/1150).
     

  2. The part of the CAFCD which covers Iraq's programme between 1991 and 1998 is consistent with the conclusions drawn by the IAEA on the basis of its verification activities conducted throughout that period and regularly reported to the Security Council.
     

  3. The key outstanding issue for the IAEA is the accuracy and completeness of Iraq's declaration that there have been no material changes in its nuclear programme since 1998 and that its nuclear activities have been limited to the non-proscribed use of radioisotopes.

24. The IAEA has integrated the new declarations submitted by Iraq with the information accumulated between 1991 and 1998 (such as original Iraqi documents, results of inspections, commercial satellite imagery and information provided by States) and information acquired after 1998. Analysis of all of this information is continuing in parallel with, and in support of, inspection activities.

3. Other Declarations

25. In response to a request by the IAEA in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1441 (2002), Iraq provided a list of 214 Iraqi personnel involved in Iraq's past nuclear programme, most of whose names are well known to the IAEA as a result of its inspection activities prior to 1998. The list includes the professional rank, as well as the location where each of these individuals currently works. The IAEA has already met with many of these people since inspections were resumed in November 2002.

26. During a meeting held 19-20 January 2003 in Baghdad, in which the Director General of the IAEA and the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC met with an Iraqi delegation led by Dr. Al Saa'di, Iraq agreed to supplement the list in accordance with advice from the IAEA and to provide information on the whereabouts of key scientists and technicians.

C. Documents

27. The Iraqi counterpart has been requested, in the course of inspections, to provide explanations in writing of complex matters and inventories of items of relevance to investigations of specific issues. These explanations and inventories have been provided in the form of summaries and new documents, generated on an ad hoc basis. While Iraq might have been more proactive in anticipating the need for some of this documentation, the requested documents have been prepared and provided to the IAEA within reasonable time frames.

28. In response to inspectors' questions, Iraq has also provided documents that appear to be original documents prepared contemporaneously with the events described in them (such as reports, minutes of meetings, letters and communications, and notes created as part of the normal operations of a programme). The provision by Iraq of such original documents has been and remains critical for verification of Iraq's declaration.

29. On 16 January 2003, documents were found in the private home of an employee of an Iraqi Government company, a former staff member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. Most of the 2000 pages concern laser physics or uranium enrichment using laser techniques, some pages of which were marked as being classified. Although a preliminary analysis of these documents suggests that they are not of particular significance in terms of providing new information concerning Iraq's past nuclear programme, it suggests that documents of relevance can be found at private homes. Iraq has been urged to implement measures to locate any other documents which may have been retained by individuals and which contain information relevant to Iraq's nuclear and nuclear-related activities and to provide promptly to the IAEA any documents so located.

D. Inspections

1. Sites

30. Since the resumption of inspections on 27 November 2002, the IAEA has conducted 139 inspections at 106 sites, including two Presidential Sites. 31. The focus of the first phase of inspections was reconnaissance: re-establishment of the IAEA's knowledge of Iraq's remaining nuclear capabilities, including confirmation of the locations of major equipment, of nuclear material and significant non-nuclear materials, and of key technical personnel.

32. The first step of the reconnaissance phase was to inspect facilities that were known to have been of significance in the past programme, to confirm that no nuclear activities have been revived at these locations. Most of these facilities were effectively destroyed either during the Gulf War or pursuant to the IAEA's authority under resolution 687 (1991). The IAEA has also re-inspected several dozen facilities that had been deemed prior to 1998 as being capable of supporting the resumption of a nuclear programme. There were no signs of nuclear activities at any of these facilities.

33. During this phase, the IAEA has concentrated on accounting for the most significant equipment monitored at these facilities under the OMV Plan prior to 1998. It is now in the process of locating other equipment, material and sources.

34. While the IAEA is still continuing with its reconnaissance, the inspectors have already initiated the investigative phase, with particular emphasis on Iraq's activities over the last four years, focusing on those areas of concern identified by States, as well as those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis.

35. Drawing from satellite imagery and other information available to it, the IAEA identified a number of sites, some of which had been associated with Iraq's past nuclear activities, where modifications of possible relevance to the IAEA's mandate had been made, or new buildings constructed, between 1998 and 2002. Eight of these sites were identified by States as being locations where nuclear activities were suspected of being conducted. All of these sites were inspected to ascertain whether there had been developments in technical capabilities, organization, structure, facility boundaries or personnel. In general, the IAEA has observed that, while a few sites have improved their facilities and taken on new personnel over the past four years, at the majority of these sites (which had been involved in research, development and manufacturing) the equipment and laboratories have deteriorated to such a degree that the resumption of nuclear activities would require substantial renovation. The IAEA has found no signs of nuclear activity at any of these sites.

36. Several other facilities which had never been inspected by the IAEA or UNSCOM in the past were inspected in response to information that indicated the presence of large industrial capabilities at those locations. None of these facilities has proven to be nuclear-related or to require their declaration by Iraq.

2. Inventory of Nuclear Material

37. As indicated above, prior to the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors from Iraq in December 1998, the IAEA had removed from Iraq all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material. The remaining stocks of nuclear material in Iraq are stored under IAEA seal in a storage facility referred to as Location C, just outside the Tuwaitha complex.

38. An inspection of Location C was undertaken in December 2002 to verify the nuclear material. The inspection confirmed that the IAEA seals, and the inventory of nuclear material, remained intact since the last safeguards inspection in January 2002.

3. Ongoing Monitoring - Containment, Surveillance and Sampling

39. The IAEA will soon re-introduce containment and surveillance systems for the monitoring of critical dual-use equipment and activities associated with such equipment. The systems will provide not only for the application of seals and the installation of cameras, but the remote transmission of data in near-real-time mode from those cameras. An example of this will be the installation at certain sites of surveillance systems to monitor the location and use of flow forming machines which had been monitored by the IAEA prior to 1998 and are subject to ongoing monitoring and verification.

40. The IAEA verification system in Iraq also includes numerous methods and technologies designed to detect certain radioisotopes. Given the restrictions imposed on Iraqi nuclear activities, the detection of radiation in facilities or in the environment can be an important indicator that could guide inspections and investigations.

41. The monitoring of Iraq's waterways (rivers, canals and lakes), through the collection of water, sediment and vegetation, began in 1992, and was implemented on a semi-annual basis until December 1998. The programme also surveyed the sewage outfalls of waste treatment plants and any other facility of interest. The first such campaign since inspections were resumed was completed in December 2002. The samples are still being analysed.

42. In 1998, the IAEA also initiated a programme of wide-area environmental sampling, which consisted of air sampling and widespread vegetation and swipe sampling. Four IAEA air samplers were in operation in Iraq in 1998. The samplers were removed from Iraq by IAEA inspectors in November 2002 for servicing. They will be re-installed within the next two weeks.

43. The IAEA's environmental sampling programme also included the taking of surface swipe samples in factories and laboratories across Iraq. The IAEA inspectors have resumed this activity at key locations previously associated with Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme and at new sites. Analysis of the results thus far obtained has revealed no indication of the conduct of proscribed activities at the locations where these samples were taken.

44. In addition to the taking of environmental samples, the IAEA has re-instituted routine car-borne and hand-held gamma surveys in Iraq. The purpose of these surveys is to detect the existence of possible undeclared nuclear material or radioisotopes, not just within inspected sites, but also along routes travelled by the gamma survey vehicle. No indications of proscribed nuclear activities have been detected thus far during these surveys.

E. Interviews

45. The IAEA has regularly conducted interviews of Iraqi scientists, managers and technicians in its inspection and monitoring process. Interviews elicit information about individuals and their activities that can confirm where they work or worked, the activities in which they are or were engaged and hierarchical relationships. Discussions and interviews are a major tool for obtaining information about programmes, activities and achievements. Such information has proven essential in assessing the completeness and accuracy of the IAEA's understanding of Iraq's past and current programmes.

46. The IAEA has conducted many interviews since the resumption of inspections, some in the form of group interviews. During these interviews, the IAEA has focussed on activities in which the individuals are known to have participated or are currently participating.

47. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1441 (2002), the IAEA is entitled to private access to all officials and other persons whom it wishes to interview. The first two individuals whom the IAEA requested to be interviewed privately declined to be interviewed except in the presence of an Iraqi Government representative. It is noted, however, that, in the course of the meeting on 20 January 2003 in Baghdad, Iraq committed itself to encourage its citizens to accept to be interviewed in private. However, it is regrettable that a request for a private interview made following that commitment was declined by the interviewee. The IAEA intends to make full use of its interview authority and to determine the modalities and locations for interviews, both inside and outside of Iraq as necessary. It will continue to report to the Security Council on its efforts and degree of success in that regard.

F. Specific Issues Raised by States

1. Aluminium Tubes

48. In recent months, concerns have been expressed about attempts by Iraq to procure high-strength aluminium tubes. These concerns arose from the fact that high-strength aluminium tubes with appropriate characteristics can be used as components of equipment for the enrichment of uranium.

49. In response to IAEA questioning, the Iraqi authorities indicated that unsuccessful attempts had been made between 2000 and 2002 to procure high-strength aluminium tubes, but that the tubes had been intended for use in connection with a programme aimed at reverse engineering 81-millimetre rockets.

50. According to Iraq, a large number of 81-millimetre rockets, the combustion chambers of which were made of high-strength aluminium, had been imported into Iraq in the middle of the 1980's. Most of these rockets were consumed during the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Between 1988 and 1989, Iraq imported 160 000 un-anodized aluminium tubes with the goal of reverse engineering the original rockets and establishing its own indigenous capability of producing similar rockets. The programme was delayed by many factors, including the fact that, due to their being un-anodized, the majority of the imported tubes were ruined through poor storage and weather conditions. Of the 160 000 imported tubes, about 20 000 were salvaged, roughly 13 000 of which were subsequently used in the manufacture of rockets. According to Iraqi officials, Iraq began to look for a new supply of tubes in 2000, using private traders to search abroad for new tubes. The new tubes were to be anodised, to take into account uncertain storage conditions while awaiting machining.

51. The IAEA has conducted a series of inspections at sites involved in the production and storage of reverse engineered rockets, held discussions with and interviewed Iraq personnel, taken samples of aluminium tubes and begun a review of the documentation provided by Iraq relating to contracts with the traders.

52. As a result of these inspection efforts, it has been possible to confirm the existence of a programme for producing 81-millimetre rockets. The IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminium tubes recently sought by Iraq appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for such use. The IAEA will continue to investigate the matter. It should be noted, however, that the attempted acquisition of such tubes is prohibited under paragraph 24(a) of resolution 687 (1991), which, inter alia, proscribes the supply to Iraq of components of arms and related matéiel.

2. HMX

53. The relocation and consumption of HMX (a high explosive of potential use in nuclear weapons), as described in Iraq's backlog of semi-annual declarations, has been investigated by the IAEA. In those declarations, Iraq stated that, between 1998 and 2002, it had transferred 32 of the 228 tonnes of HMX which had been under IAEA seal as of December 1998 to other locations. In addition, Iraq stated that a very small quantity (46 kg) of HMX had been used at munitions factories for research and development. At the request of the IAEA, Iraq has provided further clarification on the movement and use of the HMX. In that clarification, Iraq indicated that the 32 tonnes of HMX had been blended with sulphur to produce industrial explosives and provided mainly to cement plants for quarrying, and that the research and development using the small quantity of HMX had been in the areas of personnel mines, explosives in civilian use, missile warhead filling and research on tanks.

54. IAEA inspectors have been able to verify and re-seal the remaining balance of approximately 196 tonnes of HMX, most of which has remained at the original storage location. The movement of the blended HMX and the other small quantity of HMX has also been documented by Iraq. However, it has not been possible to verify the use of those materials, as all of it is said to have been consumed through explosions and there are no immediately available technical means for verifying such uses. The IAEA will continue to investigate means of verifying the Iraqi statements about the use of the HMX and blended HMX.

3. Uranium imports

55. In response to information suggesting that Iraq had attempted to import uranium from an African country, the IAEA has requested Iraq to provide clarification. Iraq has denied that it imported or attempted to import uranium in any form after 1990. This message was also conveyed in an official letter to the IAEA on 14 January 2003.

56. During the recent high-level meeting held in Baghdad, Iraq was encouraged to take a more proactive approach to assisting the IAEA in resolving the issue. The IAEA will continue to further investigate the matter.

4. Procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities

57. Questions have been raised about Iraqi attempts to construct a facility for the manufacture of magnets.

58. In response to IAEA inquiries, Iraq presented detailed information on a project to construct a facility to produce magnets for the Iraqi missile programme, as well as for industrial applications, and that Iraq had prepared a solicitation of offers, but that the project had been delayed due to "financial credit arrangements".

59. Preliminary investigations indicate that the specifications contained in the offer solicitation are consistent with those required for the declared intended uses. However, the IAEA will continue to investigate the matter with a view to ascertaining whether the attempted procurement was in connection with efforts to resume activities associated with uranium enrichment.

G. Co-operation

60. In support of the IAEA inspections, the Iraqi authorities have provided access to all facilities visited - including presidential compounds and private residences - without conditions and without delay, despite some complaints about the inconvenience or intrusive nature of the inspection activities. The IAEA has taken, and will continue to take, full advantage of all of the inspection authority granted by resolution 1441 (2002). In doing so, the inspectors have been instructed to make every effort to conduct their activities with professionalism and sensitivity.

61. The Iraqi authorities also have been co-operative in making available additional original documentation, in response to requests by IAEA inspectors. These documents, however, have to date not included any information relevant to the questions and concerns that have been outstanding since 1998.

62. As indicated above, on 19 and 20 January 2003, the Director General of the IAEA and the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC met in Baghdad with an Iraqi delegation, headed by Dr. Al Saa'di, with a view to encouraging greater transparency and more proactive co-operation on the part of Iraq. A statement was issued on the outcome of the meeting (see Attachment 1).

III. IAEA ASSESSMENT

63. Neither Iraqi declarations nor IAEA inspections have given rise to any new information of significance regarding the period covering Iraq's past nuclear programme (pre-1991) or the evolution of its nuclear-related capabilities between 1991 and 1998. The only area where some refinement of the understanding of Iraq's past programme may be expected is in the area of laser enrichment, owing to the discovery of the cache of documents referred to in paragraph 28 above. However, an initial review of these documents suggests that they are unlikely to change the IAEA's conclusion with respect to the lack of achievement in the production of enriched uranium using this method.

64. Little progress has been made in resolving the questions and concerns that remained as of 1998. On the question of external assistance to the past nuclear programme, Iraq has provided a letter that summarises information provided by it during earlier discussions and which reiterates Iraq's previous statements that it had never followed up on offers of such assistance. On the issue of the abandonment of the programme, Iraq has indicated its intention to adopt, as required in paragraph 34 of the OMV Plan, laws prohibiting the conduct of proscribed activities in Iraq.

65. In the first eight weeks of inspections, the IAEA has visited all sites identified by it or by States as significant. No evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities at those locations has been detected to date during these inspections, although not all of the laboratory results of sample analysis are yet available. Nor have the inspections thus far revealed signs of new nuclear facilities or direct support to any nuclear activity. However, further verification activities will be necessary before the IAEA will be able to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme.

66. The IAEA has started to work at resolving the key issue of whether Iraqi nuclear activities or nuclear-related capabilities have changed since December 1998. Marked progress has already been made in areas about which major concerns had been expressed prior to the resumption of inspections: concerns raised over the construction or reconstruction of buildings at known facilities have been defused; and it appears, prima facie, that the high strength aluminium tubes were to be for the production of rockets and not for use in centrifuges for uranium enrichment, although assessment of the possibility that Iraq may have intended to modify the tubes in question later for use in centrifuges remains to be completed. Following the provision by Iraq of its backlog of semi-annual declarations, a thorough analysis of the movement and use of the dual-use equipment and material made it possible to reduce the areas of concern to a minimum. The disposition of the 32 tons of the previously monitored HMX that Iraq declared to have been used for civilian purposes, however, will be difficult to confirm.

67. No progress has been made on the issue of Iraq's alleged attempt to import uranium from abroad. It is not possible for the IAEA to draw any conclusions with respect to this issue without more specific information.

IV. THE WAY AHEAD

68. The IAEA will step up its activities, both with regard to operations in the field and work at Headquarters. It will continue to aim at resolving all pending issues, in particular the key issue as to whether there had been any material changes in Iraq's nuclear programme and nuclear-related capabilities while inspections were suspended. The IAEA will also reinstate or initiate all activities necessary for the full operation of its OMV Plan, including the types of activities conducted prior to December 1998 and new ones that will enhance the IAEA's detection capabilities. Among these activities will be the installation of remote video surveillance at key facilities, the installation of air samplers, the conducting of air-borne gamma surveys, and the carrying out of other methods of wide area environmental sampling.

69. Resolution 1441 (2002) requests States to provide to the IAEA and UNMOVIC information which may be of assistance to them in carrying out their mandates under the resolution, including recommendations of sites to be inspected and persons to be interviewed. While some information has been provided, actionable information has been limited and has only been forthcoming in the past three weeks. For the IAEA to fulfil its mandate quickly and most effectively, it is important that States continue to provide support to the IAEA in all aspects relevant to its mandate in Iraq.

70. Iraq's co-operation with the IAEA should be full and active, as required by the relevant Security Council resolutions. While Iraq's co-operation has been forthcoming in connection with the provision of unconditional and immediate access to sites, and satisfactory in the answering of a number of specific questions, this co-operation could and should be more proactive. The IAEA is keen to see that Iraq's commitment to encourage its citizens to provide access to private sites and to accept private interviews is put into practice. Iraq also should intensify its search for all documents and other types of evidence, both direct and indirect, which could help the IAEA in resolving pending issues and in clarifying the remaining questions and concerns.

71. The IAEA expects to be able, within the next few months, barring exceptional circumstances and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. In the meantime, the presence in Iraq of inspectors with broad investigative and monitoring authority serves as a deterrent to, and insurance against, the resumption by Iraq of proscribed nuclear activities.

New York
27 January 2003


ATTACHMENT 1

Agreed Statement following Talks Between UNMOVIC/IAEA and the Iraq Baghdad , 19 - 20 January 2003

The meeting between the Iraqi side and UNMOVIC and the IAEA was devoted to stocktaking of the inspections, which have taken place and resolving issues that have come up. The following was noted:

  1. Access has been obtained to all sites. This will continue. The Iraqi side will encourage persons to accept access also to private sites.
     

  2. There has been helpful assistance in the logistic build-up of the inspection infrastructure, e.g at the Mosul office. This will continue, e.g regarding a field office in Basrah.
     

  3. After the find of some empty 122mm chemical munitions at Al Ukhaidhir stores, the Iraqi side has appointed a team to undertake an investigation and comprehensive search to look for similar cases at all locations. One find of four more units was already reported at Al Taji munitions stores. The final results will be reported.
     

  4. A response was given to an UNMOVIC request for a number of documents. Some were handed over and clarifications were given regarding others.
     

  5. The list of persons engaged in the various disciplines will be supplemented in accordance with advice from UNMOVIC and the IAEA.
     

  6. The declaration given on 7 December by Iraq was discussed. Iraq expressed a readiness to respond to questions raised in connection with the declaration and discuss such questions.
     

  7. Persons asked for interviews in private will be encouraged to accept this.
     

  8. UNMOVIC and the IAEA agreed that their helicopters will take an appropriate number of minders on board, as necessary.
     

  9. Iraq will enact national legislation as soon as possible regarding proscribed activities.
     

  10. Iraq agreed to continue technical discussions with the IAEA to clarify issues, regarding aluminum tubes, alleged uranium importation and the use of high explosives, as well as other outstanding issues.

20 January 2003

Source: http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html


The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq

by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

For the past 60 days, the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency have been engaged in the process of verifying the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Today, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1441, I have submitted to the President of the Security Council an update report on our progress since we resumed our nuclear verification activities in Iraq - in terms of the approach we have adopted, the tools we have used, the specific results achieved, the degree of co-operation we have received, and finally our view on how we should proceed. Let me in this statement outline the key aspects of this report.

Background: Understanding the Starting Point

To understand the approach of the IAEA's inspection over the past two months, it is important first to recall what was accomplished during our inspections from 1991 to 1998, in fulfilment of our Security Council mandate to eliminate Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. In September 1991, the IAEA seized documents in Iraq that demonstrated the extent of its nuclear weapons programme. By the end of 1992, we had largely destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all Iraqi facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production. We confiscated Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable material - high enriched uranium and plutonium - and by early 1994 we had removed it from the country. By December 1998 - when the inspections were brought to a halt with a military strike imminent - we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear programme.

While we did not claim absolute certainty, our conclusion at that time was that we had neutralized Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and that there were no indications that Iraq retained any physical capability to produce weapon usable nuclear material.

During the intervening four years of our absence from Iraq, we continued our analytical work to the best of our ability, using satellite imagery and other information. But no remote analysis can replace on-site inspection - and we were therefore not able to reach any conclusions about Iraq's compliance with its Security Council obligations in the nuclear field after December 1998.

Conduct of Inspections to Date

Against this backdrop, when Iraq agreed last September to re-open its doors to inspection, and following the subsequent adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1441, which strengthened the IAEA's authority and the inspection process, the first goal of our inspection activities was "reconnaissance". In this phase, we sought to re-establish rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, to ensure that key facilities had not been re-opened, to verify the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material, and to identify and begin interviewing key Iraqi personnel.

Over these first two months of inspection, we have made good progress in our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, with a total of 139 inspections at some 106 locations to date. The bulk of these inspections have taken place at State-run or private industrial facilities, research centres and universities - either at locations where Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past, or at new locations suggested by remote monitoring and analysis. All inspection activities have been carried out without prior notification to Iraq, except where notification was needed to ensure the availability of required support. IAEA inspectors have taken - and will continue to take - full advantage of the inspection authority granted by resolution 1441. In doing so, the inspectors have been instructed to make every effort to conduct their activities with appropriate professionalism and sensitivity.

While we are continuing to some extent with this reconnaissance work, our inspections are now well into the "investigative" phase - with particular emphasis on determining what, if anything, has occurred in Iraq over the past four years relevant to the re-establishment of nuclear capabilities. These investigative inspections focus on areas of concern identified by other States, facilities identified through satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998, and other inspection leads identified independently by the IAEA.

In parallel with these inspection activities, the IAEA has been conducting exhaustive analysis of supporting information obtained from various sources. In this context, we have integrated the new information submitted by Iraq - including the declaration submitted on 7 December in response to resolution 1441 - with the records we had accumulated between 1991 and 1998 and the additional information we had compiled through remote monitoring since 1998. The Iraqi declaration was consistent with our existing understanding of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear programme; however, it did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998 - in particular regarding Iraq's progress prior to 1991 related to weapons design and centrifuge development. While these questions do not constitute unresolved disarmament issues, they nevertheless need further clarification.

In addition to onsite inspection and offsite analysis, IAEA inspectors have employed a variety of tools to accomplish their mission. Taking advantage of the "signature" of radioactive materials, we have resumed the monitoring of Iraq's rivers, canals and lakes to detect the presence of certain radioisotopes. A broad variety of environmental samples and surface swipe samples have been collected from locations across Iraq and taken to IAEA laboratories for analysis. And we have re-instituted routine car-borne and hand-held gamma surveys for the detection of undeclared nuclear material.

The inspectors have also conducted a great number of interviews of Iraqi scientists, managers and technicians - primarily in the workplace in the course of unannounced inspections - as a valuable source of information about past and present programmes and activities. The information gained has been helpful in assessing the completeness and accuracy of Iraq's declarations.

Resolution 1441 also clearly gave to the IAEA and UNMOVIC the authority to determine the modalities and venues for conducting interviews with Iraqi officials and other persons. The first two individuals whom the IAEA requested to see privately declined to be interviewed without the presence of an Iraqi Government representative. This has been a restricting factor. Although the Iraqi Government recently committed itself to encouraging Iraqi officials and other personnel to be interviewed in private when requested, regrettably the third request, two days ago, for a private interview was again turned down by the interviewee.

The IAEA will continue to determine the modalities and locations of the interviews, including the possibility of interviewing Iraqi personnel abroad. We will continue to report to the Security Council on our efforts to conduct interviews according to our preferred modalities and venues, and our degree of success in that regard.

Findings of Inspections to Date

Let me summarize briefly a number of the findings that have resulted from our inspection activities thus far.

First, we have inspected all of those buildings and facilities that were identified, through satellite imagery, as having been modified or constructed over the past four years. IAEA inspectors have been able to gain ready access and to clarify the nature of the activities currently being conducted in these facilities. No prohibited nuclear activities have been identified during these inspections.

A particular issue of focus has been the attempted procurement by Iraq of high strength aluminium tubes, and the question of whether these tubes, if acquired, could be used for the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Iraqi authorities have indicated that their unsuccessful attempts to procure the aluminium tubes related to a programme to reverse engineer conventional rockets. To verify this information, IAEA inspectors have inspected the relevant rocket production and storage sites, taken tube samples, interviewed relevant Iraqi personnel, and reviewed procurement contracts and related documents. From our analysis to date it appears that the aluminium tubes would be consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges; however, we are still investigating this issue. It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council resolution 687.

Another area of focus has been to determine how certain other "dual use" materials have been relocated or used - that is, materials that could be used in nuclear weapons production but also have other legitimate uses. A good example is the Iraqi declaration concerning the high explosive "HMX" - which states that, out of the HMX under IAEA seals in Iraq at the end of 1998, some had been supplied to cement plants as an industrial explosive for mining. The whereabouts and final use of the removed material are matters that will require further investigation - although it will be difficult to verify the disposition of the HMX that is declared to have been used.

A fourth focal point has been the investigation of reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991. The Iraqi authorities have denied any such attempts. The IAEA will continue to pursue this issue. At this stage, however, we do not have enough information, and we would appreciate receiving more.

We are also making progress on a number of other issues related, for example, to the attempted importation of a magnet production facility.

Moving Forward

Need for Continued Unified Support from the Security Council
In addition to the new authorities granted by resolution 1441, I believe that the unified resolve of the Council to support the inspection process has been a vital ingredient, and must remain so, if we are to achieve a peaceful resolution of the situation in Iraq. I trust that the Council would continue its unified and unequivocal support for the inspection process in Iraq.

Over the next several months, inspections will focus ever more closely on follow-up of specific concerns, as we continue to conduct visits to sites and interviews with key Iraqi personnel. We have begun helicopter operations, which increase the inspectors' mobility and their ability to respond rapidly to new information, and allow wide-scale radiation detection surveys. Laboratory analysis of environmental samples is continuing, and we will be re-installing air samplers for wide-area environmental monitoring. We also will re-introduce surveillance systems with video cameras in key locations to allow near-real-time remote monitoring of dual-use equipment.

Need for Actionable Information from Other States
By its very nature, the inspection process, both in Iraq and elsewhere, is not based on "trust", but on a thorough process of fact finding, supported by access to all available information. Where applicable, this should include information available to States that may be relevant to the purpose of the inspection. We have begun in the last few weeks to receive more actionable information from States - that is, information of direct and current value for inspection follow-up. I would continue to call on States that have access to such information to provide it to the inspecting organizations, so that the inspection process can be accelerated and additional assurances can be generated.

Need for Additional Co-operation by Iraq
Finally, we have urged Iraq once again to increase the degree of its co-operation with the inspection process. In support of the IAEA inspections to date, the Iraqi authorities have provided access to all facilities visited - including presidential compounds and private residences - without conditions and without delay. The Iraqi authorities also have been co-operative in making available additional original documentation, in response to requests by IAEA inspectors.

In our discussions with Iraqi officials last week in Baghdad, we emphasized the need to shift from passive support - that is, responding as needed to inspectors' requests - to proactive support - that is, voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing documentation, people and other evidence that will assist in filling in the remaining gaps in our information.

One example of how Iraq could be more proactive was illustrated by the inspection of a private residence just two weeks ago, which resulted in the retrieval of a sizeable number of documents, some of which were classified, and related, in part, to Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to use laser technology for enriching uranium. While these documents do not appear to reflect new or current activity related to nuclear weapons in Iraq, they may enhance our detailed understanding of certain aspects of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear programme. It is urgent and essential therefore that Iraq, on its own initiative, identify and provide any additional evidence that would assist the inspectors in carrying out their mandate.

This proactive engagement on the part of Iraq would be in its own best interest and is a window of opportunity that may not remain open for very much longer. Iraq should make every effort to be fully transparent - with a demonstrated willingness to resolve issues rather than requiring pressure to do so. The international community will not be satisfied when questions remain open with regard to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; the world is asking for a high level of assurance that Iraq is completely free from all such weapons, and is already impatient to receive it. The sooner such assurance can be provided by the inspecting organizations, the sooner the prospects of a peaceful resolution will translate into a plausible reality.

The Value of Inspections
Inspections are time consuming but, if successful, can ensure disarmament through peaceful means. It is worth recalling that, in our past experience in Iraq, the elimination of its nuclear weapons programme was mostly accomplished through intrusive inspections. It is also worth recalling that the presence of international inspectors in Iraq today continues to serve as an effective deterrent to and insurance against resumption of programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, even as we continue to look for possible past activities.

Conclusion

To conclude: we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s. However, our work is steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course. With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n003.shtml

 

Main History Page

Middle East Gateway