Mideastweb: Middle East

The 9-11 Commission Report
Notes to Chapters 2 and 3

Released July 26,  2004

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466 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2


authority at 10:31, see DOD record, Continental Region chat log, Sept. 11, 2001. For possibility of ordering a shootdown, see Larry Arnold interview (Feb. 2, 2004).

241. NEADS audio file, Identification Technician position, recorder 1, channel 4, 10:02:22.

2 The Foundation of the New Terrorism

1. “Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, ” Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998 (trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service), which was published for a large Arab world audience and signed by Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al Zawahiri (emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), AbuYasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha (leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group), Mir Hamzah (secretary of the Jamiat ul Ulema e Pakistan), and Fazlul Rahman (head of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh).

2. “Hunting Bin Ladin, ” PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998 (online at www. pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview. html).

3. Usama Bin Ladin, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places, ” Aug. 23, 1996 (trans. , online at www. terrorismfiles. org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1. html).

4. “Hunting Bin Ladin, ” PBS Frontline broadcast, May 1998.

5. Ibid.

6. For a classic passage conveying the nostalgic view of Islam’s spread, see Henri Pirenne, A History of Europe, trans. Bernard Miall (University Books, 1956), pp. 25--26.

7. See Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds. , Fundamentalism Observed, vol. 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994).

8. See Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam:MedievalTheology and Modern Politics, enlarged ed. (Yale Univ. Press, 1990).

9. From the perspective of Islamic, not Arab, history, the Baghdad Caliphate’s destruction by the Mongols in 1292 marks the end not of Islamic greatness but of Arab dominance of the Muslim world. Moghul India, Safavid Persia, and, above all, the Ottoman Empire were great Islamic powers that arose long after the Baghdad Caliphate fell.

10. Bin Ladin, “Declaration of War, ”Aug. 23, 1996.

11. The Muslim Brotherhood, which arose in Egypt in 1928 as a Sunni religious/nationalist opposition to the British-backed Egyptian monarchy, spread throughout the Arab world in the mid--twentieth century. In some countries, its oppositional role is nonviolent; in others, especially Egypt, it has alternated between violent and nonviolent struggle with the regime.

12. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (AmericanTrust Publications, 1990). Qutb found sin everywhere, even in rural midwestern churches. Qutb’s views were best set out in Sayyid Qutb, “The America I Have Seen” (1949), reprinted in Kamal Abdel-Malek, ed. , America in an Arab Mirror: Images of America in ArabicTravel Literature:An Anthology (Palgrave, 2000).

13. For a good introduction to Qutb, see National Public Radio broadcast, “Sayyid Qutb’s America, ” May 6, 2003 (online at www. npr. org/display_pages/features/feature_1253796. html).

14. “Bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America, ’” Observer Worldview, Nov. 24, 2002 (trans. , online at http://observer. guardian. co. uk/worldview/story/0, 11581, 845725, 00. html). The al Qaeda letter was released in conjunction with the release of an audio message from Bin Ladin himself.

15. Ibid.

16. See Arab Human Development Report 2003 (United Nations, 2003), a report prepared by Arabs that examines not only standard statistical data but also more sensitive social indicators recently identified by the Nobel Prize--winning economist Amartya Sen. It says little, however, about the political dimensions of economic and social trends. See Mark LeVine, “The UN Arab Human Development Report:A Critique, ” Middle East Report, July 26, 2002 (online at www. merip. org/mero/mer0072602. html).

17. President Bush, remarks at roundtable with Arab- and Muslim-American leaders, Sept. 10, 2002 (online at www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020910-7. html).

18. See, e. g. , Intelligence report, interrogation of Zubaydah, Oct. 29, 2002; CIA analytic report, “Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable, ” CTC 00-40017CSH, Nov. 2, 2000.

19. “Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the invasion . . . almost the entire population of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice, ‘God is great. ’This open defiance of the Russian generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the countryside. ” General (Ret. ) MohammedYahya Nawwroz and Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet War in Afghanistan;History and Harbinger of Future War?” Military Review (Fort Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies Office), Sept. /Oct. 1995, p. 2.

20. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network ofTerror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 16--23. Regarding UBL’s access to his family’s fortune, see Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004).

21. Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v. Enaam Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N. D. Ill. filed Jan. 6, 2003).

22. Intelligence report, Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Historical Links to ‘Abdallah Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997. By


NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 467


most accounts, Bin Ladin initially viewed Azzam as a mentor, and became in effect his partner by providing financial backing for the MAK.

23. In his memoir, Ayman al Zawahiri contemptuously rejects the claim that the Arab mujahideen were financed (even “one penny”) or trained by the United States. See Zawahiri, “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, ” Al Sharq al Awsat, Dec. 2, 2001. CIA officials involved in aiding the Afghan resistance regard Bin Ladin and his “Arab Afghans” as having been militarily insignificant in the war and recall having little to do with him. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2003).

24. See Abdullah Azzam, “Al Qaeda al Sulbah” (The solid foundation), Al Jihad, Apr. 1988, p. 46.

25. A wealth of information on al Qaeda’s evolution and history has been obtained from materials seized in recent years, including files labeled “Tareekh Usama” (Usama’s history) and “Tareekh al Musadat” (History of the Services Bureau). For descriptions of and substantial excerpts from these files, see Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003. See also Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; DOD document, “Al-Qaeda, ” AFGP-2002-000080 (translated). For a particularly useful insight into the evolution of al Qaeda--written by an early Bin Ladin associate, Adel Batterjee, under a pseudonym--

see Basil Muhammad, Al Ansar al Arab fi Afghanistan (The Arab volunteers in Afghanistan) (Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and World Association of Muslim Youth, 1991).

26. Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003.

27. See FBI report of investigation, interview of Jamal al Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 23.

28. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of SacredTerror (Random House, 2002), pp. 6--7, 57--63, 83--85; United States v. Rahman, 189 F. 3d 88, 104--105, 123--124 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 1996).

29. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 25--27;DOD document, “Union Agreement between Jama’at Qaedat Ansar Allah (The Base Group of Allah Supporters) and Jama’at Al-Jihad (Jihad Group), ” AFGP-2002-000081, undated; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 103.

30. Trial testimony of Jamal al Fadl, United States v. Usama bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S. D. N. Y. ), Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 218--219, 233); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 514--516); Feb. 20, 2001 (transcript p. 890). Fadl says this invitation was delivered by a Sudanese delegation that visited Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. See also CIA analytic report, “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992--1996: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths, ” CTC 2003-40028CHX, Mar. 10, 2003.

31. See Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996.

32. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 220--224).

33. For Bin Ladin’s confrontation with the Saudi regime, see, e. g. , Peter L. Bergen, HolyWar Inc. : Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Ladin (Touchstone, 2001), pp. 80--82. On aid provided by a dissident member of the royal family, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept.

26, 2003. See also FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996.

34. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 34.

35. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin’s business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Terrorism:

Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ”Mar. 10, 2003.

36. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 301--302, 305--306, 315--317, 367--368); Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ”Mar. 10, 2003.

37. See Intelligence report, Bin Ladin’s business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Shipment of Arms and Boats toYemen for Use by an Islamic Extremist, Aug. 9, 1996; Intelligence report, Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council, Dec. 19, 1996; CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ”

Mar. 10, 2003; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; CIA analytic report, “Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa’ida’s Business and Financial Links in Southeast Asia, ”CTC 2002-40066CH, June 6, 2002.

For Bin Ladin’s involvement in the Bosnian conflicts, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe:The Afghan-

Bosnian Network (Berg, 2004).

38. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 354); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Dec. 21, 1998;“RP Cops Aware of Long-Term Rightwing Muslim Connection, ”

Manila Times, Apr. 26, 2002.

39. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 354--355); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Feb. 4, 1998. See also Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report to Parliament, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, ” Jan. 7, 2003.

40. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 100, 235.

41. See CIA analytic report, “Arizona: Long-Term Nexus For Islamic Extremists, ” CTC 2002-30037H, May 15, 2002; Steven Emerson, American Jihad (Free Press, 2002), pp. 129--137.

 

42. Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U. S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 265--266); trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript p. 1163); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

43. On Wali Khan’s relationship with Bin Ladin, see Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin’s Historical Links to ‘Abdallah Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Muhammad, Al Ansar al Arab fi Afghanistan. On the Blind Sheikh, Bin Ladin eventually spoke publicly of his admiration. See ABC News interview, “To Terror’s Source, ” May 28, 1998. In late 1992, Abu Zubaydah confided to his diary that he was getting ready to go to one of al Qaeda’s military camps:“Perhaps later I will tell you about the Qa’ida and Bin Ladin group. ” Intelligence report, translation of Abu Zubaydah’s diary, June 9, 2002. Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed masterminded the 1995 Manila air plot, and KSM helped fundYousef ’s attempt to blow up theWorld Trade Center in 1993. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. The Blind Sheikh was linked toYousef and the 1993 World Trade Center attack, while Wali Khan was convicted together with Yousef for the Manila air conspiracy.

44. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin Links to a SouthernYemeni Group, Mar. 5, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ”Mar. 10, 2003, p. 4.

45. U. S. intelligence did not learn of al Qaeda’s role in Somalia until 1996. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin’s Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support, Apr. 30, 1997.

46. Intelligence report, Bin Ladin’s Activities in Eritrea, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, Dec. 7, 1999; trial testimony of Essam Mohamed al Ridi, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 14, 2001 (transcript pp. 578--593); trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 279--285). In June 1998, Bin Ladin was indicted on charges arising out of the Somalia attack in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

47. For background about the attack on the training facility, see, e. g. , Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 132, 242. On the proposed attack in Saudi Arabia, see Intelligence report, Fatwa to attack U. S. interests in Saudi Arabia and movement of explosives to Saudi Arabia, Jan. 8, 1997; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 12, 1996; Feb. 13, 1998. On associates taking credit, see Intelligence report made available to the Commission.

48. CIA analytic report, “Khobar Bombing: Saudi Shia, Iran, and Usama Bin Ladin All Suspects, ” CTC 96- 30015, July 5, 1996; DIA analytic report, Defense IntelligenceThreat Review 96-007, July 1996; Intelligence report made available to the Commission. See also Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 224--225, 300--302.

49. Intelligence report, Usama Bin Ladin’s Attempts to Acquire Uranium, Mar. 18, 1997; CIA analytic report, “Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?” CTC 97-30002, Jan. 6, 1997; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 357--366); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 528--529); Feb. 20, 2001

(transcript pp. 982--985).

50. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript p. 528).

51. CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ”Mar. 10, 2003.

52. Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31

1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 290--293); FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

53. CIA analytic report, “Ansar al-Islam: Al Qa’ida’s Ally in Northeastern Iraq, ” CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003.

54. Ibid. ; Intelligence report, al Qaeda and Iraq, Aug. 1, 1997.

55. Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, May 22, 2003; May 24, 2003. At least one of these reports dates the meeting to 1994, but other evidence indicates the meeting may have occurred in February 1995. Greg interview (June 25, 2004). Two CIA memoranda of information from a foreign government report that the chief of Iraq’s intelligence service and a military expert in bomb making met with Bin Ladin at his farm outside Khartoum on July 30, 1996. The source claimed that Bin Ladin asked for and received assistance from the bomb-making expert, who remained there giving training until September 1996, which is when the information was passed to the United States. See Intelligence reports made available to the Commission. The information is puzzling, since Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan in May 1996, and there is no evidence he ventured back there (or anywhere else) for a visit. In examining the source material, the reports note that the information was received “third hand, ” passed from the foreign government service that “does not meet directly with the ultimate source of the information, but obtains the information from him through two unidentified intermediaries, one of whom merely delivers the information to the Service. ”The same source claims that the bomb-making expert had been seen in the area of Bin Ladin’s Sudan farm in December 1995.

56. Intelligence report, Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an “Egyptian Operation” and Logistical and


NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 469


Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers, Feb. 13, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 4, 1997.

57. Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003).

58. Trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1280--1282).

59. On the Sudanese economy, see, e. g. , Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 114--115, 132--133. For details about Saudi pressure on the Bin Ladin family, see, e. g. , Frank G. interview (Mar. 2, 2004). Regarding management of Bin Ladin’s finances, see CIA analytic report, “Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa’ida’s Financial Facilitators, ”OTI IA 2001-134-HXC, Oct. 18, 2001; CIA analytic report, “Shaykh Sa’id:Al-Qa’ida’s Loyal Senior Accountant, ”CTC 2003-30072H, July 2, 2003; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Sept. 17, 1998; Aug. 4, 1999. On the financial crisis in al Qaeda at this time, see trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282--1284).

60. Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 165--174, 190--205, 255--258); Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 382--391); trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282--1284).

61. Because the U. S. embassy in Khartoum had been closed in response to terrorist threats, the U. S. Ambassador to Sudan was working out of the embassy in Nairobi. The Sudanese regime notified him there by fax. See Tim Carney interview (Dec. 4, 2003); Donald Petterson interview (Sept. 30, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 7020, “Sudan: Foreign Minister on Developments re Terrorism and Peace, ” May 21, 1996. On the attempted assassination of Bin Ladin, see FBI report of investigation, interview of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, Oct. 15, 2000; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

62. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 23, 2003.

63. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale Univ. Press, 2000), p. 133; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars:The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 9; Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM, July 12, 2003; Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003. The current Afghan Foreign Minister told us that one of Bin Ladin’s planes landed in Islamabad for refueling. See Abdullah Abdullah interview (Oct. 23, 2003).

64. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 88--90.

65. See Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Yale Univ. Press, 2002); Raffat Pasha interview (Oct.

25, 2003);Rashid, Taliban;Waleed Ziad, “How the Holy Warriors Learned to Hate, ” New York Times, June 18, 2004, p. A31.

66. See, e. g. , Marvin Weinbaum interview (Aug. 12, 2003);William Milam interview (Dec. 29, 2003). Milam described “strategic depth” as Pakistan’s need for a friendly, pliable neighbor on the west due to its hostile relationship with India on the east.

67. On Pakistan’s consent, see Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003); see also Rashid, Taliban, p. 139; Intelligence report, Terrorism:Activities of Bin Ladin’s in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India, July 14, 1997; FBI investigation, interview of former al Qaeda associate, Mar. 19, 2001, p. 26. On the Afghanistan-Pakistan-centered network of guesthouses and training camps, see CIA analytic report, “Sketch of a South Asia--Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network, ”DI TR 95-12, Dec. 1995; CIA analytic report, “The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response, ” Mar. 19, 2004 (draft), p. 11.

68. On Bin Ladin’s money problems, see trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2003 (transcript pp. 1282--1286);Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003); DOS cable, Nairobi 11468, “Sudan: Major Usama Bin Ladin Asset Deregistered, ”Aug. 6, 1996; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 30, 2003. See also Robert Block, “In War on Terrorism, Sudan Struck a Blow by Fleecing Bin Laden, ” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2001, p. A1.

69. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; trial testimony of Ashif Juma, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 15, 2001 (transcript pp. 626--627); trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1264--1267); FBI report of investigation, interview of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 2000. See also Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 27, 2003.

70. See trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 22, 2001 (transcript pp. 1282--1286).

71. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 41; Rashid, Taliban, pp. 19--21, 133.

72. For Bin Ladin’s 1996 fatwa, see Bin Ladin, “Declaration of War, ”Aug. 23, 1996. On constraints from the Sudanese, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004. On warnings from the Saudi monarchy, see Intelligence report, Timeline of events from 1993 bombing ofWorld Trade Center through 9/11 (citing cables from Apr. 1997).

73. On Bin Ladin’s promise to Taliban leaders, see government exhibit no. 1559-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the Bin Ladin interview, see CNN broadcast, interview of Bin Ladin by Peter Arnett on Mar. 20, 1997, May 9, 1997 (available online at http://news. findlaw. com/cnn/docs/binladen/binladenintvw-cnn. pdf). According to


470 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2


KSM, Bin Ladin moved to Kandahar “by order of Emir Al-Mouminin, ” that is, Mullah Omar. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, July 12, 2003. On the Taliban’s invitation to UBL, see Mike briefing (Dec. 12, 2003) Rashid, Taliban, p. 129. Rashid has also described the move as part of Bin Ladin’s plan to solidify his relationship with, and eventually gain control over, the Taliban. Ahmed Rashid interview (Oct. 27, 2003).

74. Intelligence report, unsuccessful Bin Ladin probes for contact with Iraq, July 24, 1998; Intelligence report, Saddam Hussein’s efforts to repair relations with Saudi government, 2001.

75. Intelligence report, Iraq approach to Bin Ladin, Mar. 16, 1999.

76. CIA analytic report, “Ansar al-Islam:Al Qa’ida’s Ally in Northeastern Iraq, ” CTC 2003-40011CX, Feb. 1, 2003. See also DIA analytic report, “Special Analysis: Iraq’s Inconclusive Ties to Al-Qaida, ” July 31, 2002; CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ” Mar. 10, 2003. We have seen other intelligence reports at the CIA about 1999 contacts. They are consistent with the conclusions we provide in the text, and their reliability is uncertain. Although there have been suggestions of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding chemical weapons and explosives training, the most detailed information alleging such ties came from an al Qaeda operative who recanted much of his original information. Intelligence report, interrogation of al Qaeda operative, Feb. 14, 2004. Two senior Bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any such ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. Intelligence reports, interrogations of KSM and Zubaydah, 2003 (cited in CIA letter, response to Douglas Feith memorandum, “Requested Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq--al Qaida Contacts (1990--2003), ’” Dec. 10, 2003, p. 5).

77. On Gulf-based donors to Bin Ladin, see Frank G. and Mary S. briefing (July 15, 2003);CIA analytic report, “Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations, ” CTC 2002-40117CH, Nov. 14, 2002. On the relationship between Bin Ladin and Omar, see Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 20, 2002. On relations between the Arabs in Afghanistan and the Taliban, see ibid. On financial relations, see CIA analytic report, “Ariana Afghan Airlines:Assets and Activities, ”OTI IR 1999-170CX, July 29, 1999; CIA, NID, “Near East:UAE: Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin’s Finances, ” June 9, 1999.

78. CIA analytic report, “Afghanistan:An Incubator for International Terrorism, ” CTC 01-40004, Mar. 27, 2001; CIA analytic report, “Al-Qa’ida Still Well Positioned to Recruit Terrorists, ” July 1, 2002, p. 1.

79. The number of actual al Qaeda members seems to have been relatively small during the period before 9/11, although estimates vary considerably, from the low hundreds to as many as 5, 000. For the low hundreds, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Dec. 3, 2003. For 5, 000, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Nov. 26, 2003. Khallad added that because pledging bayat was secret, the number of al Qaeda members can only be speculative. On al Qaeda’s training and indoctrination, see minutes from the August 1988 meeting leading to the official formation of al Qaeda, cited in Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003, p. 36.

80. By 1996, al Qaeda apparently had established cooperative relationships with at least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition. See CIA analytic report, “Old School Ties, ” Mar. 10, 2003, p. 3. On ties with Southeast Asia and the Malaysian-Indonesian JI, see, e. g. , Intelligence report, interrogation of Hambali, Sept. 5, 2003. On Pakistani militant ties to Bin Ladin, see CIA analytic report, “Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan, ” Nov. 29, 2001, p. 1 and appendix B; see also Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 169--171, 199; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 286--287. On Europe, see, e. g. , trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 301, 315--316), Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 368). On London, see, e. g. , Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Sept. 17, 1997. On Balkans, see Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003; Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe.

81. See, e. g. , “Tareekh Usama” and “Tareekh al Musadat” (described in note 25). See also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al ‘Owhali, Aug. 22--25, 1998; FBI report of investigation, interview of Nasser Ahmad Nasser al Bahri, Oct. 3, 2001, p. 8.

82. The merger was de facto complete by February 1998, although the formal “contract” would not be signed until June 2001. See Intelligence report, Incorporation of Zawahiri’s Organization into Bin Ladin’s Al-Qa’ida, and Recent [1998] Activities of Egyptian Associates of Al-Qa’ida, Sept. 22, 1998; see also Intelligence report, interrogation of detainee, Feb. 8, 2002.

83. FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; FBI report of investigation, interview of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug. 28, 2000; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 123--124.

84. On the group’s surveillance and photography activities, see trial testimony of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 21, 2001 (transcript pp. 1499--1500); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of L’Houssaine Kherchtou, Aug. 18, 2000; Oct. 18, 2000; see also FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999. On Bin Ladin’s use of technical equipment to promote his intelligence/security capabilities, see Intelligence report, Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Intelligence Capabilities and Techniques, Dec. 5, 1996.

85. On the surveillance reports and the Hezbollah training camps, see FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999; see also Intelligence report, Al Qaeda Targeting Study of U. S. Embassy Nairobi, prepared 23 December 1993, Apr. 5, 1999; Intelligence report, Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among


NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 471


Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31, 1997; Intelligence report, Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army, Iran, and the NIF, Jan. 31 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996. Bin Ladin told his operatives he wanted them to study Hezbollah’s 1983 truck bombing of U. S. marines in Lebanon that killed 241 and led to the American pullout from Lebanon. See, e. g. , statement of Ali Mohamed in support of change of plea, United States v. Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S. D. N. Y. ), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 30); trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 292--293); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Mar. 10, 1997; FBI report of investigation, interview of confidential source, Sept. 16, 1999.

86. Hugh Davies, “Saudis Detain Member of Anti-American Terror Group, ” Daily Telegraph (London), Aug. 2, 1997.

87. For general information on Hage, see Oriana Gill, “Hunting Bin Laden: A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist, ” PBS Frontline broadcast, Sept. 12, 2001. On returning to the United States, Hage was met at the airport by FBI agents, interrogated, and called the next day before the federal grand jury then investigating Bin Ladin. Because he lied to the grand jury about his association with Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, he was arrested immediately after the embassy bombings a year later. Testimony of Patrick Fitzgerald before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Oct. 21, 2003, pp. 3--4. On Hage’s phone taps, see introduction of stipulation (government exhibit no. 36), United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 27, 2001 (transcript pp. 1575--1576). For Harun’s fax, see government exhibit no.

300A-T, United States v. bin Laden.

88. “World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad, ” Al Quds al Arabi, Feb. 23, 1998; closing statement by Asst.

U. S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5369, 5376--5377). On related activities in Kenya and Tanzania, see FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 15--28, 1998.

89. FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohamed Sadeeq Odeh, Aug. 15--28, 1998; closing statement by Asst. U. S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 1, 2001 (transcript pp. 5239, 5408, 5417).

90. For the Atef fax, see government exhibit no. 1636-T, United States v. bin Laden. For the fatwa, see government exhibit no. 1602-T, United States v. bin Laden (translation of “Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a Fatwa calling for the Removal of American Forces from the Gulf, ” Al Quds al Arabi, May 14, 1998). For the interview, see ABC

News interview, “To Terror’s Source, ” May 28, 1998.

91. See closing statement by Asst. U. S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript pp. 5426--5439); see also FBI report of investigation, interviews of Mohammad Rashed Daoud al ‘Owhali, Aug.  22--25, 1998, p. 9. Copies of the declarations issued by “The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places” taking credit for the operation were recovered from a raid in Baku, Azerbaijan, after the bombings in September 1998. See also government exhibit no. 1557C-T, United States v. bin Laden (“The formation of the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places”); government exhibit no. 1557D-T, United States v. bin Laden (“Al-Aqsa Mosque operation”); government exhibit no. 1557E-T, United States v. bin Laden (“The Holy Ka’ba operation”).

92. Closing statement by Asst. U. S. Attorney Ken Karas, United States v. bin Laden, May 2, 2001 (transcript p.

5445).

93. ABC News interview, “Terror Suspect: An Interview with Osama Bin Laden, ” Dec. 22, 1998 (conducted in Afghanistan by ABC News producer Rahimullah Yousafsai).

3 Counterterrorism Evolves

1. Brief of the United States, United States v. Ramzi AhmedYousef, Lead No. 98-1041 (2d Cir. filed Aug. 25, 2000), pp. 42--43; John Miller and Michael Stone, with Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (Hyperion, 2002), pp. 95, 99.

2. On President Clinton’s tasking the NSC, see Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003). On the role of different U. S. government agencies, see Steve Coll, Ghost War:The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p. 251.

3. Trial testimony of Brian Parr, United States v. Yousef, No. S12 93 CR 180 (KTD) (S. D. N. Y. ), Oct. 22, 1997 (transcript p. 4694).

4. On the process of identification, see Joseph Malone interview (May 25, 2004).

5. United States v. Salameh, 152 F. 3d 88, 107--108 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 104--105, 107, 109. Abouhalima had fled to the Middle East after the bombing, and was picked up by Egyptian authorities and returned to the United States in late March 1993. Brief of the United States, United States v. Mohammed A. Salameh, Lead No. 94-1312 (2d Cir. filed Jan. 17, 1997), p. 64 and n. ***.

6. United States v. Salameh, 152 F. 3d at 107--108, n. 2; United States v. Yousef, 327 F. 3d 56, 78--79 (2d Cir. 2003); Miller and Stone, The Cell, p. 119; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), p. 12.

7. On Rahman’s ties to the Farouq mosque, see Miller and Stone, The Cell, pp. 54--55. On Rahman’s message, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F. 3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999);Brief for the United States, United States v. Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, Lead No. 96-1044 (2d Cir. filed July 3, 1997), pp. 10, 15. See also DOS Inspector General report, “Review


472 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3


of theVisa-Issuance Process Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance ofVisas to Sheikh Omar Ali Ahmed Abdel Rahman, ”Mar. 1994, pp. 6, 8, 36. On the informant’s reports, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F. 3d at 106--107.

On the landmarks plot, see United States v. Rahman, 189 F. 3d at 108--111, 123--127; Miller and Stone, The Cell, p.  116.

8. These prosecutions also had the unintended consequence of alerting some al Qaeda members to the U. S. government’s interest in them. In February 1995, the government filed a confidential court document listing Usama Bin Ladin and scores of other people as possible co-conspirators in the New York City landmarks plot. Ali Mohamed, who was on the list, obtained a copy and faxed it to a close Bin Ladin aide for distribution. Statement of Ali Mohamed in support of change of plea, United States v. Ali Mohamed, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S. D. N. Y. ), Oct. 20, 2000 (transcript p. 29);Statements of Prosecutor and Judge, United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S. D.

N. Y. ), Mar. 26, 2001 (transcript pp. 3338--3339); Patrick Fitzgerald interview (Jan. 28, 2004).

9. On Ajaj’s travels to Khaldan and interactions with KSM, see United States v. Salameh, 152 F. 3d at 107--108. Ajaj had entered the United States on a B-2 tourist visa at New York City on September 9, 1991. INS alien file, No. A72215823, Sept. 9, 1991.

10. OnYousef ’s capture and the Manila air plot, see United States v. Yousef, 327 F. 3d at 79--82. On KSM, see Joint Inquiry report (classified version), pp. 324--328; CIA analytical report, “WTC 1993:The Solid Case for al-Qa’ida Involvement, ” CTC 2002-40084H, July 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 27, 2003; James Risen and David Johnston, “Threats and Reponses:Counterterrorism;Qaeda Aide Slipped Away Long Before Sept.

11 Attack, ” New York Times, Mar. 8, 2003, p. A12.

11. For a general history of the FBI, supporting the subsequent text (unless otherwise noted), see Athan G.

Theoharis, et al. , The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (Onyx Press, 1999); the FBI’s authorized history, FBI report, “History of the FBI” (online at www. fbi. gov/libref/historic/history/historymain. htm); the FBI’s history as told by the Federation of American Scientists, “History of the FBI, ” updated June 18, 2003 (online at www. fas. org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/fbi_hist. htm). For discussion of field office autonomy, see FBI letter, Kalish toWolf, responses to questions posed by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, May 24, 2004, pp. 47--48.

12. See, e. g. , Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003); Ruben Garcia interview (Apr. 29, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of William Gore, Oct. 24, 2002.

13. The Washington Field Office was originally assigned the East Africa bombings case because it generally has responsibility for investigating crimes overseas. When the attack was determined to be al Qaeda--related, responsibility shifted to the New York Field Office. See generally Kevin C. interview (Aug. 25, 2003). This created significant friction between agents in the respective offices. Edward Curran and Sidney Caspersen interview (Jan. 20, 2004). On the concept of the office of origin, see FBI memo, Kalish to Wolf, responses to questions from the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Committee, pp. 47--48; testimony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18, 2003; FBI report, “Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, ”Apr. 14, 2004, p. 20.

14. On the impact of Watergate, see generally Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government:The Post- Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1996).

15. David M. Alpern with Anthony Marro and Stephan Lesher, “This IsYour New FBI, ” Newsweek, Jan. 5, 1976, p. 14.

16. On the Levi guidelines and the Smith modifications, see John T. Elliff, “Symposium: National Security and Civil Liberties:The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations, ” Cornell Law Review, vol. 69 (Apr. 1984), p. 785. On the line between church and state, see Floyd Abrams, “The First Amendment and the War against Terrorism, ” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 5 (Oct. 2002).

17. On Pan Am bombing investigation, see Commission analysis of U. S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968

to 1993; FBI report, “History of the FBI. ”

18. Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004); Federation of American Scientists, “History of the FBI;” DOJ Inspector General report, “Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation, ” Sept. 2003, pp.  iv, vi, viii, x, xiii.

19. For quote, see FBI report, “Congressional Budget Justification Book Fiscal Year 1995, ” undated, p. 6. On Freeh’s efforts, see Howard M. Shapiro, “The FBI in the 21st Century, ” Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 28

(1995), pp. 219--228; Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On Freeh’s budget request, see FBI report, “Congressional Budget Justification Book Fiscal Year 1995, ” undated.

20. Janet Reno interview (Dec. 16, 2003); Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004); Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004); OMB budget examiner interview (Apr. 27, 2004).

21. On the plan, see FBI report, “Strategic Plan: 1998--2003, ‘Keeping Tomorrow Safe, ’”May 8, 1998. For Watson’s recollections, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004).

22. For the mid-1990s numbers, see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno, “Reorganization of FBI Headquarters--Establishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services Division, ” Apr. 22, 1999. For the 1998--2001 num

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 473


bers, see DOJ Inspector General report, “Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management, ” Sept. 2002, p. 67. For the failure to shift resources, see DOJ Inspector General report, “FBI Casework and Human Resource Allocation, ” Sept. 2003, pp. iv, vi, viii, x, xiii. For the comparison to drug agents, see testimony of Dick Thornburgh before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Appropriations Committee, June 18, 2003, p. 20.

23. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 5, 2004);Virginia Bollinger interview (Feb. 2, 2004);Robert Bryant interview (Dec. 18, 2003).

24. On the state of information technology at FBI, seeVirginia Bollinger interview (Jan. 28, 2004);Mark Miller interview (Dec. 23, 2003). On the lack of an overall assessment, see DOJ Inspector General report, “Review of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program, ” Sept. 2002, pp. ii--iii.

25. For training statistics, see DOJ Inspector General report, “Review of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program, ” Sept. 2002, p. 74. For translation resources, see FBI report, “FY 2002 Counterterrorism Division Program Plan Summary, ” undated, p. 4. Since 9/11, the FBI has recruited and processed more than 30, 000 translator applicants. This has resulted in the addition of nearly 700 new translators. FBI report, “The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, ”Apr. 14, 2004. The FBI’s hiring process includes language testing, a personnel security interview, polygraph, and a full background investigation. The FBI must maintain rigorous security and proficiency standards with respect to its permanent and contract employees. Even as the FBI has increased its language services cadre, the demand for translation services has also greatly increased. Thus, the FBI must not only continue to bring on board more linguists, it must also continue to take advantage of technology and best practices to prioritize its workflow, enhance its capabilities, and ensure compliance with its quality control program. FBI linguists interviews (July 31, 2003--May 10, 2004);Margaret Gulotta interview (May 10, 2004). See DOJ Inspector General report, “A Review of the FBI’s Actions in Connection with Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds, ” July 1, 2004; Sibel Edmonds interview (Feb. 11, 2004).

26. Wilson Lowery interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Janet Reno testimony, Apr. 13, 2004; Helen S. interview (Dec. 29, 2003); Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004); Robert Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004).

27. FBI report, “Director’s Report on Counterterrorism, ” Sept. 1, 2001, pp. I-1--I-14. On FBI reorganization, see FBI memo, Freeh to Reno, “Reorganization of FBI Headquarters--Establishment of Counterterrorism Division and Investigative Services Division, ”Apr. 22, 1999. On Watson’s observation, see Dale Watson interview (Feb. 4, 2004). On MAXCAP 05, see FBI memo, description of MAXCAP 05, undated (draft likely prepared after Aug.

31, 2001, for incoming Director Mueller). On field executives’ views, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Program, “Strategic Program Plan, FY 2001--06, ” undated, p. 30.

28. International terrorism intelligence cases were designated as 199 matters; international terrorism criminal cases were designated as 265 matters. In 2003, these designations were eliminated; all international terrorism matters now receive the same designation, 315.

29. For historical information on FISA, see Americo R. Cinquegrana, “The Walls (and Wires) have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, ” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 137 (1989), pp. 793, 802--805. For the statute, see 50 U. S. C. §§ 1801 et seq. As enacted in 1978, FISA permitted orders authorizing electronic surveillance. It did not refer to physical searches. In 1994, the statute was amended to permit orders authorizing physical searches. See Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (Oct. 14, 1994); 50 U. S. C. §§ 1821--1829. See generally, William C. Banks and M. E. Bowman, “Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, ” American University Law Review, vol. 50 (2000), pp. 1--130.

30. On the history of courts applying the primary purpose standard, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F. 3d 717, 725--726 (FISC Ct. Rev. 2002), in which the FISC Court of Review concluded that these courts had ruled in error. See also DOJ report, “Final Report of the Attorney General’s Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation” (hereinafter “Bellows Report”), May 2000, appendix D. On DOJ interpretation of FISA, see DOJ memo, Dellinger toVatis, “Standards for Searchers Under Foreign Intelligence Act, ” Feb. 14, 1995;Royce Lamberth interview (Mar. 26, 2004); Bellows Report, pp. 711--712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion Bowman, May 28, 2003.

31. Bellows Report, pp. 711--712; DOJ Inspector General interview of Marion Bowman, May 28, 2003.

32. Bellows Report, pp. 712--714, n. 947, appendix D tabs 2, 3; Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). Because OIPR had ultimate authority to decide what was presented to the FISA Court, it wielded extraordinary power in the FISA process.

33. The group included representatives from the FBI, OIPR, and the Criminal Division. In addition, the U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York was given an opportunity to comment on the procedures. The procedures that were eventually issued were agreed to by all involved in the drafting process. As a member of the Commission, Gorelick has recused herself from participation in this aspect of our work.

34. On Reno’s July 1995 memo, see DOJ Inspector General report, “A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, ” July 2004, pp. 27--34; Bellows Report, p. 709, appen

474 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3


dix D tab 23. Some barriers were proposed by OIPR in the FISA applications and subsequently adopted by the FISC; others, less formally recorded, were believed by the FBI to be equally applicable.

35. On the misapplication of the procedures and the role of OIPR, see Bellows Report, pp. 721--722; Marion Bowman interview (Mar. 6, 2004); Fran Fragos Townsend meeting (Feb. 13, 2004). On the OIPR as gatekeeper, see Michael Vatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004). On OIPR’s stated defense, see David Kris interview (May 19, 2004); Richard Scruggs interview (May 26, 2004). On OIPR’s threat, see Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004);Thomas A. interview (Mar. 16, 2004). On the lack of information flow, see Bellows Report, pp. 722, 724--725, 729--731.

36. For Bryant’s comment, see David Kris interview (Jan. 15, 2004);Bellows Report, p. 714. On barriers between agents on same squads, see Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004);MichaelVatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of Thomas A. , May 28, 2003. On incorrect interpretation by field agents, see Joint Inquiry report, pp. 363, 367--368; Larry Parkinson interview (Feb. 24, 2004);MichaelVatis interview (Jan. 21, 2004); DOJ Inspector General interview of Thomas A. , May 28, 2003; DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002.

37. For an example of the barriers between agents, see DOJ emails, Jane to Steve B. , interpreting the wall to apply to non-FISA information, Aug. 29, 2001;David Kris interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On the NSA barriers, see DOJ Inspector General interview of Jane, Nov. 4, 2002. These barriers were reinforced by caveats NSA began placing on all of its Bin Ladin--related reports and later on all of its counterterrorism-related reports--whether or not the information was subject to the attorney general’s order--which required approval before the report’s contents could be shared with criminal investigators. Ibid. On the several reviews of the process, see Bellows Report, pp. 709, 722;

DOJ Inspector General report, “The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department’s Campaign Finance Investigation, ” July 1999, pp. 15--16, 255, 256, 328--330, 340, 344; GAO report, “FBI Intelligence Investigations:Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited, ” July 2001, pp. 3--5.

38. In December 1999, NSA began placing caveats on all of its Bin Ladin reports that precluded sharing of any of the reports’ contents with criminal prosecutors or FBI agents investigating criminal matters without first obtaining OIPR’s permission. These caveats were initially created at the direction of Attorney General Reno and applied solely to reports of information gathered from three specific surveillances she had authorized. Because NSA decided it was administratively too difficult to determine whether particular reports derived from the specific surveillances authorized by the attorney general, NSA decided to place this caveat on all its terrorism-related reports. In November 2000, in response to direction from the FISA Court, NSA modified these caveats to require that consent for sharing the information with prosecutors or criminal agents be obtained from NSA’s Customer Needs and Delivery Services group. See DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, E. O. 12333 authorized surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda operative, Dec. 24, 1999; NSA email, William L. to Brian C. , “dissemination of terrorism reporting, ” Dec. 29, 1999; NSA memo, Ann D. to others, “Reporting Guidance, ”Dec. 30. 1999; Intelligence report, Nov. 6, 2000. See also discussion of the history of the NSA caveats in the notes to Chapter 8.

39. See DEA report, “DEA Staffing & Budget” (figures for 1972 to 2003) (online at www. usdoj. gov/dea/agency/staffing.htm). For USMS staffing, see DOJ information provided to the Commission.

40. On the number of agents, see INS newsletter, “INS Commissioner Meissner Announces Departure, ” Jan. 2001; INS news release, “INS to Hire More than 800 Immigration Inspectors Nationwide, ” Jan. 12, 2001; Gregory Bednarz prepared statement, Oct. 9, 2003, p. 5. On the INS’s main challenges, see, e. g. , Eric Holder interview (Jan.

28, 2004); Jamie Gorelick interview (Jan. 13, 2004);Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the White House views, see, e. g. , White House press release, “Fact Sheet on Immigration Enforcement Act, ”May 3, 1995. On DOJ’s concerns, see INS newsletter, Remarks of Attorney General Reno on Oct. 24, 2000, Jan. 2001, pp. 16, 26. To assess congressional views, we reviewed all conference and committee reports relating to congressional action on INS budget requests for fiscal years 1995 through 2001 and all Senate and House immigration hearings from 1993 to 2001. On outdated technology, see Gus de la Vina interview (Nov. 19, 2003);Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003).

41. On Meissner’s response, see Doris Meissner interview (Nov. 25, 2003). On the lookout unit, see Tim G.  interview (Oct. 1, 2002). On the number of denials of entry, see Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: FiveYears after the World Trade Center” before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 24, 1998, p. 145.

42. Majority Staff Report, Hearing on “Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years after the World Trade Center, ” Feb. 24, 1998, p. 152; 8 U. S. C. § 1534(e)(1)(A). On the low level of removals, see Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 9, 2003); Rocky Concepcion interview (June 15, 2004).

43. On the 1986 plan, see INS report, Investigations Division, “Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan, ” May 1986; Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003). On the 1995 plan, see INS memo, Bramhall to Bednarz and Hurst, “Draft Counter-Terrorism Strategy Outline, ”Aug. 11, 1995. On the 1997 plan, see INS email, Cadman to others, “EAC briefing document, ”Dec. 5, 1997 (attachment titled “Counterterrorism/National Secu

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 475


rity Strategy and Casework Oversight”). On the work of the National Security Unit and the Intelligence Unit, see Daniel Cadman interview (Oct. 17, 2003); Cliff Landesman interview (Oct. 27, 2003).

44. For number of agents on Canadian border, the Canadian situation generally, and the inspector general’s recommendations, see INS report, “Northern Border Strategy, ” Jan. 9, 2001; DOJ Inspector General report, “Followup Review of the Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border, ” Apr. 2000 (inspection plan). On terrorists entering the United States via Canada, see, e. g. , INS record, Record of Deportable Alien, Abu Mezer, June 24, 1996. Mezer was able to stay in the United States despite apprehensions for his illegal entries along the northern border.

45. The inspectors’ views are drawn from our interviews with 26 border inspectors who had contact with the 9/11 hijackers. On the incomplete INS projects, see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), §§ 110, 641.

46. For the 1996 law, see 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (1996). On unauthorized immigration, see Migration Policy Institute report, “Immigration Facts: Unauthorized Immigration to the United States, ” Oct. 2003 (online at www. migrationpolicy. org/pubs/two_unauthorized_immigration_us. pdf). On the initiation of city noncooperation, see New York Mayor Ed Koch’s 1987 order prohibiting city line workers, but not police or the Department of Corrections, from transmitting information respecting any alien to federal immigration authorities. On backlogs, see testimony of Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the House Judiciary Committee, Mar. 11, 2004. On the overwhelmed INS, see James Ziglar testimony, Jan. 26, 2004.

47. On the relationship between the FBI and state and local police forces, see William Bratton et al. interview (Nov. 20, 2003);David Cohen interview (Feb. 4, 2004). On the New York JTTF, see Mary Jo White, “Prosecuting Terrorism in NewYork, ” Middle East Quarterly, spring 2001 (online at www. meforum. org/article/25). On the pre- 9/11 number of JTTFs, see Louis Freeh prepared statement for the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 8, 2002, p. 18. On the effectiveness of JTTFs, see Washington Field Office agent interview (Aug. 4, 2003); Phoenix JTTF member interview (Oct. 20, 2003); Phoenix Field Office agent interview (Oct. 21, 2003);Art C. interview (Dec. 4, 2003).

48. Treasury report, “1995 Highlights of The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, ” undated (online at www. atf. gov/pub/gen_pub/annualrpt/1995/index. htm); ATF report, “ATF Snapshot, ” Jan. 30, 1998 (online at www. atf. gov/about/snap1998. htm).

49. Dale Watson interview (Feb. 4, 2004);Frank P. interview (Aug. 26, 2003);Dan C. interview (Aug. 27, 2003); Louis Freeh interview (Jan. 8. 2004).

50. See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996), codified at 49 U. S. C. § 40101; Federal Aviation Authorization Act, H. R. Rep. No. 104-848, 104th Cong. , 2d sess. (1996) (notes on conference substitute for § 401). On responsibility for protection, see 49 U. S. C. § 44903(b). On sabotage, see FAA report, Aviation Security Advisory Committee, “Domestic Security Baseline Final Report, ” Dec. 12, 1996; FAA report, “Civil Aviation Security:Objectives and Priorities, ”Mar. 18, 1999 (staff working paper). See also Jane Garvey prepared statement, May 22, 2003; Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pan Am/Lockerbie Commission), May 15, 1990, pp. 113--114; Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Gore Commission), Feb. 12, 1997. While the sabotage of commercial aircraft, including Pan Am 103 in 1998, had claimed many lives, hijackings had also been deadly, including the 1985 hijacking of an Egypt Air flight in which 60 people were killed and 35 injured; the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am 73 in which 22 people were killed and 125 injured; and the 1996 hijacking of an Ethiopian Airlines flight in which 123 people were killed. See FAA report, “Civil Aviation Security Reference Handbook, ”May 1999. Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Gorelick, and Thompson have recused themselves from our work on aviation security matters.

51. See GAO report, “Aviation Security:Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges, ” Jan. 27, 1994; GAO report, “Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed, ” Sept. 11, 1996; GAO

report, “Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems, ” Mar. 16, 2000; GAO report, “Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance, ” June 28, 2000; testimony of Kenneth M. Mead, DOT Inspector General, Joint Hearing on Actions Needed to Improve Aviation Security before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Sept. 25, 2001. On rules regulating access to security sensitive areas of commercial airports, see FAA regulations, “Airport Security, ”14 C. F. R. § 107;FAA report, “Air Carrier Standard Security Program, ” May 2001.

52. The FAA maintained formal agreements with the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and NSA to receive data of interest as outlined in the agreement. In addition, the FAA posted liaisons with the CIA, FBI, and Department of State to facilitate the flow of intelligence and threat information. See Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb. 13, 2004). FAA civil aviation security officials reported that the agency’s intelligence watch received about 200 pieces of intelligence per day. See Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003).

The analysis regarding the passage of FBI information was based on a review of the FAA’s Intelligence Case Files. The FBI analyst who worked on the 1998 tasking indicated that the information was shared with the FAA liaison to the Bureau, but the liaison did not recall having seen it. Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Matt K. interview (Feb.

13, 2004).


476 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3


53. Regarding intelligence reports, the Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) prepared by the FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Intelligence was reviewed first by an assistant to Acting Deputy Administrator Belger, who would inform him of any information that she felt merited his attention. Belger in turn would determine whether the information needed to be raised with Administrator Garvey. Garvey told us that she maintained an open door policy and counted on her security staff to keep her informed on any pressing issues. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003); Monte Belger interview (Nov. 24, 2003); Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003). Regarding the intelligence unit, see Nicholas Grant interview (May 26, 2004); Claudio Manno interview (Oct. 1, 2003);Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003);Alexander T. Wells, Commercial Aviation Safety (McGraw-Hill, 2001), p. 308.

54. On the threat to civil aviation, see Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003). On CAPPS, also known as CAPS (Computer Assisted Profiling System), see FAA security directive, “Threat to Air Carriers, ” SD 97-01, Oct. 27, 1997. The profile was derived from information on the Passenger Name Record and did not include factors such as race, creed, color, or national origin. In addition to those chosen by the algorithm, a number of other passengers were selected at random, both to address concerns about discrimination and to deter terrorists from figuring out the algorithm and gaming the system. On no-fly lists, see FAA security directive, “Threat to U. S. Air Carriers, ” SD 95, Apr. 24, 2000. Some of the individuals on the no-fly list were in U. S. custody as of 9/11. See Kevin G. Hall, Alfonso Chardy, and Juan O. Tamayo, “Mix-Up Almost Permitted Deportation of Men Suspected of Terrorist Activities, ” Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 2001; FAA security directive, “Threat to U. S. Aircraft Operators, ” SD  108-1, Aug. 28, 2001. On the Gore Commission, see Final Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Feb. 12, 1997, p. 28. On the TIPOFF database (used to screen visa applicants and persons seeking permission to enter the United States against the names of known or suspected terrorists), see DOS cable, State 182167, “Fighting Terrorism:Visas Viper Procedures, ”Oct. 19, 2001. Finally, on the watchlist, officials told us that large lists were difficult to implement, particularly when they weren’t accompanied by numeric data such as date of birth that would enable an air carrier to distinguish the terrorist from others around the world who had his or her name. In addition, the U. S. intelligence community was required to approve the “no-fly” listing of an individual in order to protect sources and methods. Matt Kormann interview (Feb. 13, 2004).

55. On selectees, see James Padgett interview (Oct. 7, 2003). Their bags were either screened for explosives or held off their flight until they were confirmed to be aboard. See FAA security directive, “Threat to Air Carriers, ”

SD 97-01 Oct. 27, 1997. Under the previous noncomputerized profiling system, selectees were subject to secondary screening of their carry-on belongings, and checked baggage. See FAA security directive, “Threat to Air Carriers, ” SD 96-05, Aug. 19, 1996.

56. FAA report, “Air Carrier Standard Security Program, ” May 2001; FAA regulations, “Screening of Passengers and Property, ” 14 C. F. R. § 108. 9 (1999); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003).

57. “Knives with blades under 4 inches, such as Swiss Army Knives, scout knives, pocket utility knives, etc. may be allowed to enter the sterile area. However, some knives with blades under 4 inches could be considered by a reasonable person to be a ‘menacing knife’ and/or may be illegal under local law and should not be allowed to enter the sterile area. ” See FAA regulations, Air Carriers Checkpoint Operations Guide, Aug. 1999; see also Air Transport Association Regional Airlines Association report, “Checkpoint Operations Guide, ”Aug. 1999; Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003); Lee Longmire interview (Oct. 28, 2003); Leo Boivin interview (Sept. 17, 2003). A 1994 FAA assessment of the threat to civil aviation in the United States stated that “system vulnerabilities also exist with respect to hijackings . . . aircraft can be hijacked with either fake weapons or hoax explosive devices. Cabin crew or passengers can also be threatened with objects such as short blade knives, which are allowable on board aircraft. ” See FAA report, “The Threat to U. S. Civil Aviation in the United States, ” Sept. 1994.

58. On random and continuous screening, see Janet Riffe interview (Feb. 26, 2004); FAA report, “Air Carrier Standard Security Program, ” May 2001. On the 9/11 hijackers, see Intelligence report, interrogation of Ramzi Binalshibh, Oct. 1, 2002; FAA records, Intelligence Case File 98--96.

59. Courtney Tucker interview (June 3, 2004);Kenneth Mead prepared statement, May 22, 2003. Some air carrier officials, however, enjoyed a strong reputation for leadership in aviation security, including United Airlines’ Ed Soliday. Bruce Butterworth interview (Sept. 29, 2003);Cathal Flynn interview (Sept. 9, 2003);Steven Jenkins interview (Feb. 24, 2004).

60. Mike Morse interview (Sept. 15, 2003). Regarding training, see FAA report, “Air Carrier Standard Security Program, ” May 2001.

61. On a hardened cockpit door making little difference, see Tim Ahern interview (Oct. 8, 2004). For regulations governing the doors, see FAA regulations, “Miscellaneous Equipment” (emergency exit), 14 C. F. R. § 121. 313 (2001);FAA regulations, “Closing and locking of flight crew compartment door, ” 14 C. F. R. § 121. 587 (2001). Also compromising cockpit security was the use of common locks (one key fit the cockpits of all Boeing aircraft) and the absence of procedures to properly manage and safeguard cockpit keys. Michael Woodward interview (Jan. 25, 2004). For the quote on reinforced cockpit doors, see Byron Okada, “Air Rage Prompts Call for Safety Measures: The FAA Is Expected to Release a Report Today, ” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 10, 2001, p. 1.

62. James Underwood interview (Sept. 17, 2004); Mike Canavan interview (Nov. 4, 2003).


NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 477


63. Jane Garvey interview (Oct. 21, 2003).

64. As defined by statute, covert action “means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include--(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence[. ]” 50 U. S. C. § 413b(e). Executive Order 12333, titled “United States Intelligence Activities, ” terms covert action “special activities, ” defined as “activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities[. ]” E. O. 12333 § 3. 4(h). Pursuant to that order, the CIA has primary responsibility for covert action; another nonmilitary agency may conduct covert action only if the president determines that it “is more likely to achieve a particular objective. ” Ibid. § 1. 8(e).

65. See 50 U. S. C. § 401a(4).

66. DCI report, “National Foreign Intelligence Program Historical Data FY 1985 to FY 2003, ” Feb. 11, 2004.

67. For quote, see Joint Inquiry testimony of Michael Hayden, June 18, 2002; see also Michael Hayden interview (Dec. 10, 2003).

68. Michael Hayden interview (Dec. 10, 2003).

69. For the CIA’s early years, see John Ranelagh, The Agency:The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1986). For the Agency’s more recent history, see Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows:The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (Simon & Schuster, 1996).

70. Regarding the dissolution of the OSS and creation of the CIG, see Michael Warner, Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001); Executive Order 9621, “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions, ” Sept. 20, 1945;“Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities, ” Jan. 22, 1946 (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339).

71. Regarding fears of creating a U. S. Gestapo, see Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design:The Evolution of the CIA, JCS

and NSC (Stanford Univ. Press, 1999), p. 268, n. 6.

72. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3), codified at 50 U. S. C. § 403-3(d)(1).

73. On plausible deniability, see, e. g. , Ranelagh, The Agency, pp. 341--345;Evan Thomas, TheVery Best Men: Four Who Dared:The EarlyYears of the CIA (Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. 230--235.

74. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).

75. Steve Kappes interview (May 7, 2004); James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).

76. Jami Miscik interview (Aug. 29, 2003).

77. Mary McCarthy, Fritz Ermarth, and Charles Allen briefing (Aug. 14, 2003).

78. See Tom Mangold, ColdWarrior: James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (Simon & Schuster, 1991).

79. Ruth David interview (June 10, 2003).

80. “According to the 2002 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System statistics, American colleges granted only six degrees in Arabic in the survey year. ” Joint Inquiry report (unclassified version), p. 344.

81. Leo Hazelwood interview (Aug. 25, 2003); Duane Clarridge interview (Sept. 16, 2003).

82. Charles Allen interview (Sept. 22, 2003); Duane Clarridge interview (Sept. 16, 2003); David Carey interview (Oct. 31, 2003); Leo Hazelwood interview (Aug. 25, 2003); John Helgerson interview (Sept. 5, 2003); Robert Vickers interview (Sept. 17, 2003); CIA Inspector General report, “The Agency’s Counterterrorism Effort, ” Oct. 1994.

83. Cofer Black testimony, Apr. 13, 2004.

84. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).

85. George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; George Tenet testimony, Apr. 14, 2004.

86. Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).

87. See Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (W. W. Norton, 2003).

88. Michael Sheehan interview (Dec. 16, 2003).

89. See DOS report, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “1990 Report of theVisa Office, ”Oct. 1991; DOS Inspector General report, “Review of the Visa-Issuing Process; Phase I: Circumstances Surrounding the Issuance of Visas to Sheik Omar Ahmed Ali Abdel Rahman, ” Mar. 1994; Mary Ryan interviews (Sept. 29, 2003; Oct. 9, 2003); DOS briefing materials, presentation on consular systems delivered to the Information Resources Management Program Board, Apr. 26, 1995; DOS report, “History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993--2001), ”undated (online at www. state. gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059. htm);Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-236 (1994), § 140(a).

90. See Gordon N. Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff:The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Greenwood, 1999).

91. William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004); John Hamre interview (Dec. 9, 2003); Hugh Shelton interview (Dec. 5, 2004); Cohen Group meeting (Dec. 12, 2003).

92. See Monterey Institute of International Studies report, “Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness and WMD Civil Support Teams, ” Oct. 2001 (online at http://cns. miis. edu/research/cbw/120city. htm); National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996);DOD report, “Domes

478 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3


tic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, ” May 1, 1997 (online at www. defenselink. mil/pubs/domestic/toc. html).

93. John Hamre interview (Dec. 9, 2003);Henry Allen Holmes interview (Nov. 10, 2003);Brian Sheridan interview (Feb. 25, 2004).

94. Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).

95. Commission analysis of U. S. counterterrorism strategy from 1968 to 1993.

96. President Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, ” July 8, 1985 (online at www. reagan. utexas. edu/resource/speeches/1985/70885a. htm).

97. See Report of the President’s Special Review Board (Tower Commission) (GPO, 1987);Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line:The Iran-Contra Affairs (Simon & Schuster, 1991).

98. James Pavitt interview (Jan. 8, 2004).

99. President Clinton, “Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, ” June 26, 1993.

100. President Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, ” Jan. 24, 1995; President Clinton, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism, ” Feb.

9, 1995; President Clinton, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism, ” May 3, 1995.

101. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, “U. S. Policy on Counterterrorism, ” June 21, 1995.

102. President Clinton, “Remarks by the President in a Congressional Meeting, ” July 29, 1996.

103. President Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the Second Term National Security Team and an Exchange With Reporters, ” Dec. 5, 1996.

104. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, ” May 22, 1998; Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection, ” May 22, 1998.

105. President Clinton, “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, ” May 22, 1998.

106. See Ernest R. May, “Intelligence: Backing into the Future, ” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992.

107. For Congress’s domestic orientation, see Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and WhyYou Should Care (Indiana Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 18--19. For presidential focus prior to 9/11, see President Clinton, “Commencement Address at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, ”May 22, 1998;President Clinton, “Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century, ” Jan. 22, 1999.

108. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 17. Our review of the classified schedules of authorization from 1995 to 2001 found that Congress generally supported the top line requests made by the administration for intelligence, never reducing it by more than 2 or 3 percent; however, the congressional oversight committees did reallocate the administration’s requests significantly, sometimes increasing programs like counterterrorism that they believed were being underfunded. On the intelligence budget, see George Tenet prepared statement, Mar. 24, 2004, pp. 23--26. The DCI added that frustrations with getting additional funding requests arose mainly from the administration. See ibid.

109. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Final Report, Dec. 1993;“Contract with America, ”

1994; Statement of Rep. Saxby Chambliss, Hearing on Intelligence Gaps in Counterterrorism before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism of the House Armed Services Committee, Sept. 5, 2002.

110. Hamilton, How Congress Works, p. 106; Richard Durbin interview (Apr. 27, 2004); Dianne Feinstein interview (June 1, 2004); Peter Hoekstra interview (June 2, 2004); Chris Shays interview (June 2, 2004); Dana Priest, “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, ” Washington Post, Apr. 27, 2004, p. A1. For Tenet quote, see George Tenet testimony, Mar. 24, 2004.

111. For neglect of airline security, see Commission analysis of the Congressional Daily Digest and the Congressional Record using the search term “aviation security. ” See also FAA briefing materials, “FAA Hearing/Briefing Activity Prior to September 11, 2001, ” undated. For the focus on the Southwest border, see Commission analysis of the hearing records of the subcommittees on immigration of the House and Senate Judiciary committees from 1993 through 2001. On restricting the FBI’s appropriations, see Robert Dies interview (Feb. 4, 2004);Stephen Colgate interview (May 19, 2004). On sanctions on Pakistan, see Strobe Talbott interview (Jan. 15, 2004); Karl Inderfurth interview (Feb. 18, 2004); Christina Rocca interview (Jan. 29, 2004). On the lack of time for oversight, see Hamilton, How CongressWorks, p. 112;see also Center for Strategic and International Studies meeting (July 23, 2003); Jay Rockefeller meeting (Oct. 16, 2003). On the Senate Appropriations Committee, the long-serving Chair (Ted Stevens) and Ranking Minority Member (Daniel Inouye) of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee conduct at least weekly oversight sessions of the intelligence community, always behind closed doors, the effectiveness of which we cannot judge.

112. Although some members of the House sought the creation of a Select Committee on Terrorism in the beginning of 2001, the Speaker asked the intelligence ccommittee to set up a terrorism working group instead. Under Rep. Saxby Chambliss and Rep. Jane Harman, it held several briefings before 9/11 and became a subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee immediately afterward.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 479


113. Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, chairman of the National Security Subcommittee of the Government Reform Committee, held 12 wide-ranging hearings on terrorism between 1999 and July 2001, with special attention on domestic preparedness and response to terrorist attack. Though the intelligence oversight panels’ work was largely secret, the intelligence community’s annual worldwide threat testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was public testimony (typically followed by a closed session). From 1997 through 2001, the threat of terrorism rose on the priority list from third (1997--1998) to second (1999--2000) to first in 2001. See Commission analysis of congressional hearings on terrorism.

114. Congress created three commissions in 1998. One, chaired jointly by former senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, examined national security challenges for the twenty-first century. This commission included stark warnings about possible domestic terrorist attacks and recommended a new institution devoted to identifying and defending vulnerabilities in homeland security. See Phase III Report of the U. S. Commission on National Security/

21st Century, “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, ” Feb. 15, 2001. A second, chaired by former governor James G. Gilmore of Virginia, studied domestic preparedness to cope with attacks using weapons of mass destruction and presented five reports. See, e. g. , Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, “ Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing our Homeland, Preserving our Liberty, ”Dec. 15, 2003. The third, chaired by L. Paul Bremer, the former State Department counterterrorism coordinator, with vice chair Maurice Sonnenberg, a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, focused specifically on terrorist threats and what could be done to prepare for them. See Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, “Countering the Threat of International Terrorism, ” June 2000.

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