Security Council
6335th Meeting* (AM)
Security Council Imposes Additional Sanctions on Iran,
Voting 12 in Favour to 2 Against, with 1 Abstention
Brazil, Turkey, Lebanon Say Tehran Declaration Could
Boost Diplomatic Efforts, While Sanctions Represent Failure of Diplomacy
Expressing deep concern
about Iran’s lack of compliance with its previous resolutions on
ensuring the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the Security
Council imposed additional sanctions on the country today, expanding an
arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping
enterprises related to “proliferation-sensitive activities”.
Adopting resolution 1929
(2010) by a vote of 12 in favour to 2 against (Brazil, Turkey), with
1 abstention (Lebanon), the Council also requested the Secretary-General
to create a panel of experts to monitor implementation of the
sanctions. Annexed to the text containing the fourth round of sanctions
imposed on Iran were measures directed against 41 new named entities and
individuals, including one scientist and enterprises linked to the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard and the defence industry, as well as banks
and the national shipping line.
By other terms of the
resolution, the Council decided that Iran should not acquire interests
in any commercial activity relating to uranium enrichment and other
nuclear materials or technology in other States, and that all States
should prevent the transfer to Iran of any tanks, armoured combat
vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, or
missiles and related systems or parts. It also called upon all States
to report to the relevant Sanctions Committee, within 60 days, on the
steps they had taken to implement the necessary measures.
Emphasizing the importance of diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated
solution guaranteeing the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,
the Council noted in that regard the efforts by Turkey and Brazil for an
agreement on the Tehran Research Reactor, which “could serve as a
confidence-building measure”. It also stressed the willingness of the
so-called E3+3 — China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United
Kingdom and the United States — to further enhance diplomatic efforts to
promote dialogue and consultations towards a negotiated solution.
The Council affirmed that
it would suspend the sanctions if, and so long as, Iran suspended all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to allow for good-faith
negotiations. It also affirmed its determination to apply further
measures if Iran continued to defy the just-adopted text as well as
previous resolutions.
Speaking before the vote, the representatives of Brazil and Turkey said
they had voted against the text because it ran against their efforts to
bring about a negotiated solution through the agreement on the Tehran
Research Reactor and the related Tehran Declaration of 17 May, which
provided a new opportunity for diplomacy.
Following the vote,
Lebanon’s representative said Iran had a right to the peaceful use of
nuclear energy as well as an obligation to adhere to the safeguards
regime, adding that the fuel swap deal it had negotiated with Brazil and
Turkey provided a way towards a resolution of the problems that had
arisen. The sanctions regime, on the other hand, represented a painful
failure of diplomatic efforts, he added.
Speaking on behalf of the
Foreign Ministers of the E3+3 countries, the representative of the
United Kingdom said today’s action affirmed both the international
community’s concern about Iran’s nuclear programme and the need for the
country to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the
IAEA Board of Governors, while also keeping the door open for continued
engagement between the E3+3 and Iran. The Ministers welcomed and
commended all diplomatic efforts in that regard, especially those
recently made by Brazil and Turkey on the specific issue of the Tehran
Research Reactor. “We expect Iran to demonstrate a pragmatic attitude
and to respond positively to our openness towards dialogue and
negotiations,” he said.
Iran’s representative,
however, placed the resolution within the context of pressures exerted
on his country over many decades by some of the same Powers supporting
today’s resolution. Those pressures included suits to prevent Iran’s
nationalization of its own oil, and the military coup that had
reinstalled the Shah. The clear message was that no one should be
allowed to endanger the vital interests of the capitalist world, he
said.
Iran was more powerful
today and would not bow to such pressures, he asserted, emphasizing his
country’s right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and
stressing that it had carried out “robust” cooperation with IAEA. The
Council was showing its political biases by its reaction to the deal on
the Tehran Research Reactor, and its lack of action on Israeli
violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
the threats made against Iran by that country and the United States, he
said.
In their national
statements, Council members and E3+3 countries all paid tribute to the
efforts of Turkey and Brazil, which had resulted in the Tehran
Declaration, but noted that the agreement did not deal with core issues
such as compliance with IAEA, uranium enrichment in defiance of the
Council and the revelation of the previously undeclared facility at Qom.
Also speaking today were the representatives of the United States,
France, Uganda, Russian Federation, Japan, Austria, China, Nigeria,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Mexico.
The meeting began at
11:15 a.m. and ended at 12:59 p.m.
Background
Meeting this morning to
consider the question of non-proliferation, the Security Council was
expected to take action on a draft resolution (document S/2010/283)
co-sponsored by France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States.
Statements
MARIA LUIZA RIBEIRO VIOTTI (Brazil), speaking before action, said
her delegation would vote against the draft resolution to honour the
Tehran Declaration signed by her own country as well as Turkey and Iran
on 17 May. Brazil also opposed the text because it did not see
sanctions as effective in the present case. They would lead to the
suffering of the Iranian people and play into the hands of those on all
sides who did not want a peaceful resolution of the issue. Furthermore,
adopting sanctions at the present juncture ran contrary to the efforts
of Brazil and Turkey to engage with Iran on a negotiated solution, she
added.
Describing the Tehran
Declaration as a unique opportunity that should not be missed, she went
on to point out that it had been approved by the highest Iranian
officials as well as Parliament. The Declaration provided for the use
of nuclear energy and set out ways to verify fully its peaceful
purposes. The only possible way to further that collective goal was to
achieve Iran’s cooperation through dialogue and negotiations. Indeed,
the Declaration showed that dialogue could do more than sanctions, she
said, expressing the Brazilian Government’s deep regret that the
document had neither received the recognition it deserved, nor been
given time to bear fruit.
She
said she was also very concerned that the letter of the Vienna Group had
only arrived hours ago and no time had been given for Iran to react to
its opinion, including its call for a technical group meeting on
details. Also of concern was the fact that the Council’s permanent
members, together with a State that was not a member, had negotiated
behind closed doors for a month. Brazil reaffirmed the imperative to
carry out all nuclear activity under the safeguards of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran’s activities were no exception,
she emphasized, adding that the Tehran Declaration was “sound policy”
that should be pursued. The resolution would delay rather than
accelerate or ensure progress, and concerns about Iran’s nuclear
programme would not be resolved until dialogue began. By adopting
sanctions the Council was adopting one of two tracks to solving the
question, and in Brazil’s opinion, it had chosen the wrong track.
ERTUĞRUL APAKAN (Turkey),
also speaking before the vote, said his country was fully committed to
all its non-proliferation obligations and, as such, was a party to all
major relevant international instruments and regimes. Indeed the
development of nuclear weapons by any country would make it even more
difficult to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
Turkey also wished to see a restoration of international confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
To that end, seeing no
viable alternative to a diplomatic and peaceful solution, Turkey had
signed, with Brazil and Iran, the Tehran Declaration, which aimed to
provide nuclear fuel to the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor. It had
created “a new reality” with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme, he
said, adding that the agreement was designed as a confidence-building
measure, which, if implemented, would contribute to the resolution of
substantive issues relating to that nuclear programme in a positive and
constructive atmosphere. “In other words, the Tehran Declaration
provides a new and important window and opportunity for diplomacy,” he
said, stressing that sufficient time and space should be allowed for its
implementation.
Turkey was therefore
deeply concerned that the adoption of sanctions would negatively affect
the momentum created by the Tehran Declaration and the overall
diplomatic process, he said. Furthermore, it was “rather unhelpful”
that the responses of the Vienna Group had been received only a few
hours ago. The negative nature of those responses and their having been
sent only on the day when the Council planned to adopt sanctions “had a
determining effect on our position”, he said, adding that Turkey’s
position demonstrated its commitment to the Tehran Declaration and to
diplomatic efforts.
He went on to say that
his delegation’s vote against the resolution should not be construed as
indifference to the problems emanating from Iran’s nuclear programme.
“There are serious question marks within the international community
regarding the purpose and nature of [that] programme, and those need to
be cleared up.” Iran should be absolutely transparent about its nuclear
programme and demonstrate full cooperation with IAEA in order to restore
confidence. Turkey supported a diplomatic solution and the
sanctions-based resolution would be adopted despite unrelenting efforts
to that end.
However, the resolution’s adoption should not be seen as an end to
diplomacy, he emphasized, expressing his firm belief that, after the
adoption of the text, efforts towards finding a peaceful solution must
be continued even more resolutely. “Our expectation from Iran is that
to work towards implementation of the Tehran Declaration [it] must
remain on the table and Iran should come to the negotiating table with
the 5+1 [five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany] to
take up its nuclear programme, including the suspension of enrichment,”
he said.
Action on Draft
Resolution
The
Council then adopted the text by 12 votes in favour to 2 against
(Brazil, Turkey), with 1 abstention (Lebanon).
Statements
SUSAN RICE (United States), speaking after the vote, said the
resolution was a response to the threats to peace and security arising
from Iran’s refusal to comply with the requirements of IAEA and the
demands of the Council. “Words must mean something,” she said,
stressing that the sanctions were not aimed at Iran’s right to use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but squarely at concerns that it
had ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. The measures were tough,
smart and precise, she added.
Recalling the diplomatic
openings that the United States had made to Iran, she said it had
shunned successive opportunities to assure the international community
of its peaceful purposes, in addition to announcing its intention to
further enrich uranium and revealing undeclared sites. The resolution
offered Iran a clear path to the suspension of sanctions and reaffirmed
the willingness of the United States and other countries to continue
diplomacy for that purpose. She praised the work of Turkey and Brazil,
but said their proposal did not respond to the very real concerns about
Iran’s nuclear programme. “This resolution does,” she said, emphasizing
that respect for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
must remain at the centre of efforts to control nuclear weapons.
MARK LYALL GRANT (United
Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China,
France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United
States (“E3+3”), reaffirmed their determination and commitment to seek
an early negotiated settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue. The
adoption of the resolution, while reflecting the international
community’s concern about that country’s nuclear programme and
reconfirming the need for Iran to comply with Security Council and IAEA
Board of Governors requirements, “keeps the door open for continued
engagement between the E3+3 and Iran.”
He said the aim of
ministerial efforts was to achieve a comprehensive and long-term
settlement, which would restore international confidence in the peaceful
nature of Iran’s programme, while respecting its legitimate right to the
peaceful use of atomic energy. “We are resolute in continuing our work
to this purpose. We also welcome and commend all diplomatic efforts in
this regard, especially those recently made by Brazil and Turkey on the
specific issue of the Tehran Research Reactor,” he added. The Ministers
also reaffirmed their June 2008 proposals, as confirmed by the current
text, which provided a sound basis for future negotiations.
He went on to say that
the Ministers were prepared to continue dialogue and interaction with
Iran in the context of implementing the understandings reached during
their meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009. They had asked Baroness
Ashton, European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, to pursue that dialogue with Saeed
Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National
Security Council, at the earliest opportunity. “We expect Iran to
demonstrate a pragmatic attitude and to respond positively to our
openness towards dialogue and negotiations,” he added.
Reverting to his national capacity, he recalled efforts to resolve the
problem diplomatically, saying he regretted that they had not come to
fruition and stressing that Iran had followed up with programmes that
were even more provocative. He acknowledged the good-faith efforts of
Turkey and Brazil, but recalled that Iran had pulled out of a previous
agreement, noting that the United Kingdom could not allow it to use the
new agreement to justify its defiance of IAEA and the Council. Today’s
resolution had been made necessary by Iran’s own actions, he said,
pledging his country’s readiness to resume talks while confirming its
equal readiness to respond robustly if Iran continued to flout its
responsibilities.
GÉRARD ARAUD (France)
welcomed the adoption of the text, saying it had been carried out with a
balanced representation and that such unity was a response to Iran’s
clandestine nuclear programme. Since its discovery, Iran had continued
to obfuscate the efforts of IAEA and ignore successive Security Council
resolutions. There was no doubt about what was going on: Iran had built
a clandestine military facility that was far too small for civilian
purposes, and had also begun to enrich its uranium to 20 per cent,
bringing it “dangerously close” to military grade. Given all that, it
was no surprise that IAEA had recently reported that it was impossible
to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes.
He said the Council had
arrived at today’s decision after a long and earnest diplomatic push to
negotiate with Iran on the nature and breadth of its nuclear programme.
While France welcomed the initiative by Turkey and Brazil as an
important confidence-building measure, it appeared that Iran was
avoiding the substance of the agreement by continuing to enrich
uranium. It was using the Tehran Declaration as an alibi to avoid
discussing the programme with the E3+3, and to buy time for continued
enrichment, he said, adding that Iran was using it to ignore the will of
the wider international community. Indeed, the heart of the problem was
the true nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, he emphasized.
With all that in mind, the Security Council had adopted a text that
would slow down the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme and allow
diplomacy more time, he continued. The text was aimed at addressing
Iran’s continuing attempts to “ride a train for which it does not have a
ticket”; not directed at the Iranian people. Adopting it was “the very
least the Council could do” in its efforts to reassure the wider
international community about the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
The Council also sought to prevent a regional nuclear arms race and to
prevent a conflict that could have disastrous consequences in an already
unstable region.
The door to dialogue and diplomacy, as always, remained open, he said.
France, United Kingdom, United States and the Russian Federation had
written to IAEA seeking a discussion of all issues of concern regarding
the tripartite agreement. Those countries were also willing to discuss
other measures as set out in the resolution. However, such measures
could not be taken by others alone, and the Iranian leadership “must
take the hand that is being offered” rather than continue its dangerous
pursuit of regional supremacy. Rather than a path to isolation, Iran
must choose to be brought into the fold of the international community,
he added.
RUHAKANA RUGNDA (Uganda)
said his delegation had voted in favour of the text because it fully
supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s aims. Indeed, the
Treaty set out the provisions for safeguarding and verifying all nuclear
activity, and it was important that all the nuclear activities of
parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were in compliance with relevant
safeguards. The recent IAEA report raised a number of questions about
the purposes of Iran’s nuclear programme, he said. Uganda commended the
recent initiative by Turkey and Brazil, which was vital to
confidence-building efforts. All future efforts must respect Iran’s
right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, which ensuring also that Iran
adhered to Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards and cooperated with IAEA
in a full and transparent manner.
VITALY CHURKIN (
Russian Federation) said his vote in favour had been guided by his
country’s consistent position on the need for to resolve through
dialogue all questions involving Iran’s nuclear programme. Hopefully
Iran would see the resolution as an appeal to launch substantial
negotiations to clarify all issues and to fulfil its responsibilities
towards IAEA and the Security Council. The Russian Federation would
continue to make significant efforts to promote dialogue and the
resolution of all such problems.
Thus far, Iran had not
opened the road sufficiently to allow it fully to master the use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, thanks to its lack of cooperation
with IAEA, he said. Sanctions, forceful measures that must be used in a
balanced and proportional way, were aimed exclusively at bolstering the
non-proliferation regime and not at the well-being of the Iranian
people, he stressed, welcoming the efforts of Brazil and Turkey.
YUKIO TAKASU (Japan)
affirmed the importance of efforts to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and the responsibilities implied by the right to
develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses, stressing that Iran had not
fulfilled its responsibilities in that regard. Japan paid tribute to
the efforts of Brazil and Turkey, but regretted that the resulting
Declaration did not address core issues, including Iran’s continuing
enrichment of uranium to high levels. Japan also supported the
dual-track approach to resolving the Iran nuclear issue through dialogue
as well as pressure, he said, noting that the resolution contained a
targeted and balanced approach along those lines, while in no way
closing the doors to diplomacy.
THOMAS MAYR-HARTING (Austria),
noting that his delegation had voted in favour of the text, said a
decision of that kind was never to be taken lightly. From the time when
IAEA had revealed Iran’s programme in 2003, Austria had hoped that the
issue could be resolved through negotiations, but even after five
Council resolutions, the nature of the programme remained unclear.
Indeed, a clandestine nuclear facility had been discovered just a few
months ago, he said, emphasizing his country’s continuing commitment to
a dual-track approach.
While Austria believed
the current resolution was necessary, it still stood behind the two
packages proffered by the international community in 2006 and 2008, he
said, highlighting also the fact that today’s text stressed the
willingness of the E3+3 to continue and enhance diplomatic dialogue and
consultations. The resolution also expressed the Council’s willingness
to consider suspending the measures outlined therein if Iran suspended
its enrichment activities and carried out the aims of the Council’s
previous resolutions.
LI BAODONG (China)
said that, like previous texts, the current one reflected international
concerns as well as the desire of all parties to resolve the matter
through dialogue and negotiations. China therefore called on all States
to implement the resolution fully and effectively. However, any actions
undertaken must be conducive to stability in the Middle East, must not
affect the daily lives of the Iranian people, must be commensurate with
Iran’s actual practice in the nuclear field, and must respect all
international norms on nuclear matters.
He said the adoption of
the current text did not mean the door was closed to diplomatic
efforts. Indeed, it was an attempt to bring Iran back to the table,
since the sanctions it outlined could be suspended, or even lifted, if
Iran complied with its IAEA obligations. Over the years, China had
worked hard to ensure a negotiated settlement of the issue, and welcomed
the tripartite agreement between Brazil, Turkey and Iran. It was to be
hoped that Iran would use the momentum generated by the Tehran
Declaration to build the international community’s confidence.
NAWAF SALAM (Lebanon),
stressing the importance of ridding the Middle East and the world of
nuclear weapons, said his country had been one of the first parties to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, adding that the recent Review Conference
had reaffirmed the importance of a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East.
Israel was the only country in the region that held nuclear weapons, he
said, emphasizing that it should allow IAEA inspection of its nuclear
facilities, and that enforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime
should not be selective.
Iran had a right to use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as an obligation to adhere
to the safeguards regime, he said. The fuel swap deal negotiated by
Turkey and Brazil provided a road towards resolving the problems that
had arisen, he said, adding that the agreement was still a gateway to
confidence-building measures. The solution to the overall issue would
come about through dialogue and not pressure. The sanctions regime
represented a painful failure of diplomatic efforts, he said, while
stressing his refusal to give up on such efforts and calling for a
reinvigorated, flexible and constructive dialogue.
RAFF BUKUN-OLU WOLE
ONEMOLA (Nigeria) said the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the
best framework for guaranteeing the right to peaceful nuclear programmes
while preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for that reason his
country was cooperating with IAEA in its efforts to meet its people’s
energy needs. In that context, Nigeria could not understand why Iran
was not cooperating with the Agency if its goals were peaceful. It was
incumbent on that country to dispel doubts about its nuclear programme,
he stressed, calling on Iran to respond positively to diplomatic
efforts, and welcoming the dual-track approach. Nigeria applauded the
efforts of Brazil and Turkey in that context, he said.
IVAN BARBALIĆ (Bosnia
and Herzegovina) said his delegation had once again been among those
that had nourished hopes that the issue could be solved through
negotiations and in a satisfactory manner for all concerned. “However,
we find ourselves confronted by further aggravation regarding a
comprehensive solution to the nuclear capacity development in the
Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said, adding that his own country, as a
State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was fully committed to
implementing the Treaty, which represented an irreplaceable framework
for promoting security and preventing nuclear proliferation. The IAEA
safeguards agreements could ensure that nuclear energy was used in a
safe and responsible manner.
The
right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was also
important and must be fully respected and protected, he stressed. “
Iran is no exception to that rule. It should be made clear,
nevertheless, that the scope and objectives of any nuclear programme,
including Iran’s, have to remain in accordance with international rules
and must be subjected to a verifiable and transparent inspection regime
by the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The Council had adopted
resolutions calling on Iran to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and to extend full cooperation to IAEA inspectors, yet, according to the
most recent reports, the international community had not received a
clear and unequivocal response from Iran, which had brought the Council
to the present stage.
Bearing in mind the
importance of restoring confidence in the strictly peaceful nature of
the Iranian nuclear programme, he urged Iran to comply with all
resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, and
to implement the Additional Protocol. A negotiated settlement, based on
mutual trust and respect, was the best option, and in that regard,
Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed the recent efforts by Turkey and Brazil
“as a significant confidence-building measure”. The resolution adopted
today was tough, but it did not close out the option of further
diplomatic efforts towards an ultimate negotiated solution, he said,
calling upon the various parties directly involved to explore all
possible means to pave the way for a peaceful solution.
Council President CLADUE
HELLER ( Mexico), speaking in his national capacity, emphasized
that his country was firmly committed to nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Mexico
was concerned that the actions being taken weakened those three pillars
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and were of particular concern when
carried out in a region already rife with instability and mistrust.
Iran’s “controversial” nuclear programme was not a new issue for the
Council, he said, stressing that the country must comply with all
requests by IAEA to ensure the peaceful nature of its programme. It
must also comply with Security Council resolutions and ensure
transparency regarding its nuclear activities.
“It is Iran that must
gain the confidence of the international community, not the Security
Council,” he declared, expressing Mexico’s support for dialogue and
negotiations as the way forward. The sanctions and other measures
adopted by the Council did not punish the people of Iran, but focused
only on its nuclear activities. Recent diplomatic initiatives were
insufficient because they addressed neither international concerns about
the nature of Iran’s programme nor the issue of enrichment. Today’s
text did not close the door to diplomatic negotiations, but left room
for heightened diplomatic efforts, he said, adding that the creation of
a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be pursued to
ensure the security and stability of all States in that region,
including a future Palestinian State. Mexico would continue to purse
the path of dialogue and reject the use of force, he emphasized.
MOHAMMAD KHAZAEE (Iran)
said that his nation had endured unfair pressures for many years due to
the aggression of some of the same countries that supported today’s
resolution. He pointed specifically to a suit by the United Kingdom
which had claimed that the nationalization of Iran’s oil endangered
international peace, and the subsequent United States-supported coup,
mounted under a similar pretext of maintaining international peace,
which had reinstated the dictatorship of the Shah. The clear message
was that no one should be allowed to endanger the vital interests of the
capitalist world, he asserted.
The
similarity of those efforts was that the United States and United
Kingdom were, then as now, trying to deprive Iran of its absolute right
to achieve energy self-sufficiency, he said. However, the difference
was that today Iran was more powerful and enjoyed greater support among
its people, who had enjoyed three decades of political experience, a
scientific, cultural and industrial renaissance, and the support of the
overwhelming majority of nations.
Recalling also the
support that the United States had offered Iraq in its war with his
country, he said that the Security Council Powers that had refused to
take action against Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in that conflict were
the same ones that had imposed today’s resolution. Weapons of mass
destruction were religiously proscribed in Iran, which was committed to
strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while remaining determined
to exercise its right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
He said there was robust
cooperation with IAEA, with more than 4,500 person-day inspections
permitted since 2003. But even so, a few Western countries continued
their provocative behaviour, exemplified by the politically motivated
reactions to the deal for the supply of fuel for the Tehran Research
Reactor. However, Iran still responded positively to the efforts of
Turkey and Brazil, which had pursued that deal in good faith, leading to
a declaration on the exchange of fuel. But instead of welcoming that
agreement, the hostile Powers had immediately introduced the current
resolution.
The Council had been
turned into the tool of a few countries which did not hesitate to abuse
it, he said. Those countries should provide answers about their
behaviour, including their threats of force against Iran. Their
prevention of Council action against the criminal Israeli regime, which
daily issued such threats, indicated double standards, he said,
maintaining that his own country was merely trying to exercise its legal
and inalienable rights, while Israel violated the most basic principles
of international law, as demonstrated by the Goldstone Report and the
recent “flotilla massacre”. Iran would never bow to hostile actions and
pressures on the part of a few Powers, and would continue to defend its
rights, he vowed.
Mr.
LYALL GRANT (United Kingdom) said in response that Iran’s
“distorted account of history and personal attacks against my country”
only demeaned that representative. In fact, his statement seemed to be
an attempt not to respond to the concerns of the international community
and the specific concerns set out in Council resolutions about Iran’s
nuclear ambitions. The Iranian delegate’s attacks were an insult to the
Council and all those who had sought a negotiated settlement over the
past four years. “I hope that on more sober reflection, Iran will
respond honestly to the questions asked by the Council over the past
four years about its nuclear programme [and] will engage more positively
with the Council.”
Resolution
The full text of
resolution 1929 (2010) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling the
Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887
(2009) and reaffirming their provisions,
“Reaffirming its
commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all
their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in
conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination,
“Recalling the
resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states
that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global
non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle
East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of
delivery,
“Noting
with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February
2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006
(GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007
(GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/122), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48),
15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May
2008 (GOV/2008/115), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008
(GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35),
28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74),
18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran
has not established full and sustained suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related
projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007)
and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the
Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the
remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the
possibility of military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, nor
taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor
complied with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential
to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these
steps,
“Reaffirming that
outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme by Iran
responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA
Board of Governors have made on Iran,
“Noting with
serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic
Revolution”), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution
1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this
resolution, in Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
“Noting with
serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom
in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related
activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until
September 2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the
Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,
“Also noting the
resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which urges
Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the
facility’s purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls
upon Iran to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a
decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear
facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,
“Noting with
serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did
so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the
existing safeguards procedures,
“Noting with
concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s
right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran
pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and emphasizing that in
accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1
cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the
IAEA’s right to verify design information
provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the
stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a
facility,
“Reiterating
its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly
supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and commending
the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to
Iran’s nuclear programme,
“Expressing the
conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737
(2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to
a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear
programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,
“Emphasizing the
importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated
solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey
and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor
that could serve as a confidence-building measure,
“Emphasizing also,
however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of Iran
addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,
“Stressing that
China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and
the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on
exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue
through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals
(S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and noting
the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the
international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as
that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the
Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
“Welcoming the
guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist
States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions
1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), and recalling in particular the need
to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks,
including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions
contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
“Recognizing that
access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth
and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran’s
revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and further noting
that chemical process equipment and materials required for the
petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for
certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,
“Having regard
to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
“Recalling that
the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean
activities,
“Calling for the
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Iran at an
early date,
“Determined to
give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to
persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also
to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of
its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security
Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been
met,
“Concerned by the
proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and
mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
“Stressing that
nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions
exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or
the threat of force,
“Acting
under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1. Affirms that
Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of
Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007) and 1803 (2008);
“2. Affirms that
Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA
Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which
are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of
its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address
the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment
facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all
enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, further affirms
its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in
paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
“3. Reaffirms
that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues,
particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible
military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by
providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and
documents requested by the IAEA, and stresses the importance of
ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for
the fulfilment of its work in Iran;
“4. Requests the
Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all
his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;
“5. Decides that Iran shall without delay comply fully and
without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including
through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary
Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, calls upon Iran to act
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to
its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003,
calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and
reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran’s
Safeguards Agreement, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary
Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed
unilaterally by Iran, and notes that there is no mechanism in the
Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary
Arrangement
“6. Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under
previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related
and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on
any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related
facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any
uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;
“7. Decides that
Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another
State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials
and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular
uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water
activities or technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons, and further decides that all
States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their
jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran
or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on
their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled
by them;
“8. Decides that
all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer
to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or
individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels
or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems,
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile
systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items
as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides
further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their
nationals or from or through their territories of technical training,
financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance
related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture,
maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this
context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and
restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and
use of all other arms and related materiel;
“9. Decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related
to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take
all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or
technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;
“10. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures
to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of
individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006),
Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of resolution 1803 (2008) and
Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the
Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except
where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the
provision to Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i)
and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of
resolution 1737 (2006), underlines that nothing in this paragraph
shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its
territory, and decides that the measures imposed in this
paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a
case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of
humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the
Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the
objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA
Statute is engaged;
“11. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13,
14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals
and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals
or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to
entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,
and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the
Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading
sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;
“12. Decides that
the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution
1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”)
individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals
or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to
entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means,
and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over those
transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems;
“13. Decides that
for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and
7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be
superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines
that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy
water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, and further decides that for the purposes of
the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737
(2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by
the list of items contained in S/2010/263;
“14. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their
national authorities and legislation and consistent with international
law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil
aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory,
including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information
that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs
3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution
1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9
of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of
those provisions;
“15. Notes that States, consistent with international law, in
particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the
high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all
States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that
provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the
supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs
3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution
1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9
of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of
those provisions;
“16. Decides to
authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of
(such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or
transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States
for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is
prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph
5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or
paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections
pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is
not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security
Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any
obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides further that all
States shall cooperate in such efforts;
“17. Requires any
State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15
above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial
written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for
the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not
cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are
found, further requires such States to submit to the Committee,
at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant
details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of
the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and
intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;
“18. Decides that all States shall prohibit the provision by
their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as
provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to
Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if
they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they
are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is
prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph
5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or
paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services
is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo
has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and
underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal
economic activities;
“19. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13,
14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of
the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in
Annex III and to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their
direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including
through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to
have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the
provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this
resolution;
“20. Requests all Member States to communicate to the Committee
any information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air’s cargo
division or vessels owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken
in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions
of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this
resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or
ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely
available;
“21. Calls upon all States, in addition to implementing their
obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial
services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to,
through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or
entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or
persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial
or other assets or resources if they have information that provides
reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources
could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities,
or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by
freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories
or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to
their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their
jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and
applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in
accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
“22. Decides that all States shall require their nationals,
persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their
territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when
doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran’s
jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals
or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities
owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they
have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such
business could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to
violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this
resolution;
“23. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that
prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries,
or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit
Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership
interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships
with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial
services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to
believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems;
“24. Calls upon
States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions
within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening
representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if
they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that
such financial services could contribute to Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems;
“25. Deplores the
violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007)
that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of
resolution 1747 (2007), and commends States that have taken
action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;
“26. Directs the
Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided
in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this
resolution, and recalls that the Committee may designate
individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or
entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of,
these resolutions;
“27. Decides that
the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full
implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance,
investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be
submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this
resolution;
“28. Decides that
the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution
1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008), shall
also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to
receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;
“29. Requests the
Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in
consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel
of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the
following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as
specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of
this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from
States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties
regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular
incidents of non‑compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the
Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve
implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council
an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s
appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days
prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and
recommendations;
“30. Urges all
States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to
cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in
particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the
implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of
non-compliance;
“31. Calls upon
all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of
this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
21, 22, 23 and 24;
“32. Stresses the
willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume
dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most
recently in their meeting with Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a
view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this
issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 June
2008, which would allow for the development of relations and wider
cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with
Iran on the basis of the June 2008 proposal, and acknowledges with
appreciation that the June 2008 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to
this resolution, remains on the table;
“33. Encourages
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of
political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution,
including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to
create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and encourages
Iran to respond positively to such proposals;
“34. Commends the
Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft
Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of
France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for
Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for
the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets
that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009
proposal, and encourages the IAEA to continue exploring such
measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the
Council’s resolutions;
“35. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran,
taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the
instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran,
or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)
and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the
benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or
other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the
measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008)
and this resolution;
“36. Requests within 90 days a report from the Director General
of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained
suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as
well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required
by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this resolution, to the
IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its
consideration;
“37. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the
report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90
days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if
and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA,
to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and
mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures
specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006),
as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007),
paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution 1803 (2008), and in
paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23
and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report
referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with
its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council
and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by
the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the
report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions 1737 (2006),
1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the
requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions
will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
“38. Decides to
remain seized of the matter.”
Resolution Annex I
Individuals and
entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
Entities
1.
Amin Industrial Complex:
Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature
controllers which may be used in nuclear research and
operational/production facilities. Amin
Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the
Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which
was designated in resolution 1737 (2006).
Location: P.O.
Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran;
Amin Industrial Estate,
Khalage Rd., Seyedi District,
Mashad, Iran; Kaveh
Complex, Khalaj Rd.,
Seyedi St., Mashad, Iran
A.K.A.:
Amin Industrial Compound and
Amin Industrial Company
2. Armament
Industries Group: Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufacturers and
services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and
medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of
its procurement activity through Hadid
Industries Complex.
Location:
Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10,
Iran; Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19585/777,
Tehran, Iran
3.
Defense Technology and Science
Research Center:
Defense Technology and Science Research
Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of,
Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees Iran’s defence R&D, production,
maintenance, exports, and procurement.
Location:
Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran
4.
Doostan International Company:
Doostan International Company (DICO)
supplies elements to Iran’s ballistic missile program.
5.
Farasakht Industries:
Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled
by, or act on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which
in turn is owned or controlled by MODAFL.
Location: P.O.
Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran
Freeway, Shahin Shahr,
Esfahan, Iran
6. First East
Export Bank, P.L.C.: First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat.
Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has
facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian
nuclear, missile, and defense entities.
Location: Unit
Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan,
Jalan Merdeka,
87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number LL06889
(Malaysia)
7.
Kaveh Cutting Tools Company:
Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: 3rd Km
of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi
Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4 of
Khalaj Road, End of
Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box
91735-549, Mashad, Iran;
Khalaj Rd., End of
Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran;
Moqan St., Pasdaran
St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran
8. M.
Babaie Industries: M.
Babaie Industries is subordinate to
Shahid Ahmad Kazemi
Industries Group (formally the Air Defense
Missile Industries Group) of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization
(AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)
and the Shahid Bakeri
Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution
1737 (2006).
Location: P.O.
Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran
9.
Malek Ashtar
University: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes
research groups previously falling under the Physics Research
Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been
allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this
organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military
dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.
Location: Corner
of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway,
Tehran, Iran
10. Ministry of
Defense Logistics Export: Ministry of
Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells
Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of
resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or
related materiel.
Location: PO Box
16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of
Dabestan Street, Abbas
Abad District, Tehran, Iran
11.
Mizan Machinery Manufacturing:
Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is owned
or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.
Location: P.O.
Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran
A.K.A.: 3MG
12. Modern
Industries Technique Company: Modern Industries Technique Company
(MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy
water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the
construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor.
Location: Arak,
Iran
A.K.A.:
Rahkar Company, Rahkar
Industries, Rahkar
Sanaye Company, Rahkar
Sanaye Novin
13.
Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and
Medicine: The Nuclear Research Center
for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was designated in
resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI’s
center for the development of nuclear fuel
and is involved in enrichment-related activities.
Location: P.O.
Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran
A.K.A.:
Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear
Medicine; Karaji Agricultural and Medical
Research Center
14.
Pejman Industrial Services
Corporation: Pejman Industrial Services
Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location: P.O.
Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran
15.
Sabalan Company:
Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.
Location:
Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
16.
Sahand
Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO): SAPICO is a cover
name for SHIG.
Location:
Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
17.
Shahid
Karrazi Industries: Shahid
Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled
by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.
Location:
Tehran, Iran
18.
Shahid
Satarri Industries: Shahid
Sattari Industries is owned or controlled
by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.
Location:
Southeast Tehran, Iran
A.K.A.:
Shahid Sattari
Group Equipment Industries
19.
Shahid
Sayyade Shirazi Industries:
Shahid Sayyade
Shirazi Industries (SSSI) is owned or
controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.
Location: Next
To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co,
Shahid Babaii
Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran;
Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835,
Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to
Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran
20. Special
Industries Group: Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of
DIO.
Location:
Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran,
Iran
21.
Tiz Pars:
Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007,
Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis
laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material
contribution to Iran’s missile program, on behalf of SHIG.
Location:
Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran
22. Yazd Metallurgy
Industries: Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a subordinate of
DIO.
Location:
Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication
Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box
89195-678, Yazd, Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran
A.K.A.: Yazd
Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries, Directorate of Yazd
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries
Individuals
Javad Rahiqi: Head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan Nuclear Technology
Center (additional information: DOB: 24
April 1954; POB: Marshad).
Resolution Annex II
Entities owned,
controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
1.
Fater (or
Faater) Institute: Khatam al-Anbiya
(KAA) subsidiary. Fater has worked with
foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC
projects in Iran.
2.
Gharagahe
Sazandegi Ghaem:
Gharagahe Sazandegi
Ghaem is owned or controlled by KAA.
3.
Ghorb Karbala:
Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.
4.
Ghorb Nooh:
Ghorb Nooh is
owned or controlled by KAA
5. Hara Company:
Owned or controlled by Ghorb
Nooh.
6.
Imensazan Consultant Engineers
Institute: Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, KAA.
7.
Khatam al-Anbiya
Construction Headquarters: Khatam al-Anbiya
Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in
large scale civil and military construction projects and other
engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on
Passive Defense Organization projects. In
particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction
of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
8.
Makin: Makin
is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a
subsidiary of KAA.
9.
Omran Sahel: Owned or
controlled by Ghorb
Nooh.
10. Oriental Oil
Kish: Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on
behalf of KAA.
11. Rah Sahel:
Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12.
Rahab Engineering Institute:
Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on
behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. Sahel Consultant
Engineers: Owned or controlled by Ghorb
Nooh.
14.
Sepanir: Sepanir
is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15.
Sepasad Engineering Company:
Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or
controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
Resolution Annex III
Entities owned,
controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL)
1.
Irano Hind Shipping Company
Location: 18
Mehrshad Street,
Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat,
Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to
Mehrshad, Sedaghat
St., Opposite of Mellat Park,
Vali Asr Ave.,
Tehran 1A001, Iran
2. IRISL Benelux NV
Location:
Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium;
V.A.T. Number BE480224531 (Belgium)
3. South Shipping
Line Iran (SSL)
Location: Apt.
No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi
Ave., Tehran, Iran; Qaem
Magham Farahani
St., Tehran, Iran
Resolution Annex IV
Proposal to the
Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the United States of America and the European Union
Presented to the
Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran
Possible Areas of
Cooperation with Iran
In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the
Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council
resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in
June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed
as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High
Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably
suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to
OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such
negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC
and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative
state their readiness:
to
recognize Iran’s right to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT
obligations;
to
treat Iran’s nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any
Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence
in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is
restored.
Nuclear Energy
-
Reaffirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear energy for exclusively
peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
-
Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for
Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of
technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
-
Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art
technology.
-
Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is
gradually restored.
-
Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
-
Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste.
Political
-
Improving the six countries’ and the
EU’s
relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.
-
Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
-
Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in
international affairs.
-
Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation,
regional security and stabilization issues.
-
Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage
confidence-building measures and regional security.
-
Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation
mechanisms.
-
Support for a conference on regional security issues.
-
Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would
contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective
of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their
means of delivery.
-
Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
-
Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation
in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the
return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction
of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.
Economic
Steps towards the
normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran’s
access to the international economy, markets and capital through
practical support for full integration into international structures,
including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for
increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.
Energy Partnership
Steps towards the
normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy:
establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy
partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing
partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.
Agriculture
-
Support for agricultural development in Iran.
Facilitation of Iran’s
complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern
technology.
Environment,
Infrastructure
-
Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection,
infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:
-
Development of transport infrastructure, including international
transport corridors.
-
Support for modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure,
including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.
Civil Aviation
-
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of
restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
-
Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
-
Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety
standards.
Economic, social and
human development/humanitarian issues
-
Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social
development and humanitarian need.
-
Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to
Iran:
-
Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in
areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
-
Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g.
public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public
administration, history and philosophy.
-
Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency
response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster
control etc.).
-
Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among
civilizations”.
Implementation
mechanism
-
Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of
a future agreement.
* The 6334th Meeting was closed.
