Security Council
5848th Meeting (PM)
SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S
PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES, INCREASES VIGILANCE OVER IRANIAN BANKS, HAS STATES INSPECT
CARGO
Adopting Resolution 1803 by 14-0-1, Council Welcomes Agreement between
Iran,
Atomic Energy Agency to Resolve Outstanding Issues on Iran’s Nuclear
Programme
The Security Council today
approved a new round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend
uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as had been
required in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and
for taking issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA)
right to verify design information provided to it.
Adopting resolution 1803
(2008) by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention
(Indonesia), the Council, acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter [regarding binding measures not involving armed
force], the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should,
without delay, suspend the aforementioned activities, as required in
paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (Press Release
SC/8928
of 23 December 2006).
The Council called upon
all States to exercise “vigilance and restraint” regarding entry into or
transit through their territories of individuals engaged in or providing
support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the
development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.
In
that connection, it decided that all States should notify the Committee
established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2007) of such
entry or transit, specifically of those people mentioned in the annex to
resolution 1737, annex I to resolution 1747 (Press Release
SC/8980
of 24 March 2007), or annex I and annex II (regarding procurement of
prohibited items) of the current resolution, as well of additional
persons so designated by the Council or the Committee.
The Council further
extended the freezing of the financial assets of persons or entities
supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the
development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, including those
mentioned in annexes I and II of the current resolution or designated by
the Committee.
It called upon all States
to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in
their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with
Bank Melli and Bank
Saderat.
The Council also continued
the blocking of the import and export of sensitive nuclear material and
equipment, except when meant exclusively for use in light-water reactors
with advance notice to the Committee.
States were also called
upon to inspect cargo to and from Iran of aircraft and vessels owned or
operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line,
provided “reasonable grounds” existed to believe that the aircraft or
vessel was transporting prohibited goods.
The
Council welcomed the agreement between Iran and
IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear
programme, and progress made in that regard, as set out in the Director
General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4). In that context, it
stressed the willingness of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom and United States to enhance diplomatic efforts to
promote resumption of dialogue with Iran, with a view to seeking
long-term solution of the issue that would allow for wider cooperation
and, inter alia, the start of direct talks.
The Council would suspend
the sanctions if and for so long as Iran would suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development, as verified by IAEA, but warned
that, in the event Iran did not comply with relevant Council
resolutions, it would decide on the adoption of further appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII.
At the outset of the
meeting, Iran’s representative said: “Today’s action of some members of
the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along
with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the
minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.” Iran’s nuclear programme
had been and would remain absolutely peaceful and in no way posed any
threat to international peace and security. It, therefore, did not fall
within the Council’s purview. The peaceful nature of his country’s
nuclear programme had been confirmed by each and every
IAEA report in the past several years.
By resolving the
outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past activities on the one
hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the
enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of the Agency, the
country had removed any so-called “concerns” or “ambiguities” with
regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and at present, he
said.
He said the Council’s
behaviour in undermining the credibility and integrity of the Agency
would only serve the interests of those who preferred to ignore
IAEA, such as the Israeli regime, which,
with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most
serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The
future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and
especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial
manner. In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their trust
in the Council and considered its actions the result of political
pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.
Although most Council
members said they had voted in favour of the resolution because of
Iran’s non-compliance with Council demands, as well as the
IAEA stance that it could not guarantee that
Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes only, Indonesia’s
representative, explaining his abstention, said: “Essentially, we are
not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted
and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of
Iran’s nuclear programme.” Conditions today were different than at the
adoption of resolution 1747 (2007). Iran was cooperating with
IAEA and, at the present juncture, more
sanctions were not the best course.
The representative of the
United Kingdom read a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of
China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United
States, with support of the High Representative of the European Union,
saying that today’s Council action reflected the international
community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of
the Iranian nuclear programme. “We deplore Iran’s continued failure to
comply with its United Nations Security Council and International Atomic
Energy Agency Board requirements, in particular by expanding its
enrichment-related activities.”
Calling upon Iran to heed
the requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension
of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, he said that the
group of countries remained committed to an early negotiated solution to
the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed their commitment to a
dual-track approach. Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered
“substantial opportunities” for political, security and economic
benefits to Iran and the region. He urged Iran to take the opportunity
to find a negotiated way forward.
The representative of the
United States added that the international community had good reason to
be concerned about Iran’s activities, as the present regime, armed with
nuclear weapons, would pose a greater potential danger to the region and
to the world. Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and
militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan.
The President of Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member
State of the United Nations. The ministerial statement showed a
commitment to a diplomatic solution. “It gives us not pleasure, but
regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution. But our vote
today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate
their international obligations,” he said.
The representatives of
South Africa, Libya, Viet Nam, France, China, Costa Rica, Burkina Faso,
Belgium, Panama, Croatia and the Russian Federation also made
statements.
The meeting was called to
order at 12:45 p.m. and adjourned at 2:55 p.m.
Background
The Security Council met
this afternoon to take action on a draft resolution regarding
non-proliferation contained in document S/2008/141, sponsored by France,
Germany and the United Kingdom.
It
also had before it a letter dated 22 February from the Permanent
Representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General and the
Council President (document S/2008/116). In it, the Ambassador writes
that the latest report of International Atomic Energy Agency (
IAEA)
Director General of 22 February (GOV/2008/4) declares the full
implementation of the work plan concluded between Iran and
IAEA in August 2007 (INFCIRC/711) and, thus,
resolution and closure of all outstanding issues. The Director General
had stressed that “the Agency has been able to conclude that answers
provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with
its findings” and “considers those questions no longer outstanding”.
The report also clearly attests to the “exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear programme”, both in the past and at present.
He writes that the
consideration of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme was imposed on the
Council by certain countries out of “mere political motivations and
narrow national interests and on the basis of certain pretexts and
allegations, which have been totally baseless”. The full implementation
of the work plan has eliminated those pretexts and allegations. The
current and other reports show that Iran is committed to its
international obligations and, at the same time, persistent in pursuing
and exercising its legal and inalienable rights.
He
further states in his letter that, according to the
IAEA report, the Agency had recently received from Iran
additional information similar to that which Iran had previously
provided, pursuant to the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (
NPT),
as well as updated design information. Iran had provided the Agency
with access to declared nuclear material and had provided relevant
reports. It had also provided access to individuals in response to the
Agency’s requests.
It
had now become clear, says Iran’s Permanent Representative, that the
country’s peaceful nuclear issue should be dealt with by the Agency as
the sole pertinent international organization and that safeguards
implementation in Iran had to be “in a routine manner from now on”.
Further, “the Security Council should avoid inflicting more damage to
the credibility and authority of
IAEA, as
well as its own credibility, by persisting in further illegal and
illogical engagement and actions pursued by few countries,” he writes.
Draft Resolution
The full text of the draft
resolution (document S/2008/141) reads as follows:
“The Security Council,
“Recalling the
statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its
resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of
23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and
reaffirming their provisions,
“Reaffirming its
commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all
their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in
conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination,
“Recalling the
resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors
(GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue
would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing
the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction,
including their means of delivery,
“
Noting
with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007
(GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007
(GOV/2007/48) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (
IAEA),
Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment
related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects as
set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) nor
resumed its cooperation with the
IAEA under
the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with
the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006)
and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and
deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
“Noting with
concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s
right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran
pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance
with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be
modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to
verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is
not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of
nuclear material at, a facility,
“Reiterating
its determination to reinforce the authority of the
IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the
IAEA Board of Governors, commending the
IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding
issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the
Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran
(GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming the progress in
implementation of this work plan as reflected in the
IAEA Director General’s report of 15
November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4),
underlining the importance of Iran producing tangible results
rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan
including by providing answers to all the questions the
IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the
implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the
completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,
“Expressing
the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution
1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
requirements set out by the IAEA Board of
Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that
guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful
purposes,
“Stressing that
China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and
the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on
exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue
through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals
(S/2006/521), and noting the confirmation by these countries that
once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be
treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
“Having regard to
States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,
“Welcoming the
guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF)
to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under
resolution 1737 (2006),
“Determined to give
effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade
Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006),
resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the
IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s
development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and
missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines
that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,
“Concerned
by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme
and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors
and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
“
Acting
under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
“1.
Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the
steps required by the
IAEA Board of
Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build
confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme
and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context,
affirms
its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in
paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and
underlines that the
IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will
apply Code 3.1 modified;
“2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the
IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues
concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as
set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008
(GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to
continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses
that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports
the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on
Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement
between Iran and the IAEA;
“3.
Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint
regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of
individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing
support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and
decides in
this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established
pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the
Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of
the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I
to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of
additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee
as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development
of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in
procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and
technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for
activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b) (
i)
and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);
“4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a
State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all
States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into
account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as
well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution,
resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where
Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
“5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures
to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of
individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of
additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee
as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development
of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in
procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and
technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for
activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i)
and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this
paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into
its territory;
“6. Decides that
the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the
Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is
justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious
obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would
otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;
“7.
Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13,
14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and
entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons
or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to
entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities
determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated
persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the
provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution
1747 (2007);
“8. Decides that
all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale
or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or
benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories,
of:
(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale
or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of
resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and
technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document,
and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when
for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale
or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by
the IAEA or under its auspices as provided
for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);
(b) all items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category
II of document S/2006/815;
“9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering
into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade
with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or
insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in
order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);
“10.
Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks
domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank
Melli
and Bank
Saderat, and their branches and
subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to
the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737
(2006);
“11. Calls upon
all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and
legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law
of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to
inspectthe cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their
airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited
under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747
(2007);
“12. Requires all
States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is
undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a
written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation
of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time,
place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;
“13. Calls upon
all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of
this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing
effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;
“14. Decides that
the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution
1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747
(2007) and this resolution;
“15. Stresses the
willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the
United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the
basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive,
long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the
development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based
on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter
alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran
suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including
research and development, as verified by the IAEA;
“16.
Encourages the European Union High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran
in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated
solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view
to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;
“17.
Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran,
taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the
instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran,
or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)
and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the
benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or
other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the
measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or
resolution 1747 (2007);
“18. Requests
within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the
IAEA on whether Iran has established full
and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737
(2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the
steps required by the IAEA Board and with
the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007)
and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
“19. Reaffirms
that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to
in the paragraph above, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so
long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, as verified by the
IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good
faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4,
5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4,
5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9,
10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the
report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied
with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security
Council and met the requirements of the
IAEA
Board of Governors, as confirmed by the
IAEA
Board;
(c) that it shall, in
the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with
resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007)
and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41
of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to
comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the
IAEA, and underlines that further decisions
will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
“20. Decides to
remain seized of the matter.”
Resolution Annex I
1.
Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in
managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)
2. Mohammad
Fedai Ashiani
(involved in the production of ammonium uranyl
carbonate and management of the Natanz
enrichment complex)
3.
Abbas Rezaee
Ashtiani (a senior official at the
AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining
Affairs)
4.
Haleh Bakhtiar
(involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)
5.
Morteza Behzad
(involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad
Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training
and Research Institute)
7.
Seyyed Hussein Hosseini
(AEOI official involved in the heavy water
research reactor project at Arak)
8. M.
Javad Karimi
Sabet (Head of Novin
Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))
9.
Hamid-Reza Mohajerani
(involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General
Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of
Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of
State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the
sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11.
Houshang Nobari
(involved in the management of the Natanz
enrichment complex)
12.
Abbas Rashidi
(involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13.
Ghasem Soleymani
(Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the
Saghand Uranium Mine)
Resolution Annex II
A. Individuals
listed in resolution 1737 (2006)
1. Mohammad
Qannadi, AEOI
Vice President for Research & Development
2.
Dawood Agha-Jani,
Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3.
Behman Asgarpour,
Operational Manager ( Arak)
B. Individuals
listed in resolution 1747 (2007)
1.
Seyed Jaber
Safdari (Manager of the Natanz
Enrichment Facilities)
2.
Amir Rahimi
(Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is
part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production
and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related
activities)
Resolution Annex III
1.
Abzar Boresh
Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the
production of centrifuge components)
2.
Barzagani Tejarat
Tavanmad Saccal
companies (subsidiary of Saccal System
companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity
listed in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro
Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO
front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
4.
Ettehad Technical Group (AIO
front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
5. Industrial
Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka
Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO
for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber
Ibn Hayan (AEOI
laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7.
Joza Industrial Co. (AIO
front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
8.
Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary
of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG)
which depends on DIO. Involved in the
production of centrifuges components)
9.
Niru Battery Manufacturing Company
(subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to
manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile
systems)
10.
Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has
participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at
Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment
Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company,
involved in the ballistic missile programme)
12.
TAMAS Company (involved in
enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the
overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established,
including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in
charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)
Statements
MOHAMMAD
KHAZAEE ( Iran) said: “Today’s action
of some members of the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme, along with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do
not meet the minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.” Iran’s
peaceful nuclear programme had been brought to the Council in violation
of the [International Atomic Energy Agency’s] statute; Iran had not
violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement. It had signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 and had begun
its voluntary implementation, which it was not supposed to have begun
implementing prior to 2003. In addition, Iran was only obliged to
inform IAEA 180 days prior to feeding
nuclear material into facilities, but it had informed the Agency about
the uranium conversion facility four years prior to its operation in
2004, and also four years before Iran had been obliged to do so.
He said Iran’s nuclear programme had been, and would remain, absolutely
peaceful, and in no way posed any threat to international peace and
security. It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview.
The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had been
confirmed by each and every IAEA report in
the past several years. On the basis of ideological and strategic
grounds, Iran categorically rejected the development, stockpiling and
use of nuclear weapons, as well as of all other weapons of mass
destruction, and it was a leader in international efforts to oppose such
weapons. The IAEA Director General had
stressed in various statements that “the Agency does not have any data
or evidence indicating that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons”
and that there was “no evidence Iran’s enrichment of uranium is intended
for a military nuclear programme”.
The outstanding issues
were now resolved and closed, he stressed. The co-sponsors of today’s
resolution had argued in the past that the Council should be involved
due to unresolved outstanding questions. However, Iran had concluded a
work plan with IAEA in August 2007 to
address and resolve the outstanding issues. The conclusion of the work
plan had been described as “a significant step forward” by the Director
General. The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had spared no efforts to
hamper its successful implementation. The Agency’s 22 February report,
however, had “clearly declared the resolution and closure of all
outstanding issues”. The Director General had said after the report’s
release, “we managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues,
including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of
Iran’s enrichment programme”.
By resolving the
outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past activities on the one
hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the
enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of
IAEA, the country had removed any so-called
“concerns” or “ambiguities” with regard to its peaceful nuclear
activities in the past and at present, Mr. Khazaee
said. Those who had resorted to a systematic and relentless campaign
of false claims, propaganda, intimidation and pressure aimed at
IAEA had prompted one of its senior
officials to stress that “since 2002, pretty much all the intelligence
that’s come to us [from the United States] has proved to be wrong”. A
well-organized and pre-planned propaganda campaign had begun even before
the release of the latest IAEA report, in
order to eclipse Iran’s resolving outstanding issues.
He said the full
implementation of the work plan, and thus resolution and closure of the
outstanding issues, had eliminated the most basic pretexts and
allegations, on the basis of which Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme had
been referred to the Council. “ Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme
should be dealt with solely by the Agency.”
Addressing the
suspension issue, he said that Iran could not and would not accept a
requirement that was legally defective and politically coercive.
Neither in the IAEA’s statute, nor in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards, not even in the Additional
Protocol, were “enrichment” and “reprocessing” prohibited. There was
not even a limit for the level of enrichment. Voluntary suspension had
been in place for more than two years in Iran and that had been
verified. It had become clear, however, that those insisting on
suspension had indeed aimed to prolong and ultimately perpetuate it, and
thus deprive Iran from exercising its inalienable rights. The attempt
to make the suspension mandatory through the Council, from the outset,
had violated the fundamental principles of international law, the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board of
Governors’ resolutions.
He said the Council’s
decision to coerce Iran into suspension had also been a gross violation
of the United Nations Charter’s Article 25. The Council could not
coerce countries into submitting either to its decisions taken in bad
faith or to its demands negating the fundamental purposes and principles
of the Charter. Iran needed to enrich uranium to provide fuel for the
nuclear reactors it was planning to build to meet the growing energy
needs. There had never been guarantees that those fuel needs would be
provided fully by foreign sources. No country could solely rely on
others to provide it with the technology and materials that were vital
for its development and for the welfare of its people.
As
a representative of a founding Member of the United Nations, he
expressed “grave concern and dismay regarding the path that the Security
Council has chosen and pursued”. The Council should be a secure and
safe place where the rights of nations, not only were not violated, but
were fully respected. A question arose as to why, after all the crimes
of the Zionist regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territory had had been
described as ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes by the
international community, the Council had failed to put an end to those
crimes. Recalling the Council’s inaction after Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, he said “no amount of explanation
would be able to describe the disastrous consequences of these
unacceptable behaviours of the Security Council”.
The Council’s behaviour
in undermining the credibility and integrity of
IAEA would only serve the interests of those who preferred to
ignore the Agency, such as the Israeli regime, which, with hundreds of
nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most serious threat to
international and regional peace and security. “Is it not time for the
Council to respect the judgement of an institution that is part of the
UN system? Or to respect the legitimate rights of a great nation with a
long history of civilization and peaceful coexistence with other
nations?” he asked. The future security of the world depended on how
the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, functioned in a
just and impartial manner. In reality, peoples across the globe had now
lost their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of
political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.
DUMISANI S.
KUMALO
(
South Africa) regretted that the sponsors of the resolution
persisted with the same text they had tabled before the
IAEA Director General’s report. The
resolution appeared not to adequately take into account the progress
that had been made between Iran and the Agency. Adoption of the new
resolution could not even be postponed until the
IAEA Board had had a full opportunity to consider the matter.
That left the impression that the verification work and progress made by
the Agency was virtually irrelevant to the co-sponsors.
He said the rationale to
bring the issue to the Council was to reinforce the decisions of the
Agency and enhance its authority, yet the resolution did not accurately
reflect what was happening at the Agency. He was seriously concerned
about the implications of that for the Security Council’s credibility,
and the only reason South Africa supported the resolution was to
preserve the unanimity behind previous Council decisions.
IAEA was the only international authority that could provide
necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme, he said. It was unfortunate that the Council gave the
impression that it was in such haste to decide on further punitive
sanctions that it did not wish to consider the progress being made
through IAEA to provide factual information
on implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards in Iran.
The Director General’s report clearly showed that all outstanding
safeguard issues had been clarified and the Agency had not found
evidence of diversion.
Since the adoption of
resolution 1747 (2007) and following the release of the United States
national intelligence estimate, the situation had changed, he said.
Since all outstanding issues had been clarified, there should be
increased confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
At the same time, the need for continued factual information about
Iran’s current nuclear activities could be said to be more important in
the context of the recent allegations of
weaponization activities.
Also important, he noted, was not to jeopardize any of the gains made,
and the Council should seek to build on progress made through the
continued verification of the Agency’s work. Given the “confidence
deficit” that existed, he urged moving forward in a responsible manner.
South Africa did not
wish to see a nuclear-weaponsized Iran or
the denial of the right of any signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
to exploit the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, he said.
Nor did South Africa want to see a war break out over the nuclear
programme in Iran. Additionally, the suspension of enrichment
activities should not become a goal in itself. The Council should
assure Iran that the call for suspension was not a smokescreen for any
indefinite suspension or termination.
He said it was also
important to terminate the sanctions once IAEA
had addressed the remaining issues. In addition, the restrictions on
dual-use goods and on loans and credits must not be allowed to have a
negative impact on the civilian population of Iran. Security Council
members that voted in favour of the resolution, including South Africa,
had a special obligation to the Iranian people and must exercise the
highest degree of oversight in the implementation of the sanctions to
ensure no unintended consequences.
IBRAHIM O. A.
DABBASHI
(
Libya) said his country attached great importance to nuclear
non-proliferation and it was not continuing in its programme. The only
guarantee of the non-use of weapons of mass destruction was their
elimination. In that context, he favoured nuclear-weapon-free zones
throughout the world, including the Middle East, and had supported
resolutions in that regard, including in the context of the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, including in 2007.
Non-proliferation and disarmament were comprehensive issues and should
be applied without discrimination.
He
said the Council had not attached appropriate importance to Israeli
nuclear weapons, despite the fact that Israel had refused to take part
in the Non-Proliferation Treaty or comply with the
IAEA safeguards regime. Israel had not taken into consideration
the repeated appeals against nuclear weapons, which could have “terrible
effects” in the region. Israel’s attitude, and the massacres it was
committing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, showed that the regime
was “terrorist and irresponsible”. It did not take into consideration
international law or international codes of conduct. It was vital for
the Council to deal with that subject comprehensively, and for all
countries to become party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
While stressing the
importance of nuclear non-proliferation, he also reaffirmed the right of
States parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. The report of the IAEA
Director General of 22 February showed that essential progress had been
made on the Iranian nuclear file and most outstanding issues had been
resolved. The draft resolution should have taken those positive
developments into consideration.
However, he said, given the fact that countries that had developed the
text had taken into account the concerns of other members and that most
believed it was appropriate to adopt the resolution, despite the fact
that his delegation did not agree with the assessment process, Libya
associated itself with the Council’s consensus and would support the
resolution, so as to promote one Council viewpoint.
LE
LUONG MINH ( Viet Nam) said his country attached great
importance to all three major pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty --
non-proliferation, respect for the rights of all the parties to develop,
research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and nuclear
disarmament. Viet Nam had proposed changes to the draft resolution to
the effect that Iran’s cooperation with IAEA
and other progress, as well as the authority and role of the Agency as
the body mandated to resolve the non-proliferation issues within the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s framework would be more adequately
reflected. With the proposed changes having been incorporated, the fact
that IAEA had indicated that Iran still
needed to respond to requests by it and by the Council, as well as the
fact that the scope of implementation envisaged in the draft was
basically the same as in the previous resolutions adopted by consensus,
Viet Nam would vote in favour of it.
He said favourable
conditions must be created, however, for the peaceful solution of the
Iran nuclear issue, including cessation of hostile policies against
Iran, assurance of Iran’s legitimate security interests and respect for
the right of Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the
adherence by all States in the region to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
would be positive steps in that direction. While hailing new progress
in cooperation between Iran and IAEA, he
hoped that Iran’s efforts would be positively matched in the coming
period.
MARTY M.
NATALEGAWA ( Indonesia) underscored
the imperative to find a peaceful solution to any question related to
nuclear non-proliferation, one that was guided by the need to protect
the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indonesia had full
confidence in IAEA’s credibility and had
been guided by its latest report in determining the right course of
action. He appreciated Iran’s efforts for greater cooperation, which
had allowed the Agency to continue to verify the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material. Iran had provided IAEA
with access to declared nuclear material, as well as required nuclear
material accountancy reports in that connection.
He
noted that the Agency had considered that all remaining outstanding
issues contained in the work plan, with the exception of one, had been
resolved. The report stated that Iran had not suspended its
enrichment-related activities, had begun developing new generation
centrifuges and had continued its construction of the IR-40 reactor of
heavy water production. For the remaining one issue, namely alleged
weaponization studies, the report noted that
the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material. However, it
also stated that it was “not yet in a position to determine the full
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”. It was important to note that
progress had been made in resolving the outstanding issues.
Noting the
“well-calibrated nature” of the report, which depicted well the
complexity of the issue, he said that Indonesia had expected that the
draft resolution would reflect those complex dynamics and mixed
findings. In that context, he noted that the additional sanctions had
been described as “incremental” and that the Council would suspend
implementation if Iran curtailed all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities.
“Essentially, we are not
convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and
reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s
nuclear programme,” he said, wondering whether more sanctions at this
juncture constituted “the most sensible approach”. Instead, he believed
the lack of confidence and trust was at the heart of the matter.
He said he expected Iran
to continue to engage actively with the Agency to build confidence about
its programme. The Iran dossier was referred to the Council to
encourage the country to resolve outstanding verification issues, and
while work was ongoing, progress had been made. Suspension of
enrichment-related activities was not an end in itself, isolated from
developments in Iran’s cooperation with IAEA.
There was often a vicious
cycle, with no guarantee given to non-nuclear-weapon States regarding
the security of supply of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful
purposes; they were prone to suspicion, he said. To end that cycle, it
was imperative to move forward in a constructive manner and renew the
initiative to establish a multilateral arrangement to guarantee the
security of supply of nuclear technology and material. That would
provide assurance to Iran and end existing suspicions. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty should be pursued in a balanced and
non-discriminatory manner.
It was important to
recognize that conditions today were different than on the eve of
adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), he said. Iran was cooperating with
IAEA and, at the present juncture, more
sanctions were not the best course. For that reason, Indonesia would
abstain in today’s vote.
Action
The
Council then voted on the draft resolution, which was adopted by a vote
of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention ( Indonesia) as
resolution 1803 (2008).
Statements
JOHN
SAWERS (
United Kingdom), reading a
statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany,
Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States, with support
of the High Representative of the European Union, said that the Security
Council today adopted resolution 1803 (2008) reflecting the
international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the
proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme. It was the third
time the Council had sent a strong message of international resolve to
Iran by adopting a sanctions resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII
of the Charter. “We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its
United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (
IAEA)
Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related
activities,” he said.
He noted progress made in
implementing the IAEA-Iran work plan, but
also the Agency’s serious concerns about the “alleged studies”, which
were critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to the
country’s nuclear programme. He called upon Iran to heed the
requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension of
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
He said he remained
committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue,
and reaffirmed the countries’ commitment to a dual-track approach.
Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered “substantial
opportunities” for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and
the region, and he urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a
negotiated way forward.
Reiterating the countries’
recognition of Iran’s right to develop, research, produce and use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he reconfirmed that, once the
international community’s confidence in the “exclusively peaceful
nature” of Iran’s nuclear programme was restored, Iran would be treated
in the same manner as any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
He said the countries
remained ready to negotiate future arrangements, modalities and timing
in that respect, once the conditions had been established. As that
would require further diplomatic efforts, the European Union’s High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana,
had been asked to meet with Saeed
Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National
Security Council, to address concerns of both sides.
Speaking in his national
capacity, he said his Government welcomed the “very broad support” for
the Council’s resolution. Its adoption underlined the global
community’s profound concern that Iran might be intending to use its
nuclear programme for military purposes. “The United Kingdom does not
have confidence that Iran’s programme is for exclusively peaceful
purposes,” he said.
The
resolution was a necessary response to Iran’s failure to comply with
IAEA Board requirements, including
suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activity and work
on all heavy-water-related projects, resolution of all outstanding
questions and implementation and ratification of the Additional
Protocol. Iran’s progress with IAEA
addressed only one of those issues. Iran had refused to answer the
most difficult questions about its past programmes. Overall, Iran had
clearly failed to abide by its legal obligations under successive
Security Council resolutions.
The political statement
agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the “E3+3”, with support of the
European Union High Representative, had made clear the commitment to a
negotiated solution on the basis of far-reaching proposals to which the
six countries had agreed in June 2006, he said. “Our offer would give
Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power
programme, including legally guaranteed supplies of nuclear fuel.” He
regretted that Iran had ignored the offer. Iran’s failure to do what was
required, as stated by IAEA, had left no
other option but to seek further measures in the Council.
He said those measures
strengthened restrictions on individuals and entities associated with
Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and ballistic missile
programme, increased vigilance over the activities of Iranian banks,
introduced a provision for careful scrutiny of new commitments for
export credits to Iran and encouraged States to inspect cargo to and
from Iran. By adopting the text, the Council had continued its
“incremental and proportionate approach”. His Government urged Iran’s
leaders to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
and cooperate fully with IAEA. With the new
resolution, the Council was reaffirming the clear choice confronting
Iran’s leaders: to cooperate with the global community or pursue their
nuclear programme in disregard of international concerns. He hoped they
would take the positive path.
JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX ( France) saluted the almost unanimous
adoption of the resolution as a clear and firm message. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty had established a regime based on trust and
confidence. Iran had concealed an underground nuclear programme.
While enrichment was going on, Iran was working on techniques that could
be used to develop nuclear weapons. Iran was also actively developing
long-range missiles. Given that situation, the international
community’s request to restore confidence was understandable. Iran must
suspend proliferation-sensitive activities and cooperate with
IAEA. That was not a matter of refusing
Iran the right to develop nuclear energy. The Director General had
concluded that IAEA could not take a stand
on the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear programme.
He
said there was no choice but to adopt sanctions against the country.
Describing the measures in the current resolution, he said the approach
was not punitive. The priority was to find a diplomatic solution. The
Council would suspend the measures as soon as Iran fully respected its
obligations. Iran had been offered a proposal for cooperation dealing
with political, economic and nuclear cooperation, as a way of extending
a hand to the Iranian people. He hoped that proposal would be accepted.
ZALMAY KHALILZAD ( United States)
said that, instead of suspending its enrichment and reprocessing
activities, as required by the Council, Iran had chosen to dramatically
expand its number of operating centrifuges and to develop and test a new
generation of centrifuges. It continued the construction of its
heavy-water research reactor at Arak and it still had not implemented
the Additional Protocol. Once again, the Council had had no choice but
to act. “At stake is the security of a vital region of the world and
the credibility of the Security Council and the International Atomic
Energy Agency as they seek to hold Iran to its nuclear non-proliferation
commitments.” The latest IAEA report had
stated that Iran had not met its obligation to fully disclose its past
nuclear weapons programme.
He
said that, on the core issue of whether Iran’s nuclear programme was
strictly peaceful, the report had not shown serious progress.
IAEA had presented Iran with documents
detailing Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear warhead and other possible
undeclared activities with nuclear material. Iran had dismissed those
documents as “baseless and fabricated”. IAEA,
however, did not share that conclusion. “Instead of slogans and
obfuscations, the international community needs answers from Iran.” The
international community must be able to believe Iran’s declaration that
its nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes.
Iranian leaders, as a
first step, must cease enrichment and reprocessing activities and make a
full disclosure of all of its weapons-related work, he said. Iran had
not fully implemented the Additional Protocol, which
IAEA required in order to determine what
other undeclared nuclear activities were taking place. He asked, in
that regard, why Iranian leaders were not fully implementing the
additional safeguards and what it was hiding. If Iran wanted the world
to believe that its nuclear programme was peaceful, that programme must
be transparent with IAEA inspectors and Iran
must implement the Additional Protocol, as repeatedly called for by the
Council and IAEA.
He said the United States
recognized Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. The five permanent members of the Council and Germany had
offered to help Iran develop civil nuclear power, and the Russian
Federation had supplied fuel for Iran’s nuclear power plan in
Bushehr. That had exposed Iran’s false
claim that it needed to enrich uranium for civil nuclear power.
Seventeen countries generating nuclear power purchased their fuel on
the international market, rather than enrich uranium themselves. Iran
should follow the example of other States that had abandoned nuclear
weapons programmes, two of them now sitting on the Council, namely South
Africa and Libya.
The international
community had good reason to be concerned about Iran’s activities, as
the present regime armed with nuclear weapons would pose a greater
potential danger to the region and to the world, he warned. Iran had
been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon, the
Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan. The President of Iran had
embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the United
Nations. The ministerial statement agreed to by the “P5+1” showed a
commitment to a diplomatic solution. “It gives us not pleasure, but
regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution. But our vote
today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate
their international obligations.” He hoped Iran would engage in
constructive negotiations over the future of its nuclear programme.
Such negotiations, if successful, would have profound benefits for Iran
and the Iranian people.
WANG
GUANGYA ( China) said today’s resolution was the Security
Council’s fourth on the Iranian nuclear issue since July 2006. It
reflected international concern at, and expectations of all parties
regarding an early settlement through diplomatic negotiations of, the
Iranian nuclear issue. Developments vis-à-vis the Iranian issue had
been mixed. On one hand, the Director General’s latest report suggested
that the Agency could verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear
material in Iran and had no concrete information about possible
undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran had clarified such
outstanding issues as uranium contamination and polonium experiments,
and had provided information similar to that which it had provided
previously, pursuant to the Additional Protocol.
He said his country
welcomed the cooperation between Iran and IAEA,
but the report had also stated that Iran had not suspended its
enrichment activities, as required by Security Council resolutions, and
it had started development of centrifuges. As the impasse had not been
broken, the international community was calling for more diplomatic
efforts, and hoped that parties could bring the issue back on the track
of settlement.
Against that backdrop, the
Council’s resolution was not aimed at punishing Iran; rather urging its
return to the negotiating table, he said. The sanctions were not
targeted at the Iranian people, and would not affect Iran’s normal
economic and financial activities with other countries. Indeed, the
measures were reversible: if Iran complied with the Security Council and
IAEA resolutions, the sanctions would be
suspended or terminated.
He reiterated that
sanctions could not resolve issues; they could only promote
negotiations. Indeed, the best approach was through diplomatic
negotiating. All parties should adopt a highly responsible attitude,
and he further urged flexibility and sincerity in resuming talks.
Efforts to seek a solution should assure Iran’s right to the peaceful
use of nuclear energy and to address international nuclear
non-proliferation concerns. Iran should fully comply with
IAEA and Security Council resolutions, as
soon as possible.
Noting that the six
Foreign Ministers had expressed their readiness to increase diplomatic
efforts to vigorously facilitate the resumption of negotiations, he said
China hoped that all would engage in closer contact on the basis of
mutual respect, including for each others’ concerns, and increased
mutual trust, and seek an approach that was acceptable to all. His
Government was ready to work with all parties to settle the Iranian
nuclear issue.
JORGE
URBINA ORTEGA ( Costa Rica) said he could not accept that
the representative of Iran had stated that the Council had acted on the
instigation of some countries. There were still areas of non-compliance
by Iran with Council resolutions.
The strategic approach to
preventing proliferation was based on the willingness of States that
lacked nuclear weapons not to acquire them, and the decision of the
nuclear-weapon States to gradually reduce their arsenals, he said.
However, some countries that were not party to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty had developed nuclear weapons programmes with total impunity.
Real progress in disarmament required that, not only horizontal
proliferation had to be stopped, but also vertical proliferation,
meaning that the continuous development of new technologies should also
be halted.
He could not endorse the
behaviour of some States that demanded that others comply with their
obligations stemming from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, while disregarding some of their
own responsibilities. There was very little incentive for
non-proliferation in an international environment in which there was
feeble progress in disarmament and weak guarantees that the existing
nuclear weapons would not be utilized.
There was a need for a
transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear
disarmament and to create a virtuous circle where progress in
disarmament and non-proliferation could mutually reinforce one another,
he said. His country respected the right of every State to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, but considered that right to be contingent
on the fulfilment of all international obligations on the matter. The
right to enrich uranium was a legitimate activity if its scope and
objectives were subjected to complete international supervision through
absolutely transparent processes. “We believe this is still not the
case of the Iranian nuclear programme, and for this reason, we are
obligated to support the resolution that we are voting on today,” he
said.
The situation in Gaza was
a different matter, he said. He expressed concern at the humanitarian
situation in the region and had condemned attacks on Israel. His
country had also criticized non-action by the Council.
MICHEL
KAFANDO (
Burkina Faso) said
his country, since the start of consideration of the Iranian question,
had registered its reservations about considering a resolution prior to
the issuance of the
IAEA report on Iran’s
nuclear programme, as it recognized any country’s right to achieve
nuclear energy for civilian purposes. Burkina Faso had examined the
IAEA report and noted the absence of full
cooperation on the part of Iran, as well as the fact that
IAEA could not determine the exact nature of
the Iranian nuclear programme.
He stressed that all
States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must fully disclose their
information, and that view was further supported by the report’s
description of uranium enrichment activities and the development of new
centrifuges. He had also noted the report’s statement on the refusal of
Iran to implement the Additional Protocol. For those reasons -- and to
encourage Iran’s full cooperation with IAEA,
notably by providing specific information on its nuclear programme -–
Burkina Faso had voted in favour of the resolution.
The objective of the
additional measures was not to choke Iran or to create prejudice; it was
simply to encourage Iran’s cooperation with the Agency and the
transparency of its programme, he explained. He urged that dialogue
continue to persuade Iran that it was in its interest to subscribe to
the safeguards system. In that spirit, he approved the statement made
by the Foreign Ministers of the six countries, which expressed a desire
for increased dialogue with Iran. He was convinced that, only through
negotiations would the Iranian issue be resolved.
JOHAN
VERBEKE ( Belgium) said he had voted in favour of the
resolution and welcomed its adoption by a large majority. He regretted
that Iran was still not in compliance with Council resolutions aimed at
suspension of uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects. The
22 February IAEA report had concluded that
the Director General was not in a position to provide guarantees
regarding non-declared material and the peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme. The new resolution was part of a gradual approach
aimed at urging Iranian authorities to adopt a more cooperative and
transparent position. The resolution also made clear that the path of
good faith negotiations remained open to Iran.
ALFREDO
SUESCUM ( Panama) said he regretted
that, once again, sanctions had to be imposed on Iran. The necessity of
applying coercive measures reflected a failure of diplomacy on the part
of all parties. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran
must adhere to restrictions related to development and proliferation of
nuclear weapons, but had the right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, including enrichment. That right, however, involved
important obligations, including the open and transparent inspection by
IAEA.
He
said that, according to its last report,
IAEA
could not provide guarantees on the absence of non-declared materials
and was still not in a position to determine the nature of the
uranium-enrichment programme. Until there was clarity on the current
scope of the nuclear programme, Iran had not fully complied with its
obligations. Although the Council had required that Iran suspend
enrichment activities, it had not done so, according to the
IAEA report, and, therefore, was not
complying with Council resolutions. For those reasons, Panama had voted
in favour of the resolution, but hoped that the situation could be
solved promptly.
NEVEN JURICA (
Croatia) said his country, as an active member of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the IAEA Board, attached
importance to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
fully shared the concerns of the wider international community. Every
State had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but it
was also important to abide by international obligations. While the
report’s findings were satisfactory, they did not paint an overall
positive picture, as they pointed to Iran’s avoidance of key questions.
Iran’s failure to provide a clear response left questions about the
exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
He noted that
IAEA had also pointed to possible military
dimensions to the programme and to provisions of resolution 1747 (2007)
that had not been implemented. Further, Iran had not suspended its
enrichment-related activities. In light of that, Croatia had voted in
favour of the resolution. Following that, his Government welcomed the
commitment of the six Foreign Ministers to continue with all diplomatic
efforts to resolve the issues.
Council President VITALY
I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation), speaking in his national
capacity, said his Government had supported the resolution and was
pleased that the work of the six Foreign Ministers had brought the
Council to a text that was balanced and met the tasks at hand. Indeed,
the resolution was a political signal to Iran on the need for
cooperation, on the basis of implementing recommendations. It was
important for the six countries now to develop proposals for further
talks, from which Iran and the region could benefit. The Council
recognized Iran’s rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Once
confidence was restored, Iran would be treated in the same manner as any
other Treaty party.
He
said today’s decision, similar to those in resolutions 1747 (2007) and
1737 (2006), was taken under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter
and called for no use of force whatsoever. Effective solution of the
problem could be found only in the political and diplomatic sphere. His
Government favoured a “fresh approach” and was prepared to facilitate
talks to settle pending issues. Hopefully, Iran would analyse today’s
statements and choose to meet the requirements of both the Council and
IAEA, and help to launch negotiations. The
six countries must also be willing to engage in constructive cooperation
with Iran.